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SURVEY
Choosing Fairness over Fundamentals: How Bailey v. North
Carolina Undermines the Constitutional Prohibition Against
the State Contracting Away Its Power of Taxation
For approximately two hundred years, state governments have
used tax exemptions as an integral tool in formulating public policy.'
And for two hundred years, the United States Supreme Court has
protected contracts creating permanent tax exemptions from
impairment by later state actions.2 The judicial system's protection of
state-created contracts for tax exemptions is rooted in the notion of
fairness.3 Allowing a state to withdraw unilaterally from a contract
for a tax exemption after a private party has relied on that exemption
is simply unfair.4  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a
state's failure to honor a contractual obligation promising a
permanent tax exemption is a violation of the Contracts Clause of the
United States Constitution.5
This judicial protection and its resulting limitation on a state's
ability to change tax policies have led many states to adopt
constitutional provisions designed to prevent their legislatures from
1. See Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative
Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis. L. REv.
1301, 1317 (1991) (noting that in the early nineteenth century, as state legislatures
chartered private corporations, the charters commonly included tax exemptions as a
means for hiding government subsidies and affording preferences to some taxpayers).
2. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977)
(affirming that the United States Constitution prevents states from impairing contracts for
tax exemptions); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 166-67 (1812) (recognizing
for the first time, that states can create contracts for permanent tax exemptions that are
protected from impairment by the Constitution).
3. See Bailey v. North Carolina, 348 N.C. 130, 149, 500 S.E.2d 54, 65 (1998) (holding
that "[tjhe basis for prohibiting such action is fundamental fairness").
4. See Plaintiff-Appellees' Brief at 64, Bailey (No. 53PA96) (highlighting the
unfairness that would be created if the state is not bound to honor contracts for tax
exemptions where thousands of state employees have fulfilled their part of the agreement
by giving "the State a lifetime of work, loyal service, and monetary considerations").
5. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts ... ."). See, e.g., United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23-24; Murray
v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 448-49 (1877); Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall)
439, 440 (1869); State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 384 (1853); Wilson,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 166-67.
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creating permanent tax exemptions in the first place.6 Some of these
provisions include language stating that "the power of taxation ...
shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away."' 7 Under
such constitutional provisions, states can still create tax exemptions,
but such exemptions are merely statements of policy and are subject
to repealY The purpose of these constitutional provisions is to ensure
that state lawmakers maintain maximum flexibility to revise tax
policies in order to meet changing economic conditionsf For these
very reasons, the North Carolina General Assembly drafted Article
V, section 2(1) to limit the state's ability to contract away its power of
taxation.1
Inevitably, courts must decide how to mesh these constitutional
provisions with the long-standing judicial tradition of recognizing and
protecting state-created contracts for tax exemptions. Most state
supreme courts that have addressed this issue have ruled that these
constitutional provisions prevent the creation of permanent tax
exemptions." In the recent case Bailey v. North Carolina,1' however,
the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted a very different
approach. The supreme court interpreted Article V, section 2(1) of
6. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("The power of taxation shall never be
surrendered, suspended, or contracted away."); GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(1) ("The state
may not suspend or irrevocably give, grant, limit, or restrain the right of taxation and all
laws, grants, contracts, and other acts to effect any of these purposes are null and void.");
ME. CONST. art. 9, § 9 ("The Legislature shall never, in any manner, suspend or surrender
the power of taxation."); MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("The power of taxation shall never
be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away."); N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) ("The power
of taxation.., shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.").
7. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1).
& See, e.g., Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762, 765-66
(Mont. 1993) (holding that because the state constitution prohibits the state from creating
contracts for permanent tax exemptions, the tax exemption in question is simply a
statement of current policy that may be repealed).
9. See Switzer v. City of Phoenix, 341 P.2d 427, 431 (Ariz. 1959) (stating that a
constitutional provision prohibiting the state from contracting away its power of taxation
"was designed to leave legislators unencumbered in so far as their power to impose
taxes").
10. See infra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Switzer, 341 P.2d at 431 (holding that an Arizona constitutional provision
prohibiting the legislature from surrendering, suspending, or contracting away its taxation
power left the legislature unencumbered in -its ability to impose taxes); Parrish v.
Employees' Retirement Sys., 398 S.E.2d 353, 355 (Ga. 1990) (holding that the Georgia
Constitution prevents the creation of "irrevocable" tax exemptions); Blair v. State Tax
Assessor, 485 A.2d 957, 960 (Me. 1984) (ruling that the Maine Constitution prevents the
legislature from granting state retirees permanent tax exemptions); Sheehy, 864 P.2d at
766 (ruling that the Montana Constitution barred the state from granting permanent tax
exemptions on state employee retirement benefits).
12. 348 N.C. 130,500 S.E.2d 54 (1998).
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the North Carolina Constitution13 to allow the state to contract for
permanent tax exemptions, thus re-asserting the judicial emphasis on
fairness at the expense of state fiscal flexibility. 4
This Note discusses the facts of Bailey, its history in the lower
courts, and the North Carolina Supreme Court's unique resolution of
the constitutional issue presented by the case." The Note then
examines the relevant United States Supreme Court cases concerning
the impairment of contracts for tax exemptions. 6 Next, the Note
analyzes the history and intent behind the adoption of Article V,
section 2(1). 17 The Note then examines other state supreme court
cases interpreting similar constitutional provisions."8 Next, the Note
analyzes the three key aspects behind the North Carolina court's
constitutional interpretation: its focus on fairness; its structural and
intent-based analysis; and its selective use of United States Supreme
Court precedent. 19 Finally, the Note discusses the Bailey decision's
potential impact on North Carolina public policy and concludes that
the court based its approach more on concepts of fairness than on
sound constitutional interpretation.'
The relevant facts in Bailey arise from a series of legislative and
judicial decisions at both the state and federal levels. Beginning in
1939, the North Carolina General Assembly established a variety of
retirement programs to benefit North Carolina state and local
government employees.2? ' For fifty years, the state granted tax
13. The full text of Article V, section 2(1) reads "Power of taxation. The power of
taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes only, and
shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted away." N.C. CONsT. art. V, § 2(1).
14. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148, 500 S.E.2d at 64. The lack of fiscal flexibility was
immediately felt by the State of North Carolina as the court's decision left the General
Assembly with the difficult task of balancing the state budget while paying hundreds of
millions of dollars in tax refunds to state retirees. See Wade Rawlins, Budget Picture 'A
Matter of Semantics,' NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 29, 1999, at A13. The
ultimate impact of the Bailey decision on the finances of state government was enormous.
In the end, the state was required to refund $799 million in unconstitutionally collected
taxes to state and local retirees. See Telephone Interview with North Carolina
Representative Gregg Thompson, member of the North Carolina House of
Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee for General Government (Apr. 13, 1999)
(transcript on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In addition, fiscal analysts
project that the loss of tax revenue from state and local retirees will amount to
approximately $125 million annually. See id.
15. See infra notes 21-67 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 68-95 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
1& See infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 130-83 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.
21. See Act of Apr. 4, 1939, ch. 390, §§ 2, 11, 1939 N.C. Sess. Laws 837, 839, 856
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exemptions on benefits paid to state and local government retirees.22
In 1989, however, the United States Supreme Court in Davis v.
Michigan Department of the TreasuryP held unconstitutional state
taxation schemes that treated federal employees differently from
state and local employees. 4 Under the Davis ruling, North Carolina
discovered that it had unconstitutionally benefited state employees
for fifty years because its tax exemptions had not included federal
employees.l
In response to the Court's decision, the North Carolina General
Assembly changed the tax exemption on retirement benefits in two
important ways.26 First, the legislation expanded the tax exemption to
include federal government employees. 27  Second, and most
important for the Bailey decision, the legislation capped the state and
federal annual benefits exempted from state taxation at $4000 per
person.' As a result, North Carolina taxed state and local employee
retirement benefits for the first time.
Following the partial removal of the tax exemption on retirement
benefits, state and local government retirees filed a lawsuit claiming
that the General Assembly's action was an unconstitutional
impairment of contract.29 The retirees' initial complaint, however,
was rejected on procedural grounds because the plaintiffs failed to
comply with the state's statutorily prescribed procedure for protesting
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 128-22, 128-31 (1999)) (creating the Local
Government Employees' Retirement System and exempting its retirement benefits from
state and local taxation). By 1989, when the General Assembly enacted the tax legislation
in dispute in Bailey, there were a variety of different statutory retirement systems
providing benefits to former state and local employees. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-
22 (1999) (creating the Local Government Employees' Retirement System in 1939); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 135-50 to -76 (1997) (creating the Consolidated Judicial Retirement System
in 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-4.9 (1994) (creating the Legislative Retirement System in
1983).
22. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 138,500 S.E.2d at 58; Act of Apr. 4,1939, § 11 (creating the
Local Government Employees' Retirement System and exempting its benefits from state
and local taxation).
23. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
24. See iL at 817.
25. See id. (holding that differentiated taxation'between state and federal government
employees violates both the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
and federal statutory law).
26. See Act of Aug. 12, 1989, ch. 792, sec. 1.1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 2891, 2891 (1989)
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134.6(b) (1997)) (amending the exemption
so as to include all governmental employees and creating a cap on the amount of
employee benefits exempted from state taxation); Bailey, 348 N.C. at 139,500 S.E.2d at 59.
27. See Act of Aug. 12, 1989, sec. 1.1.
28. See id
29. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 135,500 S.E.2d at 56-57.
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taxes.30 The court held that compliance with the protest and demand
requirements of the statute was the exclusive method for challenging
unconstitutional or invalid income taxes in North Carolina.3 1 As a
result of this procedural setback, the plaintiffs were forced to wait
more than six years before the North Carolina Supreme Court
decided their case on the merits.32
The retirees filed suit a second time using only named plaintiffs
who had followed the requisite statutory protest requirements. In
1994, the trial court certified the lawsuit as a class action.' Following
a two-week trial in September 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of
the plaintiff-retirees. 35 Essential to the trial court's decision was its
determination that the 1989 legislation partially repealing the tax
exemption on state and local government employee retirement
benefits was an unconstitutional impairment of contract under the
United States Constitution 6  The State appealed the trial court's
decision directly to the North Carolina Supreme Court.37
The central issue in Bailey was whether the plaintiffs had a
contractual right to a tax exemption that was unconstitutionally
30. See Bailey v. North Carolina ("Bailey I"), 330 N.C. 227, 235, 412 S.E.2d 295, 300
(1991) ("When a tax is challenged as unlawful ... the appropriate remedy is to bring suit
under [N.C. GEN. STAT.] § 105-267."). Under section 105-267 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, a taxpayer with a valid defense to the enforcement of a tax must first
pay the tax and then demand a refund in writing within 30 days. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-267 (1997 & 1999 Supp.). Only if the Secretary of Revenue refuses to refund the tax
within 90 days may the taxpayer sue to recover the amount paid. See id. The plaintiffs in
this case failed to follow these procedures. First, the plaintiffs filed their complaint
seeking refunds prior to sending demand letters to the Secretary of Revenue, thus failing
to meet the condition precedent for relief outlined in the statute. See Bailey I, 330 N.C. at
237, 412 S.E.2d at 301. Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient information
about each claimant so that the Department of Revenue could determine if that person
had properly filed a protest and was thus eligible for a refund. See id. at 237-38, 412 S.E.2d
at 301-02.
31. See id. at 235,412 S.E.2d at 300.
32. The first Bailey decision was handed down in December 1991, and the court did
not decide the merits of the case until May 1998. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 131,500 S.E.2d at
54; Bailey 1, 330 N.C. at 229,412 S.E.2d at 296.
33. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 135,500 S.E.2d at 57.
34. See id The certified class included state and local government retirees and
beneficiaries who had complied with the statutory protest requirements for the tax years
1989, 1990, and 1991. See id.
35. See id. at 135, 500 S.E.2d at 56-57.
36. See id. at 135,500 S.E.2d at 57. The trial court also found that the legislation was a
material breach of contract and an unconstitutional retroactive tax, and that it violated
judges' state constitutional rights not to have their salaries diminished during office as well
as other state and federal constitutional provisions. See id.
37. See id. at 136, 500 S.E.2d at 57. The North Carolina Supreme Court designated
the case as "exceptional" and granted discretionary review, thereby bypassing the North
Carolina Court of Appeals. See id.
1999] 2221
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impaired by the State of North Carolina.38 The court used criteria set
forth by the United States Supreme Court to analyze whether the
General Assembly's partial repeal of the exemption violated the
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution.39  The key
question under this analysis was whether an enforceable contract was
created between the plaintiffs and the State by virtue of the original
legislation exempting state employee retirement benefits from
taxation.4°
The State argued that Article V, section 2(1) of the North
Carolina Constitution, which provides that "the power of taxation ...
shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away,141
prevented the state from contracting with state employees for a
permanent tax exemption on their retirement benefits.42 The State
posited that, given this constitutional prohibition, the General
Assembly never intended to confer contractual rights on state
employees.43 Though the North Carolina Constitution allows the
state to create tax exemptions,44 the State argued that Article V,
section 2(1) prohibits the state from making such exemptions
permanent4 5 Given this constitutional restriction, the state asserted
that the legislation exempting retirement benefits from state taxation
should be construed as a statement of state policy that the General
Assembly could change at any time, rather than the creation of
permanent contract rights.46 The North Carolina Supreme Court
3M See id. at 140,500 S.E.2d at 59-60.
39. See id. at 141, 500 S.E.2d at 60. The Supreme Court established a three-part test
in United States Trust that "requires a court to ascertain: (1) whether a contractual
obligation is present; (2) whether the state's actions impaired that contract; and (3)
whether the impairment was reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose." United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977). The
plaintiffs' constitutional challenge relied on the Contracts Clause of the United States
Constitution, which provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
40. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 141, 500 S.E.2d at 60; Act of Apr. 4, 1939, ch. 390, §§ 2, 11,
1939 N.C. Public Laws 837, 839, 856 (creating the Local Government Employees'
Retirement System). Section 11 of the legislation upon which the plaintiff-retirees'
contractual claim is based states in pertinent part that the retirement benefits created by
the Act are "exempt from any state or municipal tax." Act of Apr. 4,1939, § 11.
41. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1).
42. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 147,500 S.E.2d at 64.
43. See Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 45, Bailey (No. 53PA96).
44. See N.C. CoNsr. art. V, § 2(6) ("there shall be allowed... exemptions").
45. See Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 45, Bailey (No. 53PA96) (arguing that the
General Assembly could not have intended to make the tax exemptions contractual, and
therefore permanent, because doing so would have been unconstitutional).
46. See id. at 51-52; cf. Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762,765
(Mont. 1993) (holding that a similar constitutional provision prevented the State of
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rejected the State's argument on both equitable and substantive
grounds.47
The court first rejected the State's interpretation of Article V,
section 2(1) based on what the court viewed as the unfairness that
would result from the State's position. 8 The court noted that, as a
general rule, a party cannot accept benefits conferred under a statute
and then question the constitutionality of that statute in order to
avoid its burdens.49  The court pointed out that the State had
benefited from the tax exemption on retirement payments for many
years by using it as an inducement for individuals to enter and remain
in government employment5 0 The court ruled that after such a long
history of accepting the. benefits of the tax exemption, the State could
not escape its responsibilities under the agreement.5'
In assessing the unfairness of the State's constitutional argument,
the supreme court interpreted Article V, section 2(1) as allowing the
State to make permanent contracts* for tax exemptions without
running afoul of the North Carolina Constitution.5 The court's
narrow interpretation of Article V, section 2(1) stemmed in part from
its reading of other subsections of section 2 that allowed the State to
create tax exemptions.53 The court focused its analysis on Article V,
section 2(6), which provides "there shall be allowed personal
exemptions and deductions so that only net incomes are taxed," and
Article V, section 2(3), which deals exclusively with property taxes
and establishes that "[n]o taxing authority other than the General
Assembly may grant exemptions. '54 The court reasoned that, given
these subsections, a tax exemption does not constitute the
relinquishment of the state's taxation power.55 In its opinion,
however, the court failed to address the State's argument that Article
V, section 2(1) allowed the state to grant tax exemptions, but
prohibited the state from making such exemptions permanent. To
Montana from entering into a permanent contract for a tax exemption). In Sheehy, the
court held that given this limitation, all tax exemptions provided by the state legislature
simply reflected current state policy and were repealable at any time. 864 P.2d at 765.
47. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 147-50,500 S.E.2d at 64-66.
48. See iL at 147,500 S.E.2d at 64.
49. See id
50. See id. at 150, 500 S.E.2d at 65.
51. See id. at 150, 500 S.E.2d at 65-66.
52. See id. at 148,500 S.E.2d at 64.
53. See id.
54. N.C: CONST. art. V, §§ 2(3), 2(6).
55. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148, 500 S.E.2d at 64. The court, however, did not address
the State's argument that the constitution allows only temporary, not permanent, tax
exemptions. See Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 45, Bailey (No. 53PA96).
22231999]
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bolster its interpretation, the court noted that Article V, section 2(7)
allows the State to enter into contracts for public purposes. 6 The
court stated that the interplay of these other subsections precluded it
from reading Article V, section 2(1) in isolation. 7 Instead, the court
held that, when all sections are read in combination, the North
Carolina Constitution allows the State to enter into contracts for tax
exemptions without contracting away the power of taxation as long as
the contract is for a public purpose.
Following its rejection of the State's constitutional argument, the
North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the State formed a
contractual relationship with its employees vested in the state
retirement system. 9 The court based its decision on the premise that
retirement benefits are currently earned but deferred compensation
to which employees had a vested contractual right.6 The court then
determined that this contract was unconstitutionally impaired by the
General Assembly's repeal of the tax exemption on retirement
benefits, and that plaintiffs were thus entitled to relief. 61
The supreme court's final task was to determine to whom the
State owed tax refunds. 2 Following on the heels of its pro-taxpayer
interpretation of Article V, section 2(1), the court ruled that the State
56. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148, 500 S.E.2d at 64. Article V, section 2(7) provides that
the "State ... may contract with ... any person ... for the accomplishment of public
purposes only." N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(7).
57. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148,500 S.E.2d at 64.
58. See id. The court supported its interpretive conclusion with an illustration of the
impact that would result if the court interpreted Article V, section 2(1) differently. See id.*
at 149, 500 S.E.2d at 65. The court analogized the State's contract with state employees to
the State's issuance of tax-exempt municipal bonds. See id. The court suggested that if
Article V, section 2(1) invalidated the State's contract in Bailey, then the State could also
"issu[e] tax-free bonds, collec[t] hundreds of millions of dollars for their purchase, and
then retrospectively repea[l] investors' tax-free interest and capital gain advantages." Id.
at 149, 500 S.E.2d at 65.
59. See Bailey, 500 S.E.2d at 61. This portion of the opinion does not appear in the
North Carolina reporter. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 141.
60. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 141, 500 S.E.2d at 60 (citing Simpson v. North Carolina
Local Gov't Employees' Retirement Sys., 88 N.C. App. 218, 223-24, 363 S.E.2d 90, 94
(1987)). After determining that a contractual obligation existed, the court determined that
the State had impaired this contract by capping the amount of retirement benefits
exempted from taxation. See id. at 151, 500 S.E.2d at 66. The court went on to rule that
the impairment of the contract was neither necessary nor reasonable to serve an important
public purpose. See id. at 151, 500 S.E.2d at 66-67 (holding that the State was not forced to
cap the tax exemptions of state retirees following the Supreme Court's decision in Davis,
but could have instead met its legal obligation to tax federal and state employees equally
by extending full tax exemption to federal employees).
61. See id. at 153, 500 S.E.2d at 67 (holding that the State had unconstitutionally
impaired the contractual rights of state and local retirees).
62. See id. at 163, 500 S.E.2d at 73.
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owed refunds to all retirees unconstitutionally taxed, not simply those
who followed the statutorily prescribed protest procedures. 63 This
reversal of earlier precedent, including the court's decision in Bailey I,
was opposed by two members of the court.' In addition, the reversal
provoked widespread media coverage of the Bailey decision because
it substantially increased the amount of money the State was forced
to refund.6
The court's interpretation of Article V, section 2(1) of the North
Carolina Constitution is likely to have similarly important, though
more subtle, effects on North Carolina public policy. Although not so
widely publicized at the time, the Bailey decision was the first explicit
supreme court interpretation of Article V, section 2(1)'s prohibition
on the state contracting away its power of taxation.66 Interestingly,
63. See id. at 166, 500 S.E.2d at 75. The court based its decision on what it perceived
as the underlying purpose of the statutory protest requirements. See id. The court found
that section 105-267 of the North Carolina General Statutes was simply a procedural
requirement designed to give the State notice of potential liabilities and allow it to budget
accordingly. See id. The court held that once the plaintiffs followed the procedural
requirements of section 105-267 and the court decided the case on its merits, the state
could not use the statute to prevent those taxpayers that did not follow the statutory
"protest" procedures from recovering refunds from the State. See id.
64. See id. at 167-68, 500 S.E.2d at 76-77 (Webb, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 167, 500 S.E.2d at 76 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Webb argued that the court should not overturn contrary precedent by focusing on
the purpose of the statute, but should instead follow the plain meaning of the statute and
limit refunds to those taxpayers paying under protest. See iL at 167-68, 500 S.E.2d at 76-
77 (Webb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. See Rawlins, supra note 14, at A13 (discussing how the Bailey decision and its
multi-million dollar, court-ordered refund to retirees contributed to "one of the toughest
fiscal squeezes in a decade" for lawmakers attempting to craft a two-year state budget);
Early Look at Budget Exposes Problems: North Carolina Might Be Facing a $900 Million
Shortfall, NENWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), December 30, 1998, at B2D (noting that
the Bailey decision would cost the state $400 million and could lead to a budget shortfall).
The court's statutory interpretation of section 105-267 of the North Carolina General
Statutes was an extremely important aspect of the Bailey decision because of its enormous
impact on the state budget. See Rawlins, supra note 14, at A13. The broad fiscal
implications of the court's statutory interpretation have already been felt in a subsequent
lawsuit against the state. See Smith v. State, 349 N.C. 332, 341, 507 S.E.2d 28, 33 (1998)
(holding that the State of North Carolina owed hundreds of millions of dollars in
additional refunds to all state taxpayers who paid unconstitutional intangibles taxes).
Unfortunately, the necessarily limited scope of this Note does not allow for a more in-
depth analysis of this important statutory interpretation. Instead, the analysis of this Note
focuses on the court's equally important, though less publicized, constitutional
interpretation of Article V, section 2(1). See infra notes 130-203 and accompanying text
(analyzing the Bailey court's constitutional interpretation).
66. Other supreme court cases have cited Article V, section 2(1), but have not
explicitly interpreted its meaning. See, e.g., Swanson v. State, 329 N.C. 576, 586, 407
S.E.2d 791, 796 (1991) ("It is very difficult under this section for the State to waive its right
to collect taxes.").
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the court's interpretation differed substantially from the
interpretations adopted by other states with similar constitutional
provisions.67 Thus, to understand if the court's decision was a proper
interpretation of Article V, section 2(1), it is necessary to analyze
three factors: the United States Supreme Court precedent upon
which the court based its decision; the legal and legislative history
behind the adoption of Article V, section 2(1); and the alternative
constitutional analysis favored by other state courts.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently ruled that a
state may contract for tax exemptions and that such contracts are
protected from impairment by the Contracts Clause of the United
States Constitution.' As early as 1812, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that a state could, consistent with the United States
Constitution, properly grant a permanent tax exemption and that the
Contracts Clause prohibited the impairment of such an agreement. 9
In New Jersey v. Wilson,70 the State of New Jersey entered into a
contract with the Delaware Indians that granted a permanent tax
exemption to a tract of land used by the tribe.7' The Court ruled that
the contract affected the land itself and that, despite later being sold
to a third party, the State could not levy taxes on the land without
unconstitutionally impairing the contract.72
Forty years later, in State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop,73 the Court
rejected the argument that a state legislature did not have the power
to make a binding contract for a tax exemption.74 In Knoop, the
Court examined an 1845 Ohio statute that fixed the amount of state
67. See, e.g., Switzer v. City of Phoenix, 341 P.2d 427,431 (Ariz. 1959) (holding that an
Arizona Constitution provision prohibiting the legislature from surrendering, suspending,
or contracting away its taxation power left the legislature unencumbered in its ability to
impose taxes); Parrish v. Employees' Retirement Sys., 398 S.E.2d 353, 355 (Ga. 1990)
(holding that the Georgia Constitution prevents the creation of "irrevocable" tax
exemptions); Blair v. State Tax Assessor, 485 A.2d 957, 960 (Me. 1984) (ruling that the
Maine Constitution prevents the legislature from granting state retirees permanent tax
exemptions); Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762, 766 (Mont.
1993) (ruling that the Montana Constitution barred the state from granting permanent tax
exemptions on state employee retirement benefits).
6& See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977); State
Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 384 (1853); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 164, 166-67 (1812).
69. See Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 166-67.
70. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
71. See id at 165.
72. See id at 167.
73. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1853).
74. See id. at 384.
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taxation on banks at six percent In 1851, the Ohio legislature
attempted to tax banks at general property rates, thereby increasing
taxation over the previous six percent limit.76  The United States
Supreme Court held that the 1851 legislation represented an
impairment of a contractual obligation between the banks and the
State and was thus unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause.7 In
its analysis of the case, the Court specifically rejected the notion that
a contract for a tax exemption amounted to bargaining away a part of
a state's sovereignty.78 Since Knoop, the Court has repeatedly
affirmed its position that a state may contract for a permanent tax
exemption without contracting away an essential element of its
sovereignty.79
The Court's most recent analysis of the impact of the Contracts
Clause on state tax-exemption legislation reinforces the outcomes of
these previous decisions. In United States Trust Co. of New York v.
New Jersey, 0 the Court analyzed the constitutionality of repealing a
New Jersey statute that provided security for holders of certain state
bonds.8l The Supreme Court held that this repeal violated the
Contracts Clause of the Constitution because it impaired the contract
between the bond holders and the State by removing an important
75. See id. at 376-77.
76. See id. at 377-78.
77. See id. at 392; supra note 5 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1).
78. See Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 384. The Court held that:
The assumption that a State, in exempting certain property from taxation,
relinquishes a part of its sovereign power, is unfounded. The taxing power may
select its objects of taxation; and this is generally regulated by the amount
necessary to answer the purposes of the State.... [T]he exemption of property
from taxation is a question of policy and not of power.
Id. at 384.
79. See, e.g., Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 444 (1877) ("The constitutional
provision against impairing contract obligations is a limitation upon the taxing power, as
well as upon all legislation, whatever form it may assume. Indeed, attempted State
taxation is the mode most frequently adopted to affect contracts contrary to the
constitutional inhibition."); Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439, 440 (1869)
(stating that the charter creating Washington University contained an "exemption from
taxation [that] became one of the franchises of the corporation of which it [c]ould not be
deprived by any species of State legislation").
80. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
81. See id. at 13-14. The United States Trust decision did not explicitly involve a
legislative contract for tax exemption. Instead, the New Jersey legislature passed a law
requiring certain funds generated by the New York-New Jersey Port Authority to be used
only to repay bondholders. See id. at 9-10. The Supreme Court held that this legislation
created a contract with the bondholders that could not be impaired. See id. at 32.
Although the case did not directly address tax exemptions, its Contract Clause analysis
was derived from the previously cited cases and was cited by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Bailey. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148,500 S.E.2d at 64-65.
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security provision that was an essential element of the contract. 82 In
its analysis, the Court distinguished between the various powers of
state governments, holding that a state cannot contract away certain
"reserved powers," such as its police power and the power of eminent
domain.' In contrast, however, a state can contractually create
permanent limits on the future exercise of its taxing and spending
powers, including making indelible contracts for tax exemptions. 4
Despite Supreme Court precedent affirming the ability of states
to make constitutionally protected contracts for tax exemptions, the
Court has stated that it will interpret tax exemption legislation in light
of state constitutional restrictions that prevent the creation of
contracts for tax exemptionsY5 In Home of the Friendless v. Rouse,"
the State of Missouri attempted to tax a charitable organization
despite a provision in the organization's charter that exempted it from
state taxation.87 The United States Supreme Court held that the
organization's charter created an enforceable contract for a
permanent tax exemption and was thus protected by the Contracts
Clause.' The Court, however, noted that the contract was
enforceable only because a state constitutional provision prohibiting
the state from entering into such contracts was not in effect at the
time the charter was adopted.89
82. See id. at 32.
83. See id. at 23-24.
84. See id. at 14. In Bailey, the North Carolina Supreme Court relied specifically on
United States Trust to support its contention that the state could enter into a contract for a
tax exemption without impermissibly undermining its sovereignty. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at
148,500 S.E.2d at 64-65.
85. See Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co. v. Hewes, 183 U.S. 66,71 (1901) (stating that the
railroad's charter had to be "construed in subordination to the [state] constitution"); see
also Sterk & Goldman, supra note 1, at 1319 n.104 (stating that the Supreme Court
implicitly affirmed the ability of a state constitution to prevent the creation of contracts for
permanent tax exemptions).
86. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869).
87. See id. at 436.
88. See id. at 438-39.
89. See id. at 438. As the Court noted, "the present constitution of Missouri prohibits
the legislature from entering into a contract which exempts the property of an individual
or corporation from taxation, but when the charter in question was passed there was no
constitutional restraint on the action of the legislature in this regard." Id. at 438. Both
Home of the Friendless v. Rouse and Washington University v. Rouse were Missouri cases
that involved state-created corporations with identical tax exemption provisions in their
charters. See Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869); Washington
Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439 (1869). The Supreme Court ruled against the State of
Missouri in both cases on the same day. See Home of the Friendless, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at
438-39; Washington University, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 440-41.
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Similarly, in Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Co. v. Hewes,9 the
Supreme Court concluded that a state charter granting a railroad a
tax exemption had to be construed as subordinate to the Mississippi
State Constitution.91 The Court focused its analysis on a provision of
the state constitution that declared that the "property of all
corporations ... shall be subject to taxation."92 The Supreme Court
stated that in determining whether a contract exists, .the Court
presumes that the parties enter any agreement in contemplation of
the existing state constitution. 93  Therefore, because the state
constitution prevented the creation of permanent tax exemptions for
corporations, the Court held that no contract existed and that the
original charter was simply a statement of policy that was subject to
subsequent legislative repeal.94 Since Hewes, the Court has continued
to affirm the ability of state constitutions to limit the creation of
contracts for permanent tax exemptions."
North Carolina's legal history preceding the adoption of Article
V, section 2(1) highlights the impact on public policy of the United
States Supreme Court's Contracts Clause analysis. In 1871, the
United States Supreme Court held in Raleigh & Gaston Railroad Co.
v. Reid9" that the North Carolina General Assembly could not tax a
railroad that the state had previously exempted from, state taxation
because such an action would unconstitutionally impair the obligation
of contract.97 The charter of the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad, which
was granted by the General Assembly in 1852, permanently exempted
90. 183 U.S. 66 (1901).
91. See id. at 71.
92. Hewes, 183 U.S. at 71-72 (citing MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 13 (1869)).
93. See Hewes, 183 U.S. at 71.
94. See id. at 74-75. The Court held that given the prevailing interpretation of the
state constitution, the charter granting the railroad a tax exemption
must be read as if it contained a proviso that the legislature might in the
meantime alter, amend or repeal the act. Hence, as the legislature is left entirely
free to act upon the subject, no subsequent legislation could possibly impair the
obligation of the contract, if such exemption can be called a contract at all. If no
statute could impair it, it goes without saying that none did impair it.
Id. at 74-75.
95. See, e.g., Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 44 (1933) (holding that though a
railroad may hold a charter creating a contract with the state for a tax exemption, if such a
contract is prohibited by state law the "contract will not give validity to what would
otherwise be void"). The recognition that state constitutions may limit the ability of state
legislatures to enter into contracts for tax exemptions is especially important because tax
exemption contracts have been read narrowly by the Supreme Court. See United States
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 24 n.21 (1977) (noting that "tax exemption
contracts generally have not received a sympathetic construction").
96. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 269 (1871).
97. See id. at 270.
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the railroad's property from state taxation." Despite this exemption,
the General Assembly in 1869 placed a property tax on the franchises
and rolling stock of all railroads.9  In a lawsuit brought by the
railroad, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that "[a] State
cannot by contract or in any other mode surrender the power of
taxation necessary for its existence." 100 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the tax exemption provision was a term
of the contract that the charter created between the state and the
railroad, and that, accordingly, the tax exemption was protected from
impairment by the Contracts Clause of the United States
Constitution. 0 '
Following the Supreme Court's decision that the General
Assembly could not impair contracts for tax exemptions, the North
Carolina Supreme Court expressed its frustration with this broad
interpretation of the Contracts Clause. In Worth v. Wilmington &
Weldon Railroad,1°2 the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the
State could not impose a tax on the gross receipts of a railroad
because the railroad's 1852 charter exempted it from taxation.103 The
court noted that the facts of Worth were so similar to other United
States Supreme Court cases establishing contracts for tax exemptions
via legislative charters that the availability of a constitutional
protection of such a contract was "no longer an open question for the
court."' 4 Importantly, however, the court expressed "regret ... that
the right of one general assembly to surrender a portion of the
sovereign power to tax, so as to disable itself or its successor to
resume it, has been recognized."'0 5 This sense of frustration with the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the Contracts Clause and
the resulting loss of state autonomy seems to have been the historical
9& See Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N.C. 155, 156 (1870), rev'd, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 269,270 (1871). Despite the tax exemption provision in the railroad's 1852 charter,
the North Carolina court upheld a property tax on the railroad based on the notion that
the State could not contract away its taxation power and that contracts between
individuals and the State must be construed in a meaning most favorable to the State. See
iL at 158-59, 160.
99. See id. at 156. "Rolling stock" is comprised of all the locomotives and boxcars of a
railroad. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICrIONARY 1164 (3d ed. 1988).
100. Id. at 160. The court concluded that the tax exemption provision was not an
essential part of the contract created by the charter between the State and the railroad.
See id. at 162-63. As a result, the State was not bound by that provision, thus making the
newly enacted property tax valid. See id. at 163.
101. See Raleigh & Gaston R.R, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 270.
102. 89 N.C. 291 (1883).
103. See id. at 299-300.
104. Id. at 300.
105. IM. at 299-300.
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driving force behind the adoption of North Carolina's constitutional
amendment prohibiting the state from contracting away its power of
taxation.06
Although the language of Article V, section 2(1) was first
incorporated into the North Carolina Constitution in 193 6,107 the
intent of the drafters is best evidenced by earlier attempts to amend
the Constitution using similar language. The North Carolina General
Assembly first sanctioned the language in question in 1913.108 In that
year, the General Assembly adopted a ban on the state contracting
away its power of taxation, along with several other constitutional
changes, as a proposed amendment to the North Carolina
Constitution." These amendments, however, were defeated by
popular vote in the general election of 1914.110 The deliberations of
the commission that recommended these constitutional changes to
the General Assembly shed some light on the intent behind the
prohibition on contracting away the power of taxation."' An expert
witness to the commission, in commenting on the language in
question, stated that it "merely guards against the danger that the
State Legislature may at some unguarded moment surrender to some
interest its right of taxation and guarantee it perpetual exemption."112
This. statement, in combination with the earlier United States
106. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) ("The power of taxation ... shall never be
surrendered, suspended or contracted away."). See generally Sterk & Goldman, supra
note 1, at 1319-20 (stating that once the Supreme Court defined the broad scope of the
Contracts Clause, states moved to limit the effects of this interpretation by adopting
constitutional provisions that prohibited legislatures from contracting away taxing power).
Perceived abuses of tax exemptions in the nineteenth century were an additional factor
leading to,state constitutional restraints on legislatures' power to grant such exemptions.
See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 1, at 1317.
107. See Act of April 29,1935, ch. 248, § 1, 1935 N.C. Public Laws 270,270. In 1936 the
voters ratified an amendment to Article V, section 3 of the North Carolina Constitution
that read:
"Sec. 3. State Taxation. The power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and
equitable manner, and shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted
away. Taxes on property shall be uniform as to each class of property taxed.
Taxes shall be levied only for public purposes, and every act levying a tax shall
state the object to which it is to be applied."
Id.; NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585-1974: A NARRATIVE AND STATISTICAL
HISTORY 920-21 (John L. Cheney, Jr., ed., 1975) (discussing 1935 Act's ratification by
voters in 1936).
108. See Act of October 13,1913, ch. 81, § 1, 1913 N.C. Public Laws [Ex. Sess.] 95, 97.
109. See id.
110. See NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585-1974: A NARRATIVE AND
STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra note 107, at 898.
111. See STATE OF N.C. COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, MINUTES OF
THE COMMITTEE ON ARTICLE V, REVENUE AND TAXATION 33, S. 1884 (1913).
112. Id. (testimony of Dr. Adams of the University of Wisconsin).
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Supreme Court rulings limiting the General Assembly's ability to
repeal legislatively-created tax exemptions, suggests that North
Carolina lawmakers intended to create a state constitutional
provision that would prevent the federal courts from interpreting tax
exemptions as creating contractual obligations." 3
In other states with provisions similar to Article V, section 2(1),
courts have pointed to legislative intent as a key factor in rejecting
recent challenges to the repeal of tax exemptions on retirement
benefits.114 Much like North Carolina, these other states eliminated
tax exemptions on the retirement benefits of state employees
following the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Michigan
Department of. Treasury,1 5 and subsequently faced lawsuits by
retirees."6 Yet in contrast to Bailey, other states with constitutional
provisions similar to North Carolina's have uniformly interpreted
those provisions as allowing the repeal of retirement benefit tax
exemptions."7
In Georgia, state retirees lost their challenge to the repeal of a
tax exemption on their retirement benefits because the Georgia
Constitution provides that " '[tihe state may not suspend or
irrevocably give, grant, limit or restrain the right of taxation'" and
that laws to the contrary "'are null and void.' "11 The Georgia
113. See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 1, at 1319-20 (discussing states' efforts to
prohibit legislatures from contracting away their taxing power after the Supreme Court's
decision in Raleigh & Gaston R.R.); see also Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co. v. Hewes, 183
U.S. 66, 71 (1901) (presuming that alleged legislative contracts are entered into in
contemplation of the existing state constitution).
114. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148-50, 500 S.E.2d at 64-66. The state constitutional
provisions that were interpreted differently contained very similar language to Article V,
section 2(1). See supra note 6 (listing various state constitutional provisions).
115. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
116. See, e.g., Parrish v. Employees' Retirement Sys., 398 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. 1990);
Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993); Hughes v.
Oregon, 838 P.2d 1018 (Or. 1992).
117. See Parrish, 398 S.E.2d at 354; Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 770-71. In Oregon, a state
without a constitutional limitation on the contracting away of the power of taxation, the
state supreme court held in favor of retirees challenging the repeal of a tax exemption on
their retirement benefits. See Hughes, 838 P.2d at 1038. The court held that the tax
exemption constituted, a contract between the state and its employees and that its
subsequent repeal was an "impairment" of the contract therefore violating the Contracts
Clause of the United States Constitution. See id. at 1038. Without a state constitutional
provision preventing the state from contracting away its power of taxation, the State of
Oregon was relegated to arguing that, through the nature of its sovereignty, it could not
contract away its sovereign power of taxation. See id. at 1024. Not surprisingly, given the
United States Supreme Court precedent on the subject, the Oregon Supreme Court
summarily rejected this argument. See id. at 1025-26.
118. Parrish, 398 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(1)).
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Supreme Court rejected arguments by the retirees that the tax
exemption in question was not "irrevocable" because it ends when
retirement payments to each employee cease.119 Instead, the court
concluded that enforcing the contract for a tax exemption would
make the tax exemption "irrevocable" and thus, would violate the
Georgia Constitution. 20
The State of Montana faced a similar lawsuit following the Davis
decision and the state legislature's subsequent repeal of a tax
exemption on the retirement benefits of state employees. In Sheehy
v. Public Employees Retirement Division,"21; the Montana Supreme
Court concluded that the statute creating the tax exemption in
question did not create a contractual right because the state
constitution prohibited the state from surrendering or contracting
away its power of taxation.'22 Because the state did not have the
power to create a contract with state retirees ensuring them that their
retirement benefits would never be taxed, the court concluded that
the statute was simply a statement of policy regarding public
employment."2 The court held that, given the constitutional
provision preventing the state from contracting away. its power to tax,
"the state cannot promise any group of taxpayers that it will never tax
them."24
Other state courts, in cases which were not prompted by the
Davis decision, have also interpreted similar state constitutional
provisions as preventing their states from entering into contracts for
permanent tax exemptions.'2 Following the legislative repeal of a tax
exemption on state retirement benefits, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine dismissed a lawsuit challenging this repeal, concluding that
the original enactment of the tax exemption did not create a
contractual obligation to state employees. 2 6 This interpretation of
119. See id. at 355.
120. See id. at 354-55.
121. 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993).
122. See id. at 765-66; see also MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("The power of taxation
shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.").
123. See Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 765.
124. Id. at 766.
125. See, e.g., Switzer v. City of Phoenix, 341 P.2d 427, 431 (Ariz. 1959) (holding that
the state constitutional provision prohibiting the legislature from surrendering,
suspending, or contracting away its taxation power left the legislature unencumbered in its
ability to impose taxes); Blair v. State Tax Assessor, 485 A.2d 957, 960 (Me. 1984) (holding
that because the state constitution forbids the legislature from suspending or surrendering
the power of taxation, persons who receive state retirement allowances have no
contractual entitlement to tax-exempt retirement benefits).
126. See Blair, 485 A.2d at 960.
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the statute was based, in part, on the fact that the creation of such a
contractual obligation would violate Article 9, section 9 of the Maine
Constitution, which prohibits the state from surrendering its power of
taxation.lV Similarly, in interpreting a provision in the Arizona
Constitution that is identical to the portion of Article V, section 2(1)
at issue in Bailey, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the
provision "was designed to leave legislators unencumbered in so far
as their power to impose taxes."'1 Several other state courts have
interpreted such constitutional limitations in a similar fashion.129
As evidenced by the foregoing cases, the North Carolina
Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional prohibition on
contracting away the power of taxation is a deviation from the
interpretation adopted by other states. This distinction raises the
question of whether the supreme court's constitutional interpretation
in Bailey was consistent with the intent behind the adoption of Article
V, section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution. An additional
question also arises as to how this constitutional interpretation will
affect North Carolina public policy in the future.
As a matter of fairness, the North Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in Bailey is on target. As a matter of constitutional
interpretation, however, the court's opinion is questionable at best.
The court rejected the State's interpretation of Article V, section 2(1)
for three major reasons.130 First, the court sided with the plaintiffs as
a matter of fairness.13' Second, the court interpreted the various
subsections of Article V, section 2 in a way that dramatically limits
the scope of the prohibition on the state contracting away its power of
127. See id. at 960. The court held that:
Even if we were to find the exemption to be a contractual right of state
employment, the legislative grant of such a right would violate the Maine
Constitution, which states: "The Legislature shall never, in any manner, suspend
or surrender the power of taxation." We cannot presume the legislature would
intentionally enact a statute that would contract away the power to tax on a
permanent basis.
Id. at 960 (citation omitted).
12& Switzer, 341 P.2d at 431.
129. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418, 438 (Alaska 1985), appeal
dismissed, 474 U.S. 1043 (1986) (holding that a constitutional restriction on the state
contracting away the power of taxation prevented the state, through oil and gas leases,
from limiting its ability to tax oil); Reserve Mining Co. v. State, 310 N.W.2d 487, 494
(Minn. 1981) (ruling that a state statute did not create a permanent tax exemption because
the state constitution, which forbids the surrender, suspension, or contracting away of tax
power, does not allow the state to contract away the legislature's ability to tax).
130. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 147-50,500 S.E.2d at 64-66.
131. See id.
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taxation. 132 Third, the court asserted that United States Supreme
Court precedent supported its interpretation.33
The court began its analysis of Article V, section 2(1) by arguing
that basic fairness would not allow the state to raise constitutional
defenses to its contract with state employees.134 In addition to citing
the general rule that a party cannot accept benefits conferred under a
statute and then question the constitutionality of that statute in order
to avoid its burdens,135 the court suggested that the state's proposed
interpretation would allow it to issue tax-exempt bonds, collect
millions of dollars from their purchase, and then retrospectively
repeal investors' tax-free interest advantage. 36 After describing this
scenario, the court concluded that "[t]he basis for prohibiting such
action is fundamental fairness."'137
Given this compelling argument, the court could have chosen to
base its opinion solely on grounds of estoppel, thus reaching its
desired result while avoiding its questionable constitutional
interpretation of Article V, section 2(1).138 Because the State used
the tax exemption on retirement payments as an inducement to enter
into and remain in state employment, the court could have simply
estopped the State from raising a constitutional challenge to the
creation of contractual rights stemming from this arrangement. Such
a result would follow longstanding North Carolina precedent, such as
Convent of Sisters of St. Joseph v. City of Winston-Salem, 9 in which
the North Carolina Supreme Court estopped a plaintiff from
challenging a city ordinance because he had previously accepted
benefits under the ordinance he was contesting.140 The Sisters of St.
Joseph court stated that "'one who voluntarily proceeds under a
statute and claims benefits thereby conferred will not be heard to
question its constitutionality in order to avoid its burdens.' "141 The
court in Bailey, however, did not recognize estoppel as a possibility
132. See id. at 148, 500 S.E.2d at 64.
133. See id. at 148-49,500 S.E.2d at 64-65.
134. See id. at 147, 500 S.E.2d at 64.
135. See iL
136. See id at 149, 500 S.E.2d at 65.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Convent of Sisters of St. Joseph v. City of Winston-Salem, 243 N.C. 316,
325, 90 S.E.2d 879, 885 (1956) (holding that the Bishop of the Diocese of Raleigh had
waived any right to contest the validity of a zoning ordinance by accepting the benefits of
the provision).
139. 243 N.C. 316, 90 S.E.2d 879 (1956).
140. See id. at 325-26, 90 S.E.2d at 885-86.
141. Id. at 324,90 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting 11 AM. JUR. Constitutional Law § 123 (1937)).
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and instead continued its constitutional analysis. 42 The court's
resulting interpretation of Article V, section 2(1) as allowing the state
to contract for permanent tax exemptions, differs significantly from
interpretations of similar constitutional provisions by other state
courts.143 The North Carolina court's unique constitutional analysis
raises questions concerning the validity of the court's structural
interpretation of Article V, section 2(1) and whether its interpretation
was consistent with the provision's intended purpose.
In Bailey, the supreme court interpreted the structure of Article
V, section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution in a fashion that
significantly limits the scope of the prohibition on the state
contracting away its power of taxation."M The court concluded that
Article V, section 2(1) allows the State to enter into contracts for tax
exemptions without contracting away the "power" of taxation as long
as the contract is for a public purpose. 45 The court held that because
certain subsections of Article V, section 2 allowed the state to grant
tax exemptions, 46 the granting of a tax exemption was not equivalent
to relinquishing the "power" of taxation.1 47 If it were, the court
reasoned, then the constitution would prohibit tax exemptions-a
result incongruous with other express provisions of section 2.148
The problem with the court's analysis is that the State did not
argue that Article V, section 2(1) prevented it from granting tax
exemptions.1 49  Rather, the State argued that the constitution
prevented it from making contracts for permanent tax exemptions."5
Under this interpretation of the constitutional provision in question,
the original statute granting the tax exemption on retirement benefits
was an expression of state policy rather than a contract for a
permanent exemption.'5' This limitation on the state's ability to make
142. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 147-50, 500 S.E.2d at 64-66.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 148, 500 S.E.2d at 64.
145. See id.
146. See id. The subsections relied upon by the court do not provide sweeping support
for the court's contention that Article V envisions the state having broad authority to
create permanent income tax exemptions. Article V, section 2(6) provides that "[tihe rate
of tax on incomes shall not in any case exceed ten percent, and there shall be allowed
personal exemptions and deductions so that only net incomes are taxed." N.C. CONST.
art. V, § 2(6). Additionally, section 2(3) establishes that "[n]o taxing authority other than
the General Assembly may grant [property tax] exemptions." N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(3).
147. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148, 500 S.E.2d at 64.
148. See id.
149. See Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 45, Bailey (No. 53PA96).
150. See id
151. See, e.g., Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762, 765 (Mont.
1993) (holding that because the state constitution prohibited the state from contracting
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contracts for permanent tax exemptions is supported by decisions in
all other states that have interpreted similar constitutional
provisions. 2  Surprisingly, the North Carolina Supreme Court
ignored this argument and ruled that Article V, section 2(1) did not
prevent the state from entering into contracts for either permanent or
non-permanent tax exemptions.'53
In addition to relying on the constitutional provisions expressly
permitting the state to grant tax exemptions, the supreme court's
structural interpretation also depended on an overly broad reading of
Article V, section 2(7), which allows the State to enter into contracts
for public purposes.54 Lost in the court's analysis is the fact that the
statutes creating the retirement plans at issue in Bailey predate the
adoption of Article V, section 2(7) in 1970Y.5 In contrast, Article V,
section 2(1)'s prohibition on the state contracting away its power of
taxation was adopted as part of the state constitution prior to the
legislative creation of the first retirement plan."6 Thus, Article V,
section 2(7) could not have given the state the authority to contract
for permanent tax exemptions in this case because this constitutional
subsection did not even exist at the time the General Assembly
with state retirees for a permanent tax exemption, the statute creating the exemption was
simply a statement of policy regarding public employment).
152 See, e.g., Switzer v. City of Phoenix, 341 P.2d 427,431 (Ariz. 1959) (holding that an
Arizona Constitution provision prohibiting the legislature from surrendering, suspending,
or contracting away its taxation power left the legislature unencumbered in its ability to
impose taxes); Parrish v. Employees' Retirement Sys., 398 S.E.2d 353, 354 (Ga. 1990)
(holding that the Georgia Constitution prevents the creation of "irrevocable" tax
exemptions); Blair v. State Tax Assessor, 485 A.2d 957, 960 (Me. 1984) (ruling that the
Maine Constitution prevents the legislature from granting state retirees permanent tax
exemptions); Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 770-71 (ruling that the Montana Constitution barred the
state from granting permanent tax exemptions on state employee retirement benefits).
153. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148,500 S.E.2d at 64.
154. See id. Article V, section 2(7) provides that the "State ... may contract with ...
any person ... for the accomplishment of public purposes only." N.C. CONST. art. V,
§ 2(7). The North Carolina Supreme Court has developed a two-prong test for
determining if a particular government undertaking is for a "public purpose" as required
by the state constitution. See Madison Cablevision v. City of Morganton, 325 N.C. 634,
646, 386 S.E.2d 200, 207 (1989). First, a municipal undertaking must involve a reasonable
connection with the convenience and necessity of the particular municipality. See id.
Second, the activity must benefit the public generally, as opposed to special interests or
persons. See id. As a result of this loosely defined two-prong test, the "public purpose"
provision of the North Carolina Constitution has been broadly construed. See id.
155. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 136-38, 500 S.E.2d at 57-58. Most of the 13 different
retirement plans in question in Bailey were created by the General Assembly before 1973.
See id.
156. Article V, section 2(1) was adopted by the North Carolina legislature in 1935. See
Act of April 29,1935, ch. 248, § 1,1935 N.C. Public Laws 270,270.
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originally granted the tax exemptions in question. 7 Additionally, the
Local Government Finance Study Commission's report
recommending the addition of Article V, section 2(7) suggests that
the intent of the provision was limited to allowing local governments
to make appropriations to private organizations and did not
contemplate the creation of permanent tax exemption contracts.'
Therefore, Article V, section 2(7) should not have been interpreted as
the basis for creating a contractual obligation between the state and
public employees.
The court in Bailey supported the questionable structure of its
analysis with selective use of United States Supreme Court
precedent.5 9 Specifically, the North Carolina Supreme Court cites
United States Trust to support the notion that a state may contract for
a permanent tax exemption without undermining the state's
sovereignty.' 6° The court's contention is indisputable, given the
Supreme Court's consistent rulings on this subject.'6' Unfortunately,
however, the court's analysis of Supreme Court precedent is
incomplete because it failed to analyze other Supreme Court cases
that suggest that a state constitution may prevent a state from
entering into a contract for a permanent tax exemption in the first
place.62 In fact, these Supreme Court rulings prompted North
157. See Act of April 4, 1939, ch. 390, § 2, 1939 N.C. Public Laws 837, 839 (creating the
Local Governmental Employees' Retirement System).
158. See NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL GOV'T STUDY COMM'N, REPORT OF THE 1968
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDY 19 (1969). The Commission commented that the intent
behind Article V, section 2(7) was to codify two previous North Carolina Supreme Court
decisions holding "that local governments may make appropriations to private
organizations for the accomplishment of public purposes so long as the object of
expenditure is identified and so long as the local government retains ultimate control over
the disposition of public funds," thereby removing "any reasonable doubt that government
may cooperate with private enterprise in the accomplishment of public purposes." Id. at
19-20 (referring to the rule enumerated in Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400,405,116
S.E.2d 923, 927 (1960), and Homer v. Chamber of Commerce, 235 N.C. 77, 81-82, 68
S.E.2d 660, 663 (1952)).
159. See id. at 148-49, 500 S.E.2d at 64-65.
160. See id. (citing United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-25
(1977)).
161. See, e.g., United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23-25 (holding that the Contract Clause
prevents a state from impairing a legislatively created contract); State Bank of Ohio v.
Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 384 (1853) (ruling that a state legislature has the power to
make a binding, constitutionally protected contract for a tax. exemption); New Jersey v.
Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 166-67 (1812) (establishing the principle that the United
States Constitution prevents states from impairing legislatively created contracts for
permanent tax exemptions).
162. See, e.g., Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 44 (1933); Gulf and Ship Island R.R.
Co. v. Hewes, 183 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1901); Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 430,438 (1868).
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Carolina to adopt Article V, section 2(1), in order to leave legislators
unencumbered in their power to impose taxes.16 3  If a state
constitution prevents the creation of contracts for permanent tax
exemptions, then the Supreme Court will construe an alleged contract
in light of this state constitutional restriction and will characterize the
legislative act in question as a statement of policy, rather than the
creation of a contractual obligation.164 The court's failure in Bailey to
consider alternative Supreme Court precedent is important because
Article V, section 2(1) was adopted as an amendment to the state
constitution prior to the passage of legislation exempting the
retirement benefits of state employees from taxation. 65 Therefore, a
strong argument exists that if the North Carolina Constitution
prohibits the state from contracting away its power of taxation, then
the General Assembly is prevented from entering into a contract with
state and local employees for a permanent tax exemption. 66 This
unexamined United States Supreme Court precedent and the strong
interpretive argument it creates undermines the logic of the Bailey
decision.
In addition to the problems with the court's structural analysis
and its selective reading of Supreme Court precedent, the court's
interpretation is also inconsistent with the intent behind the adoption
of Article V, section 2(1). The legislative and legal history
surrounding the adoption of Article V, section 2(1) give both explicit
and implicit support to the argument that the General Assembly
intended the constitutional provision to prevent the creation of
permanent tax exemptions, thus leaving lawmakers unencumbered in
their ability to change tax policies.167 Ironically, the court's analysis in
Bailey reached the opposite interpretation and; in fact, completely
failed to consider the intent of the General Assembly in adopting
163. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (describing North Carolina
lawmakers' intent in adopting Article V, section 2(1).
164. See Hewes, 183 U.S. at 74-75; supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
165. See Act of Apr. 29, 1935, ch. 248, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 270, 270 (proposing
language later ratified in N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1)). The earliest tax exemption for any
retirement system was contained in the initial legislation creating the Local Governmental
Employees' Retirement System in 1939. See Act of Apr. 4, 1939, ch. 390, §§ 2, 11, 1939
N.C. Sess. Laws 837, 839, 856 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 128-22, 128-31
(1999)).
166. See, e.g., Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762, 765 (Mont.
1993); see also Sterk & Goldman, supra note 1, at 1319-20 (arguing that state
constitutional provisions, such as Article V, section 2(1), prevent successful Contracts
Clause claims based on legislative grants creating permanent tax exemptions).
167. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
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Article V, section 2(1).16s This interpretation violates the court's own
guidelines for constitutional construction,169 which state that "the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect
to the intent of the framers."'70 The court's failure to assess the
General Assembly's intent also conflicts with the approach taken by
other state courts that have relied significantly on the intent of the
state legislature in interpreting similar constitutional provisions.1 7'
Given the foregoing analysis, the Bailey decision's interpretation
of Article V, section 2(1) is questionable at best. 72 But why did the
court so clearly reject the constitutional interpretation adopted by
other state courts and instead strain to create its own unique
interpretation of the scope of Article V, section 2(1)? The answer
may well lie in the court's overriding feeling that the state's repeal of
the tax exemption on the retirement benefits of public employees was
simply unfair. 73 This concern for fairness is evident not just in the
168. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 147-50,500 S.E.2d at 64-66.
169. See Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 613,264 S.E.2d 106, 110
(1980) (interpreting the scope of the North Carolina Constitution's guarantee that public
school tuition will be free of charge); In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 299, 245 S.E.2d 766, 771
(1978) (interpreting the scope of the judiciary's constitutional powers); Perry v. Stancil,
237 N.C. 442, 444, 75 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1953) (interpreting the constitutional provision
granting women the power to convey property).
170. Perry, 237 N.C. at 444, 75 S.E.2d at 513 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The court in Perry emphasized the importance of legislative intent in
constitutional construction by stating that:
Constitutional provisions should be construed in consonance with the objects and
purposes in contemplation at the time of their adoption. To ascertain the intent
of those by whom the language was used, we must consider the conditions as they
then existed and the purpose sought to be accomplished. Inquiry should be
directed to the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. The court should place
itself as nearly as possible in the position of the men who framed the instrument.
Id.
171. See, e.g., Switzer v. City of Phoenix, 341 P.2d 427, 430-31 (Ariz. 1959) (using the
Minutes of the Arizona Constitutional Convention to support its interpretation of the
legislature's intent in amending the state constitution); Parrish v. Employees' Retirement
Sys., 398 S.E.2d 353, 356 (Ga. 1990) (relying on notes from the Georgia Constitutional
Convention of 1877 to support its constitutional interpretation).
172 See supra notes 144-71 and accompanying text. The court's structural analysis of
Article V, section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution is flawed. See supra notes 144-58
and accompanying text. Additionally, the court's reliance on selective Supreme Court
precedent to support its interpretation is undermined by other precedent supporting an
alternative interpretation of Article V, section 2(1). See supra notes 159-66 and
accompanying text. Finally, the interpretation adopted by the court is not consistent with
the intent behind the adoption of Article V, section 2(1), and violates the court's own
established procedures regarding the interpretation of state constitutional provisions. See
supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
173. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 149, 500 S.E.2d at 65 (stating that "[t]he basis for
prohibiting such action is fundamental fairness").
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court's interpretation of Article V, section 2(1), but also by its
statutory interpretation in the Bailey opinion regarding which retirees
were entitled to tax refunds.174
The court in Bailey took a pro-taxpayer stance in ruling that the
State was responsible for refunding money to all state and local
retirees taxed unconstitutionally, not simply those who followed the
state's statutory protest requirements. 175  This ruling was both
surprising and controversial 76 because the court had rejected
constitutional claims in two previous decisions on the ground that the
plaintiffs failed to adhere strictly to the statutorily prescribed
procedure for protesting taxes. 77 The court in Bailey explicitly
rejected its sweeping statements in these earlier cases that prevented
taxpayers from recovering refunds of unconstitutional taxes where
they failed to follow the statutory protest requirements.17
174. See id. at 163, 500 S.E.2d at 73 (noting that "fundamental fairness" seemed to
dictate an easy answer to the statutory interpretation).
175. See id. at 163-67, 500 S.E.2d at 73-76. This was an important ruling because it
significantly increased the number of retirees entitled to receive refunds and increased the
financial burden on the state treasury. See Rawlins, supra note 14, at A13. Additionally,
the court's pro-taxpayer interpretation of the statutory protest requirements in Bailey
impacted another 1998 North Carolina Supreme Court case and resulted in the state
owing hundreds of millions of dollars in additional refunds to state taxpayers who paid
unconstitutional intangibles taxes. See Smith v. State, 349 N.C. 332, 342, 507 S.E.2d 28, 34
(1998) (Frye, J., concurring) (stating that the Bailey decision requires the state to refund
all "taxes paid under the unconstitutional intangibles tax scheme, notwithstanding
[taxpayers] failure to follow the protest requirements of N.C.G.S. § 105-267").
176. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 168-69, 500 S.E.2d at 76-77 (Webb, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that the court should not overturn contrary precedent and
should instead follow the plain meaning of the statute by limiting refunds to those
taxpayers paying under protest). The court's interpretation of the effect of section 105-267
of the North Carolina General Statutes on the state's obligation to refund unconstitutional
taxes was the only portion of the Bailey decision to which members of the court dissented.
See id. at 167, 500 S.E.2d at 76 (Frye, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 168,
500 S.E.2d at 76 (Webb, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
177. See generally Swanson v. North Carolina, 335 N.C. 674, 683, 441 S.E.2d 537, 542
(1994) (preventing taxpayer plaintiffs from recovering tax refunds due to their failure to
follow the protest requirements of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-267 (1997 & 1999 Supp.));
Bailey v. North Carolina ("Bailey I"), 330 N.C. 227, 235, 412 S.E.2d" 295, 300 (1991)
(holding that only those taxpayers that followed the statutory protest requirements were
eligible to receive refunds of unconstitutional taxes).
178. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 167, 500 S.E.2d at 76 (holding that the statutory protest
requirements do not shield the State from making refunds to all taxpayers who were
unconstitutionally taxed and stating, "[t]o the extent that our rulings in Bailey I and
Swanson imply otherwise, they are hereby disavowed"). The court in Bailey held that the
statutory protest requirements of section 105-267 of the North Carolina General Statutes
were simply procedural and designed "to establish the parameters within which a
contested tax case must arise, not to preclude recovery for those determined via the
resulting case to have been unconstitutionally taxed." Id. at 165, 500 S.E.2d at 74.
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The court confirmed that it based its new pro-taxpayer
interpretation of the statute on what it perceived to be the fair
result.179  In beginning its statutory analysis, the court stated that
"fundamental fairness would seem to dictate an easy answer" if it
were not for the court's previous decisions forcing taxpayers to
adhere strictly to the statutory protest requirements. 10 The court
went on to rule that "[i]t would be unjust to limit recovery" to only
those taxpayers who knew how to follow the formal protest
requirements that are required in order to receive a refund.181 Thus,
the notion of "fundamental fairness" played a significant role in both
the court's statutory and constitutional interpretations in Bailey.1 2
This focus on fairness in the Bailey decision as a whole may help
explain the rationale behind the court's unique, pro-taxpayer
interpretation of Article V, section 2(1).18
Aside from the question of whether the court's interpretation of
Article V, section 2(1) was correct, the key issue for the future is
determining what effect this interpretation will have on North
Carolina state and local tax policy. The court's interpretation allows
both state and local officials to enter into contracts for permanent tax
exemptions as long as they are for public purposes.1&4 Consequently,
this ruling could have an important impact on economic development
policies, many of which rely on tax incentives to attract industry to
the state or to a particular area. In 1996, the North Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that direct incentive payments to private enterprises in
order to encourage business expansion constituted a valid "public
purpose" as required by the state constitution.18 The court's decision
as to what it considered a legitimate "public purpose" was extremely
broad and included any activity designed to encourage job growth
179. See id at 163,166, 500 S.E.2d at 73, 75.
180. Id at 163, 500 S.E.2d at 73.
181. Id. at 166,500 S.E.2d at 75.
182. In its constitutional interpretation, the court stated that "[t]he basis for prohibiting
[the state from using Article V, § 2(1) to escape liability] is fundamental fairness." Id. at
149, 500 S.E.2d at 65.
183. The court's interpretation of Article V, section 2(1) was unique considering the
interpretations given to similar constitutional provisions by other state supreme courts.
See, e.g., Switzer v. City of Phoenix, 341 P.2d 427, 431 (Ariz. 1959); Parrish v. Employees'
Retirement Sys., 398 S.E.2d 353, 354 (Ga. 1990); Blair v. State Tax Assessor, 485 A.2d 957,
960 (Me. 1984); Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762, 770-71 (Mont.
1993).
184. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148, 500 S.E.2d at 64.
185. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 723-24,467 S.E.2d 615, 624-
25 (1996).
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and an expansion of the tax base.186 Given this broad definition of a
"public purpose," the Bailey decision places few, if any, limitations on
when the state or local governments can contract with private
businesses for permanent tax exemptions. 87
The court's constitutional interpretation in Bailey will allow
exactly the type of permanent tax breaks for private businesses that
Article V, section 2(1) was designed to prevent. It was the granting of
permanent tax exemptions to railroads in the nineteenth century that
led to the widespread adoption of provisions such as Article V,
section 2(l).'1 The General Assembly apparently intended for the
constitutional prohibition on the state contracting away its power of
taxation to prevent such permanent tax exemptions, thus leaving
legislators unencumbered in their power to impose taxes. 89 The
Bailey decision undermines this goal.
Following Bailey, public officials once again must exercise
caution in passing legislation that grants tax exemptions to private
entities. The court's conclusion that the legislation creating the state
retirement system constituted a contract for a permanent tax
exemption puts the burden on the government to prove that tax
incentives for private companies are not permanent 90 Thus, if public
officials decide to grant non-permanent tax incentives to encourage
economic development, the legislative or administrative action
creating the tax exemption must clearly specify that it is for a limited
duration or that it is merely a statement of current government policy
that is subject to repeal.' 91 Given the Bailey court's stance, failure to
186. See Maready, 342 N.C. at 741-42,467 S.E.2d at 635-36 (Orr, J., dissenting) (stating
that the court's interpretation of what constitutes a "public purpose" is so broad that it
would allow a local government to provide golf club memberships to the executives of a
company if such memberships would induce the executives to move their company and
create new jobs in the community).
187. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148, 500 S.E.2d at 64 (holding that the state may contract
for permanent tax exemptions if the contract is for a public purpose).
188. See Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. 269, 270 (1872); see also Sterk &
Goldman, supra note 1, at 1319-20 (describing states' attempts to limit their ability to grant
permanent tax exemptions by adopting constitutional provisions that prohibit legislatures
from contracting away their taxing power).
189. See supra notes 107-113 and accompanying text.
190. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 147-50,500 S.E.2d at 64-65.
191. The court's willingness to hold that the state legislation constituted a contract for a
permanent tax exemption stands in contrast to other state courts that have been less
sympathetic in construing tax exemption contracts. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. of
N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 24 n.21 (1977) (observing that "tax exemption contracts
generally have not received a sympathetic construction"); Sheehy v. Public Employees
Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762, 765 (Mont. 1993) (holding that legislation granting a tax
exemption to the retirement benefits of state employees was simply a statement of
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qualify such a tax exemption could result in the creation of a
permanent tax break for the private company in question as well as a
restriction on the government's future ability to revise its tax policy to
account for changing economic conditions.
Though the Bailey decision may represent a triumph of fairness
for state retirees, the court's emphasis on reaching a fair outcome
resulted in the virtual elimination of the constitutional prohibition on
the state contracting away its power of taxation.192 As a result of the
North Carolina Supreme Court's decision, the state constitution no
longer protects taxpayers from imprudent government actions that
create irrevocable, long-term tax breaks for private individuals."3
Such an interpretation stands in stark contrast to the original intent
behind the adoption of Article V, section 2(1). 191
The court's overriding concern with reaching the "fair" result
produced a convoluted constitutional interpretation. The court's
structural analysis rejected the plain meaning of Article V, section
2(1) and instead relied on an inapposite subsection of Article V to
limit the breadth of the constitutional prohibition in question. 95
Similarly, the court conveniently failed to undertake an analysis of
the basic intent behind the adoption of the provision. 6 The Bailey
decision also reflected a selective use of Supreme Court precedent.' 97
Given these fundamental flaws in the court's constitutional analysis, it
is not surprising that the court's resulting interpretation differed
dramatically from all other state supreme court interpretations of
similar provisions.
As a matter of fairness, the court was correct in preventing the
state from reneging on its agreement to exempt state employee
retirement benefits from state income taxation. The court, however,
could have legitimately reached this "fair" result without
undermining the intent of Article V, section 2(1).198 Instead of
creating a convoluted constitutional interpretation, the court could
have simply ruled that the state was estopped from questioning the
constitutionality of the statutory tax exemption since the state had
government policy and not a contract for such an exemption).
192. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) ("[t]he power of taxation ... shall never be
surrendered, suspended or contracted away").
193. See Bailey, 348 N.C. at 148, 500 S.E.2d at 64.
194. See supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
198. See Convent of Sisters of St. Joseph v. City of Winston-Salem, 243 N.C. 316, 325,
90 S.E.2d 879, 885 (1956).
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willingly accepted the benefits created by this statute for fifty years. 99
This common-sense alternative to the court's action could have
eliminated the need for the court to adopt its questionable
constitutional interpretation of Article V, section 2(1) and thus,
would have prevented the potentially troublesome impact of this
interpretation on North Carolina public policy.
In its rush to help state retirees in Bailey, the North Carolina
Supreme Court may have inadvertently cleared the way for the return
of the tax policy problems that plagued the state in the nineteenth
century.201 Today, economic development tax breaks have expanded
beyond granting tax exemptions to railroads and now include tax
incentives for a wide array of private businesses.m Following Bailey,
state and local governments may find themselves locked into
agreements for perpetual tax exemptions that they never intended to
make permanent.20 3 Although many may have assumed that the
North Carolina Constitution prevented the creation of such
permanent tax breaks, the state supreme court's unique
interpretation of Article V, section 2(1) opens the floodgates to such
claims by private businesses.
DANA EDWARD SIMPSON
199. See id. at324, 90 S.E.2d at 885 (holding that "one who voluntarily proceeds under
a statute and claims benefits thereby conferred will not be heard to question its
constitutionality in order to avoid its burdens").
200. Even if the court relied on estoppel principles to aid the plaintiff-retirees,
businesses might try to invoke such principles to prevent local governments from repealing
tax exemptions by arguing that the government benefits from tax exemptions by
convincing businesses to relocate or expand. The use of estoppel, however, would give
courts more leeway in refusing to protect such tax exemptions because, unlike a
constitutional protection, the use of estoppel is a matter of equity and gives judges
flexibility in its application.
201. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
202. In Maready, Forsyth County's local governments provided tax incentives to a wide
variety of businesses, including: banks, a tobacco manufacturer, an air-conditioning
distributor, and Wake Forest University. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C.
708, 736-37, 467 S.E.2d 615, 632-33 (1996) (Orr, J., dissenting) (listing the types of
incentives provided to businesses).
203. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
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The Whys of Lies and Vaughan v. MetraHealth: Can an
Employer's Lie Be Used to Make an Inference of
Discrimination?
Imagine that you are an African-American job applicant. You
apply for a position for which you are qualified, but the employer
does not hire you. Instead, it continues the search and hires a white
applicant with similar qualifications. You suspect that the employer
did not hire you because of racial prejudice. You file suit, and the
employer answers your complaint by claiming that the real reason for
its refusal to hire you was that you did not have an outgoing
demeanor. During discovery, you find that your ratings by the
interviewer for personality and demeanor were higher than those for
the hired applicant; however, no other admissible evidence is
discovered showing that the employer discriminated against you.'
During depositions, the body language, intonations, and facial
expressions of many of the employer's witnesses lead you to believe
that they are lying and that racism played a part in their hiring
decision. Should you lose your day in court when the defendant's
proffered explanation is a lie?
Now, imagine that you are the employer in this hypothetical
situation. You have been sued, and in defense, you offer a
nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring decision that was given to you
by your personnel manager. Later, you discover that the manager
lied to you. You do not know the manager's real motivation for not
hiring the plaintiff, but you know that his motivation was not
discrimination because you know him well, and he has an excellent
record and reputation for fair and impartial hiring practices. Should
you be forced to defend a discrimination suit at considerable expense
and risk to your reputation when the plaintiff has presented no
additional evidence of discrimination?
Discrimination cases often present such questions, forcing courts
to balance the rights of potentially aggrieved plaintiffs against the
interests of potentially innocent employers. In striking this balance,
the federal courts have historically looked to the congressional goals
1. Cf. Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52,56 (1st Cir. 1995) (addressing a case in which the
employer justified its hiring decision by claiming that the selected candidate was better
qualified, when he was not).
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") 2 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),3 both of
which were designed to prevent and redress discriminatory
employment practices.4 Because Title VII claims often turn on issues
of intent5 and are therefore generally difficult to prove, the Supreme
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16,78 Stat. 241,253-66 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)). Title VII provides that it
shall be unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602,
602-08 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (1996)). The ADEA
provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
4. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (noting the
preventative goal of Title VII); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting the compensatory aims of the 1991 amendments to Title VII); see also Migneault
v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131,1138 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting preventative goal of ADEA), petition
for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1999) (No. 98-1178); Coger v. Board of
Regents, 154 F.3d 296, 307 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting preventative and remedial goals of
ADEA), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 16,1998) (No. 98-821).
Title VII and the ADEA are treated as one for the purposes of this Note, which
focuses on the plaintiff's burden to overcome summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit
treats the issue identically under both statutes. See Giiuns v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., 148
F.3d 413, 416 fn. (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that the same framework applies with equal force
to Title VII and ADEA claims). Congress lifted much of the ADEA's language directly
from Title VII, and all courts use Title VII in interpreting the ADEA. See Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) ("[T]he prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec
verba from Title VII. "); see also Paquin v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 119 F.3d 23, 26
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (applying the Title VII framework in the context of the ADEA).
This Note generally refers to Title VII, but indicates differences between Title VII
and the ADEA where appropriate. The two statutes do differ in some areas. For
example, Title VII contains an exemption for religious educational institutions, while the
ADEA does not. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (allowing educational institutions to
make employment decisions on the basis of religion if they are controlled by a particular
religious group and are directed toward propagating that religion), with 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)
(omitting the religious exception despite other language in the ADEA which is parallel to
§ 2000e-2(e)). See generally JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR.,
THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION 983-97, 1014 (4th ed. 1997) (comparing
Title VII and the ADEA).
5. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983) (noting that there will "seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's
mental processes"); Hardin v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 451 U.S. 1008, 1008-09 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating in an ADEA case that the
showing of discrimination turned on the defendant's intent and noting that issues of
motive and intent are not appropriately resolved on summary judgment); Sheridan v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1071 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane) ("Cases charging
discrimination are uniquely difficult to prove, and often depend on circumstantial
evidence."); see also Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir.
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Court initially took an expansive view of the statute and fashioned
holdings that were supportive of plaintiffs' claims.6 Later cases,
however, have reflected the concern that these supportive holdings
should apply only when an employer has in fact discriminated, so that
Title VII will not be transformed into a general wrongful discharge
statute.7
Following the Supreme Court's early establishment of a special
prima facie case' and a burden-shifting scheme 9 for Title VII, a split
developed among the circuits concerning how much weight to give a
showing that an employer has proffered an untrue explanation for a
challenged employment action.10 In 1993, the Supreme Court
addressed this issue in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks," holding
1998) (in bane) (noting in an employment discrimination case that the central issue for the
jury was to determine the credibility of the plaintiff and defendant).
6. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973)
(establishing the elements of a prima facie case for Title VII). In order to show a prima
facie case under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that she was in a protected class; that
she applied for and was qualified for an open position or was discharged from an existing
position for which she was qualified; that the employer rejected her for the position; and
that the position remained open. See id. at 802; see also Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d
1332, 1335-37 (2d Cir. 1997) (in bane) (noting that the effect of the prima facie case is to
allow the plaintiff to bring suit with only a minimal showing, thus requiring the employer
to produce evidence to justify its employment decision upon a minimal showing by the
plaintiff), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998), reh'g denied, 118 S. Ct. 1341 (1998). This
prima facie showing generally is viewed as being generous to Title VII plaintiffs. See
Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1335-37 (noting that this prima facie case is viewed as minimal and
citing numerous opinions supporting this view).
7. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993) (stating that Title
VII liability is only appropriate where a "factfinder determines, according to proper
procedures, that the employer has unlawfully discriminated"); cf. Robert Brookins, Hicks,
Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin Is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939,
942-44 (1995) (stating that Hicks was decided at least in part to further a policy agenda on
the part of the Court to make it harder for plaintiffs to prove Title VII claims).
8. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05; Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1335-37 (discussing
the special prima facie case under Title VII). In the context of Title VII, the term "prima
facie case" does not indicate how much evidence that the plaintiff must produce in order
to prevail at trial. See Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1335-37. Instead, it is the minimal showing that a
plaintiff must make to compel the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged employment action. See id.
9. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
Under the Burdine framework, a plaintiff must set forth a prima facie case. The employer
then has the burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged employment action. If the employer carries this burden, the plaintiff then must
prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
10. See Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 342-44 (6th Cir. 1997)
(describing the development of the split among the circuit courts which led to Hicks),
reh'g en banc denied, No. 94-6355, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5559 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 1998).
11. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Hicks is discussed in detail, infra notes 97-106 and
accompanying text.
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that if an employer's proffered reason was found to be false, and thus
a pretext,12 a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff would be
allowed, but not compelled. 3 Rather than resolving the controversy,
however, the Court's holding has sparked much debate among federal
circuit courts. 4 In particular, Hicks has raised questions about what
standard courts should apply when ruling on defendants' motions for
summary judgment. The circuits are divided over whether a plaintiff
who has made out a prima facie case and offered evidence that the
employer's proffered reason for the challenged employment action is
false should be able to overcome summary judgment as a matter of
law. 6 In an attempt to grapple with the meaning of Hicks, courts
have adopted phrases to define their interpretations of the case. They
categorize themselves and each other either as "pretext only" or as
"pretext plus."'7
In Vaughan v. MetraHealth,is the Fourth Circuit recently defined
its position to be "pretext plus" and held that .a plaintiff in a
discrimination case must do more to avoid summary judgment than
12. Courts sometimes use the term "pretext" to mean that the reason given was not
the true reason, and at other times to mean that the proffered reason was pretext for
discrimination. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (in banc). This Note will use the word "pretext" to mean that the reason was not
true, not as shorthand for "pretext for discrimination."
13. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
14. See, e.g., Anderson v. Barter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (7th Cir.
1994) (noting the disagreements among federal courts about the evidentiary burdens in
Title VII claims). See generally Thomas Duley, Comment, Summary Judgment and Title
VII After Hicks: How Much Evidence Does It Take to Make an Inference? 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 261, 277-84 (1994) (detailing the confusion among courts in applying Hicks to the
employee's burden of proof).
15. See Alison M. Donahue, Casebrief, Employment Law-Ramifications of St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Third Circuit's Revival of the "Pretext Only" Standard
at Summary Judgment, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1287, 1299 (1996) ("As a result of the conflicting
interpretations of the meaning of Hicks, the circuit courts are split on the question of what
evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue of pretext for discrimination at the summary
judgment stage.").
16. Compare, e.g., Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 346-47 (6th Cir.
1997) (concluding that a plaintiff can prevail by raising a genuine dispute over the veracity
of the employer's proffered reason for the challenged employment decision), reh'g en banc
denied, No. 94-6355, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5559 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 1998), and Washington
v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) (same), with Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado
Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 335-37 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that a plaintiff's showing of
pretext will not necessarily overcome an employer's motion for summary judgment).
17. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1292 n.7 (rejecting the use of this terminology, but noting its
use by other circuits); see also infra note 74 (discussing the circuits' use of "pretext only"
generally to mean that only a showing of pretext and a prima facie case are required to
withstand summary judgment, and "pretext plus" generally to mean that additional
evidence of discrimination is also required).
18. 145 F.3d 197,202 (4th Cir. 1998).
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make out a prima facie case of discrimination and show that the
employer has lied about the real reason for the challenged
employment decision. Instead, under Vaughan, a plaintiff also must
put forward enough admissible evidence of discrimination that a trier
of fact could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer's true reason for discharging or failing to hire the plaintiff
was discrimination. 9
This Note examines the Fourth Circuit's decision in Vaughan,
focusing on the standard of proof adopted in the decision and the way
in which the court's use of the term "pretext plus" has influenced the
understanding of Hicks in subsequent Fourth Circuit decisions. After
reviewing the facts and holding of Vaughan,' the Note traces the
evolution of the proof pattern required by courts under Title VII.21
The Note then examines the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks2 and
the circuit courts' subsequent competing interpretations of that case.3
Finally, the Note considers how Vaughan's adoption of the "pretext
plus" label has affected the interpretation of Hicks and the
disposition of motions for summary judgment in the Fourth Circuit
and questions whether the standard is consistent with Hicks and the
goals of Title VII.24
Janet Vaughan was an employee of Metropolitan Life Insurance
("MetLife") for nine years before the company formed a joint
venture with Travelers Group, Inc., at which time she became an
employee of MetraHealth, the new joint venture" Pursuant to the
formation of the joint venture, MetLife reorganized its structure and
eliminated a number of positions, including several in the Richmond,
Virginia, office where Vaughan worked.2 6 After the reorganization,
only one employee would manage provider relations in the Richmond
office, a position for which there were two qualified candidates:
Vaughan, who was fifty-seven years old, and Harriet Meetz, who was
forty-five?
Paul Cooper, a vice president of MetraHealth's District of
Columbia hub, selected Meetz for the job and terminated Vaughan
19. See id.
20. See infra notes 25-71 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 107-53 and accompanying text.
24. See infra. notes 154-218 and accompanying text.
25. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 199.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 199-200.
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and six other Richmond employees3 Cooper appeared to have made
his decision, at least in part, prior to meeting either candidate: He
chose to interview Meetz in a leisurely three-hour meeting,29 but
interviewed Vaughan in the Richmond office for less than an hour on
a day when he interviewed roughly fourteen other employees. °
Cooper then went on to interview Meetz a second time without
affording Vaughan the same opportunity 3
Following her termination, Vaughan sued MetraHealth, claiming
that it had violated the ADEA.32 MetraHealth responded by making
a motion for summary judgment.33 After reviewing Vaughan's
evidence, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found that she had made a prima facie case under the
ADEA.34 Citing the prima facie case requirements under Title VII,31
the court found that Vaughan was in a protected class as a person
over age forty, that she had been discharged, that she was qualified
for the position from which she was discharged, and that she was
replaced by another worker who was substantially younger. 6
Under the proof framework for Title VII and ADEA claims,
once an employee has made out a prima facie case, the employer then
has the burden of production to articulate a " 'legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment
decision.' "37 MetraHealth's proffered reason, later challenged by
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 199.
31. See Vaughn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 3:96CV06, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11077, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 11, 1996), affd sub nom. Vaughan v. MetraHealth, 145 F.3d at
199.
32- See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 200. Vaughan also sued MetLife, but the district court
dismissed the complaint against that company. See id.
33. See Vaughn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11077, at *9-10.
34. See Vaughn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11077, at *9-16.
35. See id. at *910 (citing O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.
308,310-13 (1996) (indicating that an ADEA claim may be sustained where the employee
hired or retained is significantly younger than the employee discharged or rejected);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802-05 (1973) (discussing the method of
proof applicable to Title VII claims); Herold v. Hajoca Corp., 864 F.2d 317, 319 (4th Cir.
1988) (stating the elements of the prima facie case of an ADEA claim)).
36. See Vaughn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11077, at *14-15.
37. Id. at *1516 (quoting O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d
718,719 (4th Cir. 1996)). Curiously, the district court cited the downsizing that was taking
place within MetraHealth as the legitimate reason for the employment decision, rather
than the reason proffered by the company for terminating Vaughan in the course of its
downsizing. See id. at *16. The court should have cited the employer's proffered reason
- for firing Vaughan in particular-the requirements of the downsizing manual. See id. at
*17-18. The ADEA does not forbid firing in general, but rather firing because of age,
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Vaughan as a pretext, was compliance with its downsizing policy as
set forth in its downsizing manual.38 The district court in Vaughan
concluded that this reason satisfied MetraHealth's burden of
production.39
Vaughan then had to prove discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence in order to win her case under the Title VII and
ADEA framework.40 In addition to the elements of her prima facie
case,41 Vaughan pointed to evidence that MetraHealth had conducted
an "Adverse Impact Analysis" in connection with its downsizing plan
indicating that it could acceptably terminate seven older workers
from the pool of thirteen in the Richmond office.42 Vaughan alleged
that the impact analysis also showed that the company did in fact
terminate seven workers from that office, six of whom were over forty
years old.43
subject to certain legitimate age related concerns. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993). Vaughan apparently did not allege that the decision to downsize
was motivated by MetraHealth's desire to fire older employees, but rather that age played
an inappropriate role in the company's selection of Meetz over her. See Vaughn, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11077, at *17-19. Therefore, the court ought to have made reference to
the decision to retain Meetz and fire Vaughan, not to the decision to eliminate a position.
When discussing whether Vaughan had produced evidence that the employer's
reason was pretext, the district court focused on the employer's reason for firing Vaughan,
not its decision to downsize. See id The court of appeals also addressed the decision to
eliminate Vaughan in particular and did not question the decision to downsize. See
Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 200. Therefore, for the purposes of this Note and in accordance with
the understanding of the court of appeals and the discussion of pretext by the district
court, the "employer's articulated reason" will refer to MetraHealth's articulated reason
for firing Vaughan, not its articulated reason for downsizing and eliminating a position.
38. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 200-01.
39. See Vaughn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11077, at *16.
40. See i&L at *16-17. As the Fourth Circuit has stated in previous cases, a
presumption of discrimination arises when a plaintiff has established a prima facie case
under Title VII. See O'Connor, 84 F.3d at 719. If the employer then meets its burden of
production, the presumption of discrimination " 'drops out of the picture' and the plaintiff
bears the ultimate burden of proving both that the employer's asserted reason was
pretextual and that the plaintiff's age was the true reason for the challenged employment
decision." Id. (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993))
(citations omitted).
41. See Vaughn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11077, at *14-15 (stating that Vaughan had
satisfied her burden of presenting a prima facie case because she had shown that she was
in the protected age group, that she was qualified for the position, that she had been
terminated, and that the company had filled the position with a substantially younger
employee).
,42. See id. at *25-26. The court did not clearly explain how the company defined
"acceptable," but stated that the analysis was designed to reflect "whether potential
reductions in certain groups of those persons [categorized by race, sex, and age] would
create an 'adverse impact' on that group." ILd. at *25.
43. See id. at *25.
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Vaughan also pointed to irregularities in the selection process
that could have indicated discrimination. For example, Cooper
appeared to have made his decision before actually meeting the
candidates,' suggesting that he based his decision on a discriminatory
factor, such as age, rather than on any qualitative difference between
the two candidates.4 5 Cooper also filled out the corporate downsizing
forms to evaluate the candidates without reviewing their personnel
files and with "'no first-hand knowledge of the past performance
levels of either Harriet Meetz or [Janet Vaughan].' "46 Although
Vaughan was older, Cooper scored Meetz higher in the categories of
"qualifications, specific experience, abilities and strengths."47
To show discrimination under the Title VII and ADEA
framework, Vaughan was also required to prove that the employer's
proffered reason for firing her was a pretext.4 MetraHealth offered
its "elaborate Downsizing Policy, which is memorialized in a 144-page
Downsizing Manual" as a reason for terminating Vaughan.49  In
response, Vaughan introduced evidence indicating that Cooper had
never seen the downsizing manual before his deposition. 0 The
manual explicitly called for an objective evaluation and reliance on
"'facts v. opinions.' '51  In contrast, Cooper asserted that
"'[m]anagement is a highly subjective art' " and that he relied on his
44. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 199-200; supra notes 29-31 (noting discrepancies in the
number and length of interviews given to Vaughan and Meetz).
45. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 200-01.
46. Id. at 200 (apparently quoting from the record without citation).
47. Id. at 203. In fact, Vaughan had a total of nine years' experience with MetLife and
MetraHealth; the court's opinion does not disclose Meetz's length of employment. See id.
at 200-01 ("Cooper admitted ... that, when he terminated Vaughan, he was unaware of
the extent of her experience with MetLife and did not know that she helped develop
MetLife's Health Maintenance Organization ... network in Boston ... ."), 203 (discussing
Cooper's ranking of Meetz as superior in specific experience). Ordinarily, one might posit
that an older worker would rate higher on experience than a younger worker. Thus,
ranking a younger worker higher in the category of experience without inquiring into the
work records of the two candidates seems curious and might suggest discrimination to a
reasonable factfinder.
48. See Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs -v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)
(stating that once a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason has been offered by the
employer, the plaintiff may go on to prove discrimination directly by persuading the court
that discrimination was the real reason, or indirectly by showing that the reason offered by
the employer is not worthy of belief); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84
F.3d 718,719 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying Burdine's proof scheme to the ADEA).
49. Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 200. MetraHealth offered this explanation both in its
answers to Vaughan's interrogatories and in its own motion for summary judgment. See
id.
50. See id.
51. Id. (apparently quoting from the manual without citation).
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subjective judgment in choosing Meetz over Vaughan. 2 Based on
this information, the district court concluded, and the Fourth Circuit
confirmed, that "the fact that MetraHealth often failed to follow it9
downsizing policy [was] 'considerable evidence' that this reason was
pretext. '5
3
Vaughan relied upon the Fourth Circuit's holding in Herold v.
Hajoca54 to argue that the evidence that she offered was sufficient to
support her claim for discrimination.5 5 In Hajoca, which was also an
ADEA case, the plaintiff had avoided summary judgment by showing
that the employer's proffered reason for firing him was false and that
the employer had fired another older employee while retaining
younger ones. 6 Vaughan interpreted Hajoca as holding that a triable
issue of age discrimination exists whenever a plaintiff makes out the
elements of a prima facie case and offers evidence that the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is pretext, but the district court
disagreed.57 Instead, the court distinguished Hajoca because the
plaintiff there had offered direct evidence of age discrimination in
addition to the evidence introduced to show pretext.58 In Vaughan's
case, however, the district court found that the evidence from the
Adverse Impact Analysis was insufficient to support her claim of bias
against older workers. 9 Vaughan's counsel argued that the analysis
52. Id.
53. Id. at 201. The Fourth Circuit agreed that Vaughan had raised a genuine dispute
over the credibility of the proffered justification. See id.
54. 864 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1988). In Hajoca, the plaintiff-appellee, Warren Herold,
argued that the jury finding of discrimination should be upheld over the defendant-
appellant's motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment non obstante
verdicto because he had shown discrimination in part by showing that the employer had
lied about the reason for his termination. See id. at 318-19. The employer offered several
reasons for the termination: that the plaintiff's job was the easiest to eliminate; that policy
would not allow the company to terminate a less senior employee in favor of Herold if the
two were in different job categories; that Herold was less versatile in performing other
jobs; and that Herold was not as good an employee as those retained. See id. at 320.
Herold rebutted these reasons at trial. See id. In addition, he offered evidence that when
making cutbacks, the employer had terminated an older truck driver while retaining two
younger ones. See id. On appeal, the court held that the plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence from which a jury could find both that the reasons offered by the employer were
pretext and that the real reason was age discrimination. See id. at 320-21.
55. See Vaughn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 3:96CV06, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11077, at *20-21 (E.D.Va. July 11, 1996).
56. See Hajoca, 864 F.2d at 318-20.
57. See Vaughn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11077, at *21.
58. See id. at *21-22 (citing Hajoca, 864 F.2d at 320). The plaintiff in Hajoca showed
that the employer had laid off an older truck driver while retaining two younger ones. See
Hajoca, 864 F.2d at 320.
59. See Vaughn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11077, at *23-26.
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showed that six out of the seven employees terminated in the
Richmond office were over forty, but the court discounted this
argument because Vaughan did not produce expert testimony or
other evidence to support her counsel's interpretation of the
analysis.' Although the court found considerable evidence that the
reason proffered by MetraHealth was false, it granted MetraHealth's
motion for summary judgment.6' The court based its decision on its
finding that Vaughan had failed to produce evidence from which a
reasonable juror could conclude that age discrimination was, more
likely than not, the reason for her termination.'
On appeal, Vaughan presented two questions to the Fourth
Circuit. One question was whether the showing of pretext plus the
prima facie case was sufficient as a matter of law to overcome the
motion for summary judgment.6 Second, Vaughan asked the court to
review the case to determine whether all of the evidence presented-
including not just the fact that the employer's proffered reason was
false, but also the evidence regarding the candidates' respective
qualifications, the job interview procedure, and the ages of the other
employees who were terminated-would as a whole defeat summary
judgment.' 4
On the first issue, Vaughan argued that a finding of pretext
should forestall a defendant's motion for summary judgment.65 The
court rejected this argument, holding that "Vaughan must adduce
some evidence that MetraHealth's proffered justification was not just
60. See id. The court subjected the evidence regarding the Adverse Impact Analysis
to careful scrutiny because it viewed the report as statistical evidence and, therefore,
inherently open to manipulation. See id. at *23-24 (citing EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713
F.2d 1011, 1018 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing use of statistical evidence in employment
discrimination cases); Rosado v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 927 F. Supp. 917, 935-36
(E.D. Va. 1996) (same)).
61. See id. at *17, *27.
62. See id. at *20, *27.
63. See Vaughan, 145 F.3. at 201 (stating that Vaughan argued that she could
overcome a motion for summary judgment merely upon showing pretext); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,247-48 (1986) (establishing the standard for
summary judgment).
64. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 202-03 (reviewing the evidence that Vaughan had
offered to see whether it was sufficient to overcome summary judgment); see also Bailey v.
University of N.C., No. 98-1501, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29941, at *3 (4th Cir. Nov. 23,
1998) (stating that a grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo (citing Higgins v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988))).
65. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 201 (" 'A plaintiff in an age discrimination case may
defeat a summary judgment motion brought by the employer if the plaintiff produces
evidence that the employer proffered a phony reason for firing the employee.'" (quoting
Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d 353,355 (7th Cir. 1996))).
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a pretext, but a pretext for age discrimination."66 The court reasoned
that "[t]his approach, dubbed 'pretext plus,' is a better approach than
'pretext only' "67 because it is consistent with the statement of the
Supreme Court in Hicks that "'nothing in law would permit us to
substitute for the required finding ... of discrimination, the much
different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation
... was not believable.' "I Accordingly, the court concluded that
Vaughan had failed to carry her burden of proof to avoid summary
judgment.69
The Fourth Circuit then turned to the second issue, examining
Vaughan's evidence of discrimination de novo. The court concluded
that Vaughan's evidence was insufficient to permit a trier of fact to
find for the plaintiff.70 Because the court found that Vaughan had
failed to meet the required burden of proof, it upheld the district
court's grant of summary judgment.7'
By adopting the "pretext plus" analysis in Vaughan,72 the Fourth
Circuit not only elaborated on its interpretation of Hicks, but also
announced its position on the growing controversy over terminology
that has arisen in the wake of Hicks. 3 Circuits have adopted the
phrases "pretext only" and "pretext plus" to describe their
interpretations of Hicks, but often use the same labels to apply
different meanings.74  To understand the controversy and the
66. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 202.
68. Id. (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,514-15 (1993)).
69. See id.; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)
(establishing the standard for summary judgment).
70. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 202-04.
71. See id
72. Id. at 202. The court did not repudiate its earlier holding in Hajoca, instead citing
the case as good authority. See id. at 200 (citing Hajoca for the proposition that an ADEA
plaintiff can prevail by showing that the defendant's proffered reason is pretext and that
age discrimination was the more likely reason for the dismissal). However, the court did
not use or refer to its holding in Hajoca in its analysis of what weight should be given to
the finding of pretext. Instead, the court relied directly on Hicks and the interpretation of
Hicks in earlier decisions by the Fourth Circuit and by other circuits. See id. at 201-03
(citing, e.g., Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515; Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 1995);
Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260-61 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994) (interpreting
Hicks).
73. See, e.g, Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284,1289-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in
banc) (noting the split in the circuits over the proper interpretation of Hicks).
74. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 201. The Fourth Circuit discussed the difference
between "pretext only" and "pretext plus" by comparing Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94
F.3d 353, 355 (7th Cir. 1996) (adopting the "pretext only" approach), with Woods v.
Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260-61 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994) (adopting the "pretext plus"
approach). See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 201; cf. Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d
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significance of Vaughan, it is helpful to consider the role that pretext
has played in court rulings creating the overall framework of proof
required by Title VII and the ADEA.75
Title VII was adopted to prevent and rectify employment
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, and
sex.76  Similarly, the ADEA was adopted to prevent and rectify
discrimination on the basis of age. 7 In the landmark case McDonnell
337, 343-44 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing the pre-Hicks interpretations of the appropriate
weight given a showing that the employer's proffered reason was false in terms of "pretext
plus" and "pretext only" and describing the Hicks approach as being the "permissive
pretext" standard), reh'g en banc denied, No. 94-6355, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5559 (6th
Cir. Feb. 11, 1998).
This Note will avoid using the term "pretext plus" as it is applied by the Fourth
Circuit in Vaughan to mean that a showing of pretext alone will never overcome a motion
for summary judgment. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 202. Instead, this Note will describe
such an interpretation as one "presuming insufficiency" because circuits using this
approach presume that a showing of pretext, together with the bare elements of the prima
facie case, will not be enough to overcome a defendant's motion for summary judgment.
See infra notes 155-59 and. accompanying text (contrasting Vaughan's holding with the
approaches taken by other circuit courts).
Some courts have rejected the terminology of "pretext plus" and "pretext only" in
describing a fact-sensitive standard. See, e.g., Aka, 156 F.3d at 1292 n.7. Courts have also
used "pretext only" to refer to the fact-sensitive.approach. See id. at 1312 (Silberman, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority's approach would devolve into "pretext only"). Still
other courts have referred to this approach as "permissive pretext." See Kline, 128 F.3d at
343-46 (stating that Hicks had rejected both "pretext only" and "pretext plus" and had
instead adopted a "permissive pretext" approach under which the evidence of pretext
creates a permissible, but not mandatory, inference of discrimination). This Note will
refer to the case-by-case, fact-specific interpretation as the "fact-sensitive standard,"
because it would permit, but not compel, a court to disallow a defendant's motion for
summary judgment, depending on the facts of the case. See infra notes 126-53 and
accompanying text (discussing the fact-sensitive approach and variations between courts
that have adopted this analysis).
Other courts have used "pretext only" to refer to holdings that plaintiffs will
overcome motions for summary judgment as a matter of law whenever they show pretext.
See, e.g., Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 201 (characterizing Wohl, 94 F.3d at 355, as "pretext only").
This Note will refer to such interpretations as "presumed sufficiency" because courts that
use this approach presume that a showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
false will be enough to overcome a motion for summary judgment. See infra notes 114-125
and accompanying text (discussing the presumed sufficiency approach in more detail).
75. See infra notes 76-153 and accompanying text.
76. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994); see also Taxman v. Board of Educ. of
Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547,1557 (3d Cir. 1996) (in banc) (discussing the legislative history of
Title VII).
77. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (1996); id. § 621(b) (stating that the purpose of the
chapter is "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age;
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment");
see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978) (stating that the ADEA "broadly
prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age").
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Douglas Corp. v. Green,78 the Supreme Court set forth the elements
of a prima facie case under Title VI. The Court held that a plaintiff
must show that she belongs to a protected class, that she applied and
was qualified for a job opening, that she was rejected despite being
qualified, and that after the rejection the position remained open to
persons with the plaintiff's qualifications.80 Once a prima facie case
has been presented, a presumption of discrimination arises which
supports judgment for the plaintiff if not rebutted.8 ' The employer
then has the burden to come forward with a legitimate reason for its
action. 2 If the employer meets this burden, the employee must prove
her case by a preponderance of the evidence 33
Following the decision in McDonnell Douglas, lower courts
disagreed whether the employer's burden of showing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action was
78. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
79. See id. at 802-05. In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff was a black employee who
was laid off and then participated in demonstrations protesting perceived discrimination
by the defendant employer. See id. at 794-95. The plaintiff then applied to the defendant
for a position as a mechanic, for which he was qualified. See id. at 796. The employer
refused to rehire him because of his involvement in the demonstrations. See id. The
plaintiff filed suit alleging that the employer had violated Title VII through racial
discrimination and retaliation for protected opposition to unlawful discrimination. See id.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of
discrimination and that the employer had articulated a legitimate reason for its decision.
See id. at 802-05. The Court explained that the plaintiff could prove his case on remand by
showing that the defendant's articulated reason was pretext-for example, by showing that
whites who had participated in the demonstrations had been retained or rehired-as well
as by other evidence of discrimination. See id. at 804-05. On retrial, the Court explained,
the plaintiff must be given "a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a
racially discriminatory decision." Id. at 805.
80. See id. at 802. This definition of "prima facie case" is unusual and has been
described as "'minimal,' 'de minimis' or 'not onerous.'" Fisher v. Vassar College, 114
F.3d 1332, 1340-41 n.7 (2d Cir. 1997) (in bane) (citing, e.g., Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110
F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998), reh'g denied, 118 S. Ct.
1341 (1998); EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997); Kehoe v.
Anheuser-Busch Inc., 96 F.3d 1095, 1105 n.13 (8th Cir. 1996); Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys.
Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998), reh'g denied, 118
S. Ct. 1341 (1998)).
81. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,510 n.3 (1993) (citing McDonnell Douglas for the proposition that the
presumption arises once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case by a preponderance
of the evidence).
82. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
83. See id at 804-05. The ways that an employee may prove a case of unlawful
discrimination are more fully articulated in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981), and again in Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-15. See infra notes
85-105 and accompanying text.
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a burden of production or a burden of persuasion.' The Supreme
Court settled this question in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine," holding that the employer has the burden of
production.86 The Court stated that this holding was consistent with
the understanding that the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact that discrimination occurred remains with the plaintiff at all
times.87 The Court explained that the employer would meet its
burden if its "evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff.'' s8 The employer could raise a
genuine issue of fact, for example, by introducing admissible evidence
of nondiscriminatory reasons for rejecting the plaintiff.89
The Court stated that the employer's burden of production
serves to meet the plaintiffs prima facie case and to "frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."'  After the employer
articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment
decision, the employee must have the opportunity to show that the
proffered reason was not the true reason.' At this stage, the
84. Compare Burdine, 608 F.2d 563, 568-69 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the employer
has the burden of persuasion in order to withsiand summary judgment for the plaintiff),
rev'd, 450 U.S. at 252, with Lieberman v. Grant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
that the employer has only a burden of production).
85. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
86. See i& at 254-55. Joyce Ann Burdine began working for the Texas Department of
Community Affairs ("TDCA") in January 1972 and was promoted after six months. See
id. at 250. Burdine's supervisor resigned a few months after her first promotion. Although
Burdine applied for the job, it was not awarded to her and the position remained open for
six months. See id. Pursuant to concerns about inefficiencies in the division in which
Burdine worked, TDCA hired a male from another division into the vacant supervisory
position. See id. at -250-51. The new supervisor fired Burdine and two other employees
and retained another male. See id. at 251. Burdine was soon rehired into another TDCA
division at a level equivalent to the supervisory position that she had been denied. See id.
She sued, alleging that TDCA had discriminated based on gender in its promotion and
firing decisions. See id. The district court concluded in a bench trial that Burdine had not
been the victim of gender discrimination based on testimony by TDCA's executive
director that "employment decisions ... were based on consultation among trusted
advisers and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative qualifications of the individuals
involved." Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed in part after evaluating the proffered evidence
based on its understanding that the employer has the burden of proving a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Burdine, 608 F.2d at 567. The circuit court held that TDCA had failed to rebut the
presumption of discrimination regarding its decision to fire Burdine. See Burdine, 450
U.S. at 252.
87. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
88 Id. at 254-55.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 255-56.
91. See id. at 256.
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plahitiff's burden "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of discrimination." g The plaintiff
could meet this burden of persuasion either directly, by showing that
discrimination was more likely than not the real motivation behind
the employment decision, or indirectly, by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is not worthy of being believed.93
Lower courts initially interpreted Burdine as holding that a
plaintiff's indirect showing of discrimination that discredits the
employer's proffered explanation would sustain judgment for the
plaintiff as a matter of law.94 'Gradually, however, a rift began to form
between the circuits concerning what weight should be given to a
plaintiff's showing that the employer's proffered reason was untrue
and, therefore, a pretext.95 While some courts held that a showing of
pretext would suffice for a plaintiff to prevail, other circuits required
plaintiffs to show both pretext and additional evidence of
discrimination.96  The Supreme Court addressed this' evolving
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See Brookins, supra note 7, at 946 (noting that for 20 years, nearly all federal
circuits interpreted McDonnell Douglas and Burdine as permitting plaintiffs to
demonstrate unlawful discrimination either directly or indirectly "by showing that the
defendant's articulated reasons were not the true reasons for the negative employment
decision").
95. See Kara R. Moheban, Comment, Summary Judgment in Context of Title VII and
ADEA Claims: A First Circuit Analysis-Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 E3d 1087
(1st Cir. 1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 927, 927, 929-30 (1997). Initially courts seemed to
agree that the plaintiff could prevail upon a showing of pretext. See Brookins, supra note
7, at 946. Over time, however, a number of circuits began to require both a showing of
pretext and "proof that a specific impermissible factor such as race influenced or actually
triggered the adverse decision." Brookins, supra note 7, at 946 & nn.36-41 (comparing
MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that when
an employer gives an untrue reason for firing a plaintiff, the untruth could be taken as
sufficient evidence to persuade the finder of fact that discrimination occurred), and
Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the
particular employer's reason was "unworthy of credence as a matter of law" and finding
this unworthiness to be enough for the plaintiff to prevail), and Thornbrough v. Columbus
& Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a showing of pretext
would suffice for a plaintiff to prevail), with Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651,
659 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a plaintiff must show evidence of discrimination and
pretext), overruled on other grounds, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), and Hawkins
v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 981 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that a bare showing of pretext
would not support a holding for the plaintiff), and North v. Madison Area Ass'n for
Retarded Citizens-Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 401, 406 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that even after a showing of pretext the plaintiff must show that discrimination was the
"but for" cause of the employment action)).
96. See Maria Therese Mancini, Case Comment, Employment Law: Proving Pretext
May Be Insufficient in Title VII Cases-St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993), 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 235,238-39 (1994).
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disagreement in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,9' holding that
when the factfinder does not believe the reasons put forward by the
defendant, his disbelief may support a finding of intentional
discrimination when coupled with the evidence put forward in the
prima facie case.98 Accordingly, the Court concluded, "rejection of
the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer
the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." 99 However, the Court
held that a rule which would compel judgment for the plaintiff upon a
finding of pretext would contradict "our repeated admonition that the
Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the 'ultimate burden of
persuasion.' "10 Thus, the Court found that Burdine's language
regarding indirect proof of discrimination should not be interpreted
to compel a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the plaintiff upon
a showing of pretext, but rather that it should be interpreted to
permit a judgment as a matter of law upon a showing of pretext as
part of the showing of discrimination.101
In dissent, Justice Souter took a different view of the importance
of a showing of pretext, concluding that Burdine would compel a
finding for the plaintiff."m His dissent also cast doubt on the meaning
97. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Melvin Hicks sued the State of Missouri after being fired
from his job as a correctional officer at a halfway house. See id. at 505. Although Hicks
had a satisfactory work record and had been promoted to shift commander, a new
supervisor targeted him with increasingly severe criticisms and disciplinary actions,
culminating in Hicks's termination after a heated exchange of words between the two. See
i& The Department of Corrections justified the discharge based on the severity and
number of rules violations. See id at 507-08. The district court concluded that these
explanations were false because it found that other shift commanders were not disciplined
under similar circumstances and that the final verbal confrontation was deliberately
provoked as an excuse to fire Hicks. See id Nevertheless, the district court directed a
verdict in favor of the employer, finding that Hicks" had failed to carry his burden of
showing that race was the motivating factor behind his termination. See id. at 508. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision, reasoning that a defendant whose
articulated reason for its employment action had proved false was in the same position as
a defendant who had not articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. See id at
508-09. Therefore, the appellate court concluded, a directed verdict for the plaintiff was
appropriate. See id. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further
proceedings. See id. at 525.
98. See id. at 511.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 511 (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711,716 (1983)).
101. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517-18 ("[P]roving the employer's reason false becomes
part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real
reason was intentional discrimination.").
102. See id. at 531 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he plaintiff can meet his burden of
persuasion in either of two ways: 'either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that
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of the Court's holding. Specifically, Justice Souter suggested that the
holding would support an interpretation that all plaintiffs would need
to show more than a prima facie case.1 3 Furthermore, he worried
that the Court's opinion could support a "more extreme conclusion,
that proof of falsity of the employer's articulated reasons will not
even be sufficient to sustain judgment for the plaintiff."'" The dissent
referred to this heightened standard of proof as a "'pretext-plus' "
approach that would "turn Burdine on its head, and ... result in
summary judgment for the employer in many cases." 5 Other
commentators have made similar criticisms of Hicks, arguing that the
decision undermined Title VII and retaliated against Congress for
passing amendments in 1991 to strengthen Title VII.106
Rather than resolving the lower courts' confusion concerning the
proper weight of a showing of pretext, Hicks has been cited liberally
by some circuit courts as affirming their previous, differing
interpretations.'0 Meanwhile, other circuits have changed their
the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'" (quoting Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981))). Justices White, Blackmun and
Stevens joined in the dissent. See id. at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In fact, because Congress has left
Burdine intact while undermining several intervening Supreme Court decisions, the
holding in Burdine now should have more weight as precedent. See Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275,2291 n.4 (1998) (indicating that where the Supreme Court has
interpreted Title VII and Congress has subsequently enacted legislation that leaves the
decision intact, the decision takes on added weight); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118
S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998) (same); see also Brookins, supra note 7, at 942 (discussing the
effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 upon Supreme Court decisions handed down in the
late 1980s); Janice R. Franke, Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 31 AM. Bus.
L.J 483,500 (1993) (same).
106. See Brookins, supra note 7, at 943. Professor Brookins concludes:
In effect, the Court is selecting evidentiary rules that once were swords for
victims of discrimination, melting those rules, and reforging them into shields for
employers. Still, these important interpretive conflicts are mere skirmishes in a
war to determine the kismet of this nation's antidiscrimination policy; the
ferocity of this policy-related war will be positively related to the political and
ideological gap between Congress and the Court. Today, that "gap" is an
ideological chasm. Ironically, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ... has substantially
upped the ante, thereby causing the Court to increase the number, intensity, and
blatancy of its attacks in an effort to protect employers' interests.... The ink had
hardly dried on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 before the Court had launched
another attack, through Hicks....
Id.; see also Kristen T. Saam, Note, Rewarding Employers' Lies: Making Intentional
Discrimination Under Title VII Harder to Prove, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 702-14 (1995)
(criticizing Hicks).
107. Compare, e.g., Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 202 (explicitly adopting a "pretext plus"
approach based on its interpretation of Hicks), and Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d
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interpretation of the weight accorded to a showing of pretext from
"pretext plus" to "pretext only" and vice versa 08 These shifts are
complicated further by the circuits' inconsistent interpretations of the
terms "pretext,"' 9 "pretext plus," and "pretext only,"" 0 echoing the
disagreement in Hicks between the majority and dissent on the
proper interpretation of Burdine."' The result is that the circuit
courts are now spread out along a continuum from an approach of
presumed sufficiency, represented by the Seventh Circuit's analysis in
Wohl v. Spectrum Manufacturing,"' to an approach of presumed
insufficiency, represented by Vaughan."1
In Wohl, the Seventh Circuit read Hicks as holding that a
plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment by raising a
genuine issue of fact as to the veracity of an employer's proffered
reason for the challenged employment decision." 4  The court
651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990) (implicitly adopting a "pretext plus" approach before Hicks by
requiring the plaintiff to show both evidence that the employer's reason was false and that
discrimination was the true reason), overruled on other grounds, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.
103 (1992), with Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (following "pretext only" standard after Hicks), and Duffy v.
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir. 1984) (adopting "pretext
only" standard before Hicks).
10& Compare, e.g., Ryther v. Kare 11, 108 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that a
showing of pretext may be used as evidence for discrimination, but emphasizing that
"evidence of pretext will not by itself be enough to make a submissible case."), cert
denied, 521 U.S. 1119 (1997), and MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059
(8th Cir. 1988) (holding that when an employer gives an untrue reason for firing a plaintiff,
the untruth could be taken as evidence of discrimination), with Anderson v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Hicks for the proposition
that a plaintiff can overcome a motion for summary judgment upon a showing of pretext),
and North v. Madison Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens-Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844
F.2d 401, 406 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that even after a showing of pretext the plaintiff
must show that discrimination was the "but for" cause of the employment action).
109. See, e.g., Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(in banc) ("The term 'pretext' can be slippery; sometimes it means that an employer's
explanation is incorrect, and sometimes it means both that the explanation is incorrect and
that the employer's real reason was discriminatory.").
110. See, e.g., id. at 1290 n.5 (interpreting the court's decision as being in line with the
fact-sensitive position articulated by the Second Circuit in Fisher v. Vassar College, 114
F.3d 1332,1335-38 (2d Cir. 1997) (in banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998), reh'g denied,
118 S. Ct. 1341 (1998)); cf. id. at 1307-10 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for adopting what he believed would evolve into a "pretext only" approach); see also supra
note 74 (discussing the circuit courts' use of "pretext plus" and "pretext only" to mean
different things).
111. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 517 (1993); cf. id. at 536
(Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's interpretation of Burdine as requiring
proof of discrimination beyond proof of pretext).
112. 94 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1996).
113. 145 F.3d at 202.
114. 94 F.3d at 355.
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reasoned that if a finding of pretext would allow a judgment for the
plaintiff, then the possibility of such a finding should be enough for
the plaintiff to proceed to trial."5
Martin Wohl had worked as Controller of Spectrum
Manufacturing, Inc. ("Spectrum") for four years when, at the age of
fifty-four, he was fired and replaced by a worker who was twenty
years younger."6 To counter Wohl's claim under the ADEA,
Spectrum presented evidence that Wohl had failed to'get along with
his supervisor and had failed to generate accurate accounting
reports."7 The district court granted Spectrum's motion for summary
judgment because it found that Wohl had failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to the veracity of the proffered reasons."8
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because it
concluded that Wohl had offered evidence that, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, showed that he had resolved
previous difficulties with his supervisor and that the accounting report
problems were not Wohl's fault." 9 Based solely on Wohl's prima
facie case and rebuttal of the defendant's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons, the Seventh Circuit held that summary
judgment was inappropriate. 20 The court stated that a plaintiff in an
age-discrimination case may defeat a motion for summary judgment
simply by showing that the defendant has produced a "phony" reason
for firing the employee.' 2' Reasoning that a factfinder could infer
discrimination from a finding of pretext, the court ruled that summary
judgment was inappropriate and remanded the case.' 22
The Wohl analysis has been described as "pretext only"'2
because it presumes that the elements of the prima facie case,
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 354-55.
118. See id. at 354.
119. See id. at 356-57. Specifically, Wohl introduced evidence that the irregularities in
his accounting reports were due to his supervisor's unorthodox billing practices and that
he had called management's attention to the problem. See id.
120. See id. at 358-59.
121. See id. at 355 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,511 (1993)).
122. See id. at 358-59. Specifically, the court in Wohl regarded evidence that the
employer's proffered reason for firing Wohl was false as evidence that the reason was a
pretext for discrimination. See id. at 358 ("Wohl points to a number of additional factors
that support his claim that Spectrum's proffered reasons were a pretext for age
discrimination." (emphasis added)). According to the Wohl analysis, courts can draw an
inference of discrimination from a showing of pretext when considering a motion for
summary judgment. See id.
123. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 201.
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together with an inference of discrimination drawn from a showing of
pretext, would be enough for a finder of fact to decide the case in the
plaintiff's favor. 24 As a result, courts following this analysis consider
summary judgment inappropriate when a plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case and has brought forward evidence that the
employer's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is false.125
The presumed sufficiency approach of the court in Wohl differs
from the fact-sensitive approach applied by, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Aka v. Washington Hospital
Center.'" In Aka, the court discussed the meaning of Hicks at some
length, concluding that all evidence must be considered in context to
determine whether to grant summary judgment when the plaintiff has
only produced evidence to support his prima facie case and to attack
the employer's proffered explanation.127 The court found that under
the Hicks standard, "a plaintiffs discrediting of an employer's stated
reason for its employment decision is entitled to considerable
weight."" Although the court explicitly left open the possibility that
a defendant could obtain summary judgment even when the plaintiff
offers evidence of pretext,129 it rejected "any reading of Hicks under
which employment discrimination plaintiffs would be routinely
required to submit evidence over and above rebutting the employer's
stated explanation in order to avoid summary judgment."30 The Aka
court refused to characterize its approach in terms of "pretext plus"
124. See Wohl, 94 F.3d at 355.
125. Other courts have come to a similar conclusion in applying the rule of Hicks at the
summary judgment stage. See Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 343-47 (6th
Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc denied, No. 94-6355, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5559 (6th Cir. Feb.
11, 1998); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-72 (3d Cir.
1996) (en banc); Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995); Anderson v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1994); Washington v. Garrett, 10
F.3d 1421,1433 (9th Cir. 1993).
126. 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in banc). Etim U. Aka sued his employer after his
applications for job transfers were rejected repeatedly. See id. at 1286-87. Aka, who was
56, was unable to perform the duties of his original job after undergoing heart bypass
surgery. See id. Although the plaintiff also filed a claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, this Note will not discuss that claim.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but a
divided panel of the D.C. Circuit partially vacated that decision. See id. at 1288. The
circuit court granted rehearing in banc and again vacated the summary judgment. See id.
127. See id. at 1289-91.
128. Id. at 1290.
129. See id. at 1291 ("If a plaintiff shoots himself in the foot, surely there is no point in
sending the case to the jury." (citing Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328,
1337-38 (8th Cir. 1996))).
130. Id. at 1290.
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or "pretext only,"'' but the dissent criticized the majority's holding as
"ineluctably devolv(ing) into the 'pretext only' approach. 132
The Aka approach, which allows a showing of pretext to defeat a
motion for summary judgment when the facts showing pretext also do
not contradict an inference of discrimination, is "fact-sensitive. 1 33
The fact-sensitive approach might allow some cases to go to trial
when the employer has proffered a false reason for the employment
decision, but when the true reason was not discrimination.134 The
defendant would not lose automatically because the proffered reason
was false, however, because at trial the plaintiff would still be
required to persuade the finder of fact that discrimination had
occurred. 35 Thus, a fact-sensitive approach allows an employer to
avoid liability for discrimination when a factfinder determines that
neither discrimination nor the employer's articulated reason was the
true reason for the challenged employment action.136
The First Circuit's opinion in Foster v. Dalton37 demonstrates
how the fact-sensitive approach can work in an employer's favor. The
defendant-employer in the case claimed that it preferred the chosen
job candidate to the plaintiff because the selected candidate was more
qualified.138 At trial, however, evidence showed that the plaintiff was
better qualified and that the defendant purposely had modified the
job description so that the chosen candidate could qualify at all.139
While the offered reason was false, the trial court found that the
actual reason was not discrimination, but rather was favoritism for the
131. See id. at 1292 n.7. The court stated that it refused to use the "pretext-plus" term
because:
[The wording] obscures the distinction between (1) requiring that plaintiffs both
discredit the employer's explanation and show discrimination, and (2)
presumptively requiring that plaintiffs provide more than discrediting evidence
alone in order to show discrimination.... [W]e ... adopt the first of these two
approaches, but reject the second.
Id.
13Z Id. at 1312 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 1291-93 (describing when the court would or would not allow a showing
of pretext to overcome a motion for summary judgment); supra note 74 and accompanying
text (defining the fact-sensitive approach).
134. See, e.g., Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52,54-55 (1st Cir. 1995) (involving a case where
the defendant prevailed at trial despite having offered a false reason for the challenged
employment option).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. 71 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1995).
138. See id. at 56.
139. See id. at 54-55.
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supervisor's "fishing buddy." 140 Based on these facts, the court found
for the defendant.' 41
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's holding. 42 The
court held that factfinders could find against a Title VII plaintiff when
the employer's proffered reason was false but when a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason had been shown. 43 In Dalton, the trial
judge weighed the evidence and determined that cronyism was the
real reason for the employment decision.44 Thus, the procedural
posture of Dalton was similar to that in Hicks because the plaintiff-
appellant already had received a full opportunity to show
discrimination at trial. 45 The Dalton court illustrated the functional
outcome of Hicks'" by allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to prove
his case while still permitting the finder of fact to find for the
defendant based on the facts of the case 47
Following the First Circuit's lead, the Second Circuit in Fisher v.
Vassar College' also adhered to a fact-sensitive approach. 49 The
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 56-58.
144. See id.
145. See 509 U.S. 502, 505 (1993).
146. See id. at 511 (stating that a showing of pretext would permit, but not compel, a
finder of fact to find discrimination).
147. This assumes that cronyism is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hiring
one candidate over another. In Dalton, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
cronyism is itself a form of discrimination and suggested that an attack on cronyism would
be better suited to a disparate impact claim. 71 F.3d at 57 (indicating that a policy of
nepotism can be evidence of discrimination in employment (citing EEOC v. Steamship
Clerks Union, Local 1066,48 F.3d 594, 606 (1st Cir. 1995))).
148. 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (in banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998), reh'g
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1341 (1998). In Fisher, the court was called upon to decide whether
appellate review for clear error was appropriate in a Title VII case in which the trier of
fact found liability supported by a prima facie case and a sustainable showing of pretext.
See id. at 1333. The court, in a limited in banc review, held that a review for clear error is
appropriate and is not barred by the showing of pretext. See id. at 1347. The court came
to this holding based on its understanding of Hicks as holding that evidence of pretext
does not give enhanced weight to the evidentiary value of a showing of pretext. See id. at
1334-38 (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 510-11). While Fisher, like Aka v. Washington
Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in banc), adopted a fact-sensitive
approach, the approach of the Second Circuit in Fisher is distinguishable from the fact-
sensitive approach of the D.C. Circuit in Aka. Both circuits would allow a plaintiff to
overcome a motion for summary judgment by presenting a prima facie case and showing
pretext. However, the tone of the Aka opinion suggests that the D.C. Circuit would allow
the plaintiff to do so whenever he has shown pretext, absent some evidence that pretext
was covering something other than discrimination, while the Second Circuit's language
suggests that it would not allow the inference drawn from the showing of pretext to defeat
a motion for summary judgment unless the other evidence in the prima facie case creates a
1999] 2267
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
court explained that there are many reasons why an employer might
hide the true reason for an employment decision, only one of which is
discrimination.1 5 Although the court acknowledged that a showing
by the plaintiff that the employer's proffered reason is false can be
powerful evidence of discrimination, 5' "the power of that fact as
support for a finding of discrimination is not, and should, not be, a
rule of law but a function of logic."' 2 The court explained that the
weight of the inference to be drawn from a showing of pretext would
be proportional to the other evidence offered by the plaintiff.'53
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Vaughan v. MetraHealth adds to
this series of conflicting interpretations.' -' Vaughan has the
advantage of being definite in its interpretation of Hicks in that the
Fourth Circuit clearly stated that, in order to survive a motion for
summary judgment, a plaintiff would have to show not only pretext,
substantial suggestion of discrimination. In Fisher, the Second Circuit held:
Accordingly, a Title VII plaintiff may prevail only if an employer's proffered
reasons are shown to be a pretext for discrimination, either because the pretext
finding itself points to discrimination or because other evidence in the record
points in that direction-or both. And the Supreme Court tells us that "a reason
cannot be proved to be a 'pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." We have
recognized again and again that a plaintiff does not necessarily satisfy the
ultimate burden of showing intentional discrimination by showing pretext alone.
A finding of pretext may advance a plaintiff's case, but a plaintiff cannot prevail
without establishing intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence.
114 F.3d at 1339 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515) (citation omitted). In contrast, the D.C.
Circuit in Aka held:
Although we find that rebuttal evidence alone will not always suffice to permit
an inference, we do not endorse a reading of Hicks under which employment
discrimination plaintiffs are presumptively required to submit evidence of
discrimination over and above such a rebuttal in order to avoid summary
judgment .... [W]e read Hicks (and other relevant case law) to mean that such a
showing does have considerable evidentiary significance.
156 F.3d at 1292. Compare also Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1345-47 (explaining that there is no
"fixed or special" value given to false statements in discrimination cases), with Aka, 156
F.3d at 1293 (stating that according to evidentiary principles "a lie is evidence of conscious
guilt"), and id. at 1291 (referring to the "often great" evidentiary weight given to the
plaintiffs showing that the defendant's proffered explanation is false).
149. See Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1346-47.
150. See id. at 1346.
151. See id. at 1345.
152 Id.
153. See id. at 1346-47 ("Generally speaking, the stronger the evidence that illegal
discrimination is present, the greater the likelihood that discrimination is what the
employer's false statement seeks to conceal. And, conversely, the weaker the evidence of
discrimination, the less reason there is to believe the employer's false statement concealed
discrimination .... ).
154. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 204.
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but also additional evidence to support the conclusion that the pretext
was a cover for discrimination.'-" This approach is provides a more
rigorous standard for plaintiffs than the presumed sufficiency
approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Wohl,5 6 or even the fact-
sensitive analysis applied by the D.C. and Second Circuits. 157 Yet
while the standard articulated in Vaughan is clear, it is open to
criticism because it expands the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hicks
in the context of summary judgment, and thus follows the
interpretation suggested by Justice Souter's dissent rather than the
majority opinion. 58  In addition, by adopting the terminology
"pretext plus," the Vaughan court sent a signal that has been
interpreted by lower courts to mean that the Fourth Circuit has
substantially raised the bar that plaintiffs must pass to overcome a
motion for summary judgment.5 9
The Fourth Circuit reached this result despite clear language in
Hicks stating that a factfinder may infer intentional discrimination
based solely on disbelief of the employer's proffered reasons and the
elements of the prima facie case. 6 In her appeal, Vaughan used this
155. See id.
156. See id. (rejecting the "pretext only" approach); supra notes 114-25 and
accompanying text discussing Wohl).
157. Compare Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 202 (stating that the prima facie case combined
with a showing of pretext will not, without more, be sufficient to overcome a motion for
summary judgment), with Aka, 156 F.3d 1284, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in banc) (affording a
finding of pretext considerable evidentiary weight), and Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1338 (holding
that the sufficiency of the finding of pretext to support a finding of discrimination depends
on the circumstances of the case).
158. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 535 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("But other language in the Court's opinion supports a more extreme
conclusion, that proof of falsity of the employer's articulated reasons will not even be
sufficient to sustain judgment for the plaintiff."); cf. Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 202 n.2
(following the interpretation of the dissent and citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 535-36 (Souter, J.,
dissenting)).
159. See, e.g., Venable v. Apfel, 19 F. Supp. 2d 455, 461-65 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (citing
Vaughan and granting summary judgment to the employer); see also Love v. J.C. Penney
Co., No. 4:97CV00549, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17300, at *36 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 1998)
(granting summary judgment to the employer in an ADEA claim); infra notes 211-12
(discussing subsequent decisions by the Fourth Circuit and by federal district courts within
the circuit).
160. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 201. The Fourth Circuit quoted the following passage:
"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the primary facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the
Court of Appeals was correct when it noted upon such rejection, '[n]o additional
proof of discrimination is required.'"
Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 201 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's
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language to argue that plaintiffs are protected from summary
judgment once they have made out a prima facie case and have shown
pretext, but the Fourth Circuit rejected this interpretation.' Instead,
the court focused on the Supreme Court's holding based on the facts
of Hicks that the plaintiff in that case was not entitled to a directed
verdict.162 The Vaughan court concluded that "[i]n so holding the
Court emphasized that the final stage of the ... proof scheme
requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer's proffered
justification is 'a pretext for discrimination.' "163
This interpretation of Hicks is the interpretation feared by
Justice Souter in his dissent, rather than the interpretation adopted by
the Court itself." The holding in Hicks, as understood by the
Supreme Court majority, was that judges could properly infer
discrimination from a showing of pretext, but that the plaintiff would
not be entitled to prevail unless that inference was actually made by
the finder of fact.'6 The court in Vaughan concluded that Hicks
"teaches that to survive a motion for summary judgment under the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, the plaintiff must do more than merely
raise a jury question about the veracity of the employer's proffered
justification."'1 Hicks, however, never required the plaintiff to show
more than the prima facie case and pretext to prevail. Rather, Hicks
stands for the proposition that the plaintiff would not prevail in every
Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487,493 (8th Cir. 1992) (alteration in original))).
161. See id. (distinguishing the Fourth Circuit's analysis from what it referred to as the
"'pretext only' analytical model" in Wohl v. Spectrum Manufacturing, Inc., 94 F.3d 353,
355 (7th Cir. 1996), which stated that "[a] plaintiff in an age discrimination case may
defeat a summary judgment motion brought by the employer if the plaintiff produces
evidence that the employer proffered a phony reason for firing the employee.").
162. See id. at 201-02.
163. Id. at 201 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515).
164. The Court stated that a finding of pretext coupled with the prima facie case could
be enough for a fact finder to infer discrimination. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. The Court
resolved the apparent conflict between this statement and its statement that the plaintiff
must show "both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason" by
explaining that "[e]ven though ... rejection of the defendant's proffered reason is enough
at law to sustain a finding of discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination." Id.
at 511 n.4. In his dissent, however, Justice Souter criticized the Court's holding as being
susceptible to the interpretation later adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Vaughan. See id. at
535-36 (Souter, J., dissenting). In fact, the Fourth Circuit in Vaughan cited Justice
Souter's dissent in supporting its interpretation of Hicks. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 202 n.2
(citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 535-36 (Souter, J., dissenting)). Generally, if there is a conflict
between the majority's understanding of its ovm holding and the dissent's understanding
of the majority, the majority's understanding should prevail. See J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN
& ROY M. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 26 (5th ed. 1990).
165. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511-12.
166. Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 202 (emphasis added).
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case as a matter of law upon such a showing.167
The holding in Vaughan illustrates the difficulty of applying
Hicks, which focused on the trial court's refusal to grant a directed
verdict,1' to a motion for summary judgment. This difficulty is
especially troublesome because many Title VII cases are resolved at
the summary judgment phase.169 Although the standard for a motion
for a directed verdict is the same as the standard for a motion for
summary judgment,70 the effect on the parties is markedly different.
A motion for summary judgment may deny a plaintiff her day in
court, whereas a motion for a directed verdict comes only at the close
of the evidence. 17' Moreover, summary judgment is particularly
inappropriate for resolving cases involving certain issues, such as
motive, which require the fact finder to evaluate the credibility of the
parties.172 Thus, because motive generally is a central issue in Title
167. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; cf. Brookins, supra note 7, at 964-65 (noting that the
"pretext-plus" passages of Hicks, read in conjunction with the "permissive" passages
allowing a verdict for the plaintiff on a showing of a prima facie case and pretext, place
Hicks in the middle ground of the continuum of circuits ranging from strict "pretext plus"
to strict "pretext only").
168. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08.
169. See Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991) (Baum, J.,
dissenting) ("[E]mployers and their counsel may well conclude that ... cases are won or
lost on summary judgment .... "); see also Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and
the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the 'Pretext Plus' Rule in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 67-68 n.38 (1991) (noting that motions for summary judgment
have become the primary battleground for employers in their attempts to avoid
employment discrimination trials).
170. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) (stating that judgment as a matter of law is
appropriate when "during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party"), with
FED. R. CIrv. P. 56(c) (stating that a grant of summary judgment is appropriate when the
evidence, taken together, shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law").
171. See Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment. Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM.
J. TRIAL ADvoc. 433,467-68 (1987).
172. See Hardin v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 451 U.S. 1008, 1008-10 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Hardin was a case brought under the ADEA. See id.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Rehnquist dissented from
denial of certiorari because he concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate
where issues of motive and intent were integral to the case. He contended:
It has long been established that it is inappropriate to resolve issues of
credibility, motive, and intent on motions for summary judgment. It is equally
clear that where such issues are presented, the submission of affidavits or
depositions is insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment.... [Tihis
Court has recently questioned the propriety of deciding defamation cases on
summary judgment where the defendant's state of mind is called into question
under the "actual malice" standard....
This case illustrates the frequency with which courts misapprehend the rule
against summary judgment....
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VII lawsuits,173 it is particularly damaging to resolve these cases at the
summary judgment phase.74 The dissent in Hicks feared that the
Court's holding would lead to just such a damaging result 7 5
The majority's holding in Hicks, however, strongly supports an
argument against routine disposition of Title VII cases on summary
judgment when the plaintiff has shown that the employer's offered
explanation is pretext.7 6 Hicks allows an inference of discrimination
to be made from a showing of pretext.77 In ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor
of the non-moving party.'78 Therefore, in deciding a motion for
summary judgment, an inference of discrimination may be drawn
from a showing of pretext.7 9  This conclusion is supported by
language in Hicks stating that upon the employer's production of a
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, the plaintiff
should have a "'full and fair opportunity' "to prove his case. 8' The
Court's emphasis on the importance of the ability of the Title VII
plaintiff to have this " 'full and fair opportunity'" makes it
particularly important that when summary judgment is urged against
Summary judgment simply may not be granted when such matters as the
defendant's motive and intent are questioned....
Just as summary judgment is inappropriate in qualified-immunity cases and in
defamation cases, it is inappropriate here.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citations omitted).
173. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,716
(1983) (noting that there will "seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's
mental processes"); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1071 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en bane) ("Cases charging discrimination are uniquely difficult to prove and
often depend on circumstantial evidence."); see also Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156
F.3d 1284, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in bane) (noting in an employment discrimination
case that the central issue for the jury was to determine the credibility of the plaintiff and
defendant).
174. See Hardin, 451 U.S. at 1008-10. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
175. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 535 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
176. See id. at 522-24 (explaining that the employer's proffered explanation will be
assessed by the factfinder and rebutted at trial, contemplating that the plaintiff will have
passed the summary judgment phase).
177. See id. at 511.
17& See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255 (1986).
179. See, e.g., Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1070-72 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (drawing such an inference in the context of a motion for judgment
non obstante verdicto); Wohl v. Spectrum Mfg., Inc., 94 F.3d 353, 358-59 (7th Cir. 1996)
(drawing such an inference in the context of summary judgment); Randle v. City of
Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421,
1434 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).
180. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256 (1981)).
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a plaintiff, courts should draw all inferences in favor of that plaintiff
as the non-moving party. 8' Because the trial court in Vaughan did
not draw an inference of discrimination from the showing of
pretext,' s2 the court denied Vaughan a" 'full and fair opportunity' "
to have her claim assessed by a trier of fact who would have weighed
the credibility and motives of the witnesses.18
Even if the Fourth Circuit had not followed this logic and
allowed plaintiffs to defeat motions for summary judgment
automatically upon a showing of pretext, Vaughan would almost
certainly have received a day in court under the more conservative
fact-sensitive standard.Y4 In Vaughan, the plaintiff had brought
181. See id.; see also Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255 (stating that "the evidence of
the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor").
182. Vaughan, 145 F. 3d at 202-04.
183. There is a legitimate question regarding whether a plaintiff who has merely raised
an issue of pretext by disputing the veracity of the employer's proffered reason would be
entitled to an inference of pretext and then an inference of discrimination from the
inference of pretext. However, this question should be answered in view of the clear
standard of Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 257, which stated that the non-moving party
must "present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor." Id Where
a Title VII plaintiff has presented evidence of pretext-not merely allegations-and
confronts a motion for summary judgment, the court ought properly to take the evidence
presented by the plaintiff as true and draw the inference of discrimination in favor of the
plaintiff from the evidence showing pretext. See id. at 252-55. The exception is when the
evidence showing pretext shows some other, nondiscriminatory reasons for the action,
thereby defeating the inference of discrimination. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156
F.3d 1284, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in banc) (stating that the inference of discrimination
should not be made either where there is only weak evidence of pretext and abundant
evidence that no discrimination occurred or where the evidence of pretext itself disproves
the notion of discrimination, such as when the plaintiff "shoots himself in the foot"). This
analysis is supported by common sense; when asked why an employer would lie when
faced with a charge of discrimination, unless the evidence of pretext points away from
discrimination, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the answer would be that the
employer lied to hide discrimination. See, e.g., Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-72 (adopting the
view that a plaintiff may always withstand summary judgment by demonstrating a genuine
issue regarding the veracity of the employer's proffered reason); see also Aka, 156 F.3d at
1292 (giving such evidence considerable weight, absent some reason to conclude that the
evidence of pretext does not point to discrimination); cf. Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 56
(1st Cir. 1995) (in which the defendant proffered a false reason for the employment
decision, but a legitimate reason was unearthed at trial). But cf. Fisher v. Vassar College,
114 F.3d 1332, 1346-47 (2d Cir. 1997) (in bane) (affording the showing of pretext varying
weight, depending on the weight of other evidence), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998),
reh'g denied, 118 S. Ct. 1341 (1998).
184. Cf. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1293 ("If the jury can infer that the employer's explanation is
not only a mistaken one in terms of the facts, but a lie, that should provide even stronger
evidence of discrimination.... The jury can conclude that an employer who fabricates a
false explanation has something to hide; that 'something' may well be discriminatory
intent."); Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1338 ("To the extent that an actor in defendant's position is
unlikely to have proffered a false explanation except to conceal a discriminatory motive,
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forward evidence of pretext that suggested the employer had actively
concealed its true reasons for terminating her.1 The Fourth Circuit
noted that the plaintiff had provided considerable evidence that the
employer's proffered reason was false and that the employer, despite
this showing, did not present evidence of any other reason."6 Thus,
Vaughan is a case in which the disbelief in the employer's proffered
reason should be coupled with a suspicion of deliberate deception,
making the inference of discrimination from the showing of pretext
particularly strong187
Vaughan is also distinguishable from the fact-sensitive
precedents in which a clear, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged decision emerged during discovery.' s In Vaughan, no
finding was made regarding the real reason for the employment
action.189 MetraHealth offered its downsizing manual as the reason
for Vaughan's termination, while Cooper offered the "subjective art
of management," and the court of appeals suggested that Meetz's
IMO experience and her clinical training as a dentist justified her
selection over Vaughan.190 Any of these reasons would be a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason if it was found to be true, but
the conflict between the defendant's own witnesses suggested that a
credibility determination was needed, a process which ordinarily is
then the false explanation will be powerful evidence of discrimination").
185. See Vaughan 145 F.3d at 201. In fact, the evidence offered by the employer itself
conflicted with the justification to which it clung. Cooper, the decision-maker, stated that
he had never seen the manual prior to his deposition, yet even in light of this undisputed
testimony, MetraHealth continued to insist that the guidelines in the manual were the
reason for the selection of Meetz over Vaughan. See id. at 200. If a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for MetraHealth's decision existed, one wonders why
MetraHealth never chose to discover and advance that reason for consideration.
186. See id at 201 ("While MetraHealth continues to insist that it has substantially
complied with the Downsizing Manual, we agree with the district court that Vaughan has
raised a genuine dispute over the credibility of the employer's proffered justification.").
187. Cf. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,511 (1993) (stating that where the
showing that the employer's proffered explanation was false was coupled with a suspicion
of mendacity that a verdict for the plaintiff would be appropriate).
188. Cf Chaffin v. Carter, No. 98-30155, 1999 WL 414269, at *3-4 (5th Cir. June 22,
1999) (upholding summary judgment for the employer in a Family Medical Leave Act case
in which the employer proffered a clear reason for firing the plaintiff after she refused to
justify drinking at a bar while taking an extended paid leave from work, and the employee
did not offer sufficient proof of pretext); Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1080
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding under the ADEA that the employee had failed to show pretext
and that the employer had provided a legitimate reason for firing the plaintiff, specifically
a failure to follow company procedures); Dalton, 71 F.3d at 56 (holding for the defendant
in a case in which the employer proffered a false reason for its employment decision, but a
legitimate reason-cronyism-was unearthed at trial).
189. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at202-03.
190. See id. at 200-03.
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left to the trier of fact.191 If the defendant's proffered explanations
were false, but the evidence showed a legitimate reason that a trier of
fact could find to be the true reason, then summary judgment might
be appropriate."9 However, because Vaughan was a case in which the
employer's proffered explanation seemed false, and no clear, true
explanation for the employment decision was presented, summary
judgment was not warranted.
Vaughan is also distinguishable from the fact-sensitive
precedents because no clear explanation emerged to show why the
employer lied about its decision. In Dalton, for example, the real
reason arguably was not revealed at the outset because the supervisor
did not want his employer to know that he had tweaked the hiring
process in favor of a fishing buddy.193 In Vaughan, however, no such
motive appeared for hiding the true reason for the firing.194 Thus,
Vaughan is a case where a fact-sensitive approach, such as that used
by the D.C. Circuit in Aka, 95 would draw a weighty inference of
discrimination because no other reason for the pretext, was clearly
established.u6
In addition to being inconsistent with the way that other circuit
courts have analyzed Hicks, Vaughan is also problematic because it
191. See, e.g., Combs v. Plantation Planters, 106 F.3d 1519, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citing Walker v. NationsBank of Florida, 53 F.3d 1548, 1563 (11th Cir. 1995) (Johnson, J.,
concurring specially)), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1045 (1998).
192. Mixed motive cases'are an exception. They occur when a plaintiff proves
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, but the defendant proves other,
legitimate reasons for the challenged action. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228,244-47 (1989). At that point, the employer may attempt to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the same decision would have been made, absent discrimination. See
id. In such cases, summary judgment against the plaintiff would be inappropriate. See id.
at 270-72 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining the fact pattern giving rise to
a mixed-motive case); Sam's Club v. NLRB, 160 F.3d 191, 200-01 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1998)
(explaining the Fourth Circuit's understanding of Price Waterhouse). However, this
standard for mixed-motive cases may not apply to the ADEA. See FRIEDMAN &
STRICKLER, supra note 4, at 984. Moreover, under the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of a
mixed-motive case, Vaughan's situation would not qualify because she did not have direct
evidence of discrimination and because the employer did not admit that discrimination
played a role in its employment decision. Cf. Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 200-01 (discussing
Vaughan's circumstantial evidence and the employer's repeated denial of discrimination).
193. See Dalton, 71 F.3d at 54-55.
194. For example, in Vaughan the court selected certain points from Cooper's
testimony to posit a legitimate reason for the selection of Meetz over Vaughan based on
experience and background. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 203. The court's analysis begs the
question as to why the employer did not proffer these reasons if they were true.
195. 156 F.3d 1284, 1292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
196. See id. at 1291 (stating that no inference would be drawn when the plaintiff's own
evidence of pretext points away from discrimination, thereby acknowledging an exception
to the D.C. Circuit's general proposition that evidence of pretext would be significant).
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sets a tougher standard at summary judgment than a plaintiff would
have to face at trial. Assume that the case had gone to trial and that
Vaughan had moved for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of
the evidence. 97 If the trial judge determined that MetraHealth's
proffered reason was unbelievable, that there was a suspicion of
mendacity because the reason was obviously inconsistent with other
evidence offered by the employer's own witnesses,' and that the
plaintiff had presented a prima facie case,199 the trial judge would,
under Hicks, be able to grant judgment as a matter of law to Vaughan
even if she had not introduced affirmative evidence of
discrimination.2 0 Alternatively, the trial judge could deny judgment
as a matter of law to the defendant and send the case to the jury.201
Given that judgment as a matter of law is permissible under Hicks at
the close of evidence, the holding that the same evidence would not
be sufficient to withstand a summary judgement motion by the
defendant seems at odds both with Hicks and with the ordinary
standard for summary judgment. 2
The analysis used by the Fourth Circuit in Vaughan also seems
inconsistent with the analysis that the court used in Hajoca in
reviewing denial of a motion for a judgment non obstante verdicto,20
which involves a standard of review similar to the one used on
summary judgments.1°4 In Hajoca, the court analyzed the evidence in
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
198. See Vaughan, 143 F.3d at 200-01.
199. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
200. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). But see Brookins,
supra note 7, at 952-53 (stating that under Hicks, a trial court may not direct a verdict
against an employer unless "'(1) any rational person would ... find the existence of facts
constituting a prima facie case, and (2) the defendant has failed to meet its burden of
production-i.e. has failed to introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason.' " (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509)).
In Hicks, the Court indicated that a directed verdict was compelled by the finding of a
prima facie case if the employer failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the challenged action; however, the Court did not say that this situation was the only
one in which a directed verdict would be permitted. Compare Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509
(noting that a case need only go to the factfinder if any rational person would find the
existence of a prima facie case and the employer has failed to produce a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions), with Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (noting that disbelief
of the defendant's reason will permit the factfinder to find discrimination).
201. See FED. R. Crv. P. 50(a).
202. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55
(1986).
203. 864 F.2d 317,319 (4th Cir. 1988).
204. See id. (stating that an appellate court should apply the same standard in
reviewing a directed verdict or a judgment non obstante verdicto as was used by the trial
court, namely, "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
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the aggregate and upheld the verdict for the plaintiff. 5 In Vaughan,
however, the Fourth Circuit never brought the evidence together in
its de novo review.20 6 Instead, the court first determined that the
finding of pretext by itself would not overcome the motion for
summary judgment.2° The court then determined that the evidence
of discrimination was not, by itself, enough to overcome a motion for
summary judgment.208 The court neglected to analyze whether the
inference of discrimination drawn from the fact that the employer
lied, together with the inference of discrimination drawn from the
evidence regarding the candidates' qualifications, the interview
procedure, and the termination of other older employees, was enough
to overcome a motion for summary judgment. However, it may be
significant to note that Vaughan specifically did not overturn
Haoca.20 9 Thus, it is possible to read Vaughan as holding only that a
plaintiff must show something more than the prima facie case plus
pretext to overcome summary judgment, rather than creating a new
requirement that the evidence offered apart from proof of pretext
must be enough by itself to overcome a motion for summary
judgment. 10
Vaughan establishes that, in the Fourth Circuit, Hicks will be
applied to require both a showing of pretext and evidence of
discrimination for a plaintiff to overcome summary judgment. This
requirement already has led the Fourth Circuit to cite to Vaughan to
affirm eight out of eight cases involving a district court's grant of
summary judgment to an employer under Title VII or the ADEA.1
moving party and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in his favor"); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at
254-55 (setting forth a similar standard for a motion for summary judgment).
205. See Hajoca, 864 F.2d at 319-21.
206. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 202-04; cf. Hajoca, 864 F.2d at 319-20 (considering all the
evidence presented in aggregate).
207. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 201-02.
208. See id. at 202-04.
209. See Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 200 (citing Hajoca with apparent approval); supra note
72 (discussing Vaughan's treatment of Hajoca).
210. Cf. Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 200 (citing Hajoca with apparent approval); cf. also Fultz
v. Mullican Lumber & Mfg. Co., No. Civ. A. 97-0295-B, 1999 WL 252659, at *2-4 (W.D.
Va. Feb. 12, 1999) (mem.) (citing Vaughan and stating that "a strong prima facie case of
age discrimination coupled with evidence of pretext may allow a finding of age
discrimination, without requiring additional evidence as to the 'plus' prong" (emphasis
added)).
211. Search of WESTLAW, keycite feature (July 25, 1999) (searching all citations to
"Vaughan v. MetraHealth, 145 F.3d 197"); see also Mason v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,
No. 98-1834, 1999 WL 436736, at *4, *10 (4th Cir. June 29, 1999) (per curiam)
(unpublished disposition) (citing Vaughan and affirming summary judgment for the
employer); Brunson v. Andrews Office & Supply Equip. Co., Inc., No. 98-2379, 1999 WL
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Similarly, the district courts in the Fourth Circuit have cited Vaughan
liberally to support rejections of plaintiff's claims.22 A standard that
sets the bar to the courtroom so high that plaintiffs routinely are
denied their day in court, particularly when they may have
meritorious claims, does not serve the purpose of Title VII to prevent
discrimination in employment. Indeed, the standard adopted in
Vaughan is practically an invitation to deception: Absent a "smoking
gun," the employer will win as long as it lies and sticks to that lie.214
Congress passed Title VII to end discrimination in the
workplace, and all interpretations under Title VII should be
performed with this goal in mind. 15 While the decision in Vaughan
may prevent meritless claims from going to trial, it also may bar
legitimate claims that would depend on the trial process to show
motive and intent.21 6 An alternative reading of the rule in Vaughan is
possible, however. Read in light of Hajoca, the holding in Vaughan
that the plaintiff must show more than a prima facie case and pretext
371598, at *1 (4th Cir. June 8, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished disposition) (same);
Larebo v. Clemson Univ., No. 98-2234, 1999 WL 152863, at *4-5 (4th Cir. Mar. 22, 1999)
(per curiam) (unpublished disposition) (same); Bailey v. University of N.C., No. 98-1501,
1998 WL 808220, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 23, 1998) (per curiam) (unpublished disposition)
(same); Presley v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 98-1016, 1998 WL 610873, at *34 (4th
Cir. Sept. 3, 1998) (per curiam) (unpublished disposition) (same); Tinsley v. First Union
Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 444-45 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); Thomas v. Randolph Hills
Nursing Ctr., No. 97-2642, 1998 WL 454088, at *2 (4th Cir. July 28, 1998) (per curiam)
(unpublished disposition) (same); Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 148 F.3d 413, 416-
17 (4th Cir. 1998) (same). But cf Dockins v. Benchmark Communications, 1999 WL
292103, at *5 (4th Cir. Mar. 29, 1999) (upholding summary judgment for the employer
without citing Vaughan); id at *5-6 (King, J., dissenting) (citing Vaughan to dispute the
majority's decision).
212. See, e.g., Venable v. Apfel, 19 F. Supp. 2d 455, 461-65 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (citing
Vaughan and granting summary judgment to the employer); see also Love v. J.C. Penney
Co., No. 4:97CV00549, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17300, at *36 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 1998)
(granting summary judgment to the employer in an ADEA claim).
213. See Taxman v. Board of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996) (in
banc) (discussing the legislative history of Title VII).
214. Cf. Brookins, supra note 7, passim (criticizing Hicks as being susceptible to a
"pretext plus" interpretation and thus rewarding an employer for lying).
215. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
(" 'The phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" evinces a congressional
intent "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women" in
employment .... '" (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 702 n.12
(1978)))).
216. See Hardin v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 451 U.S. 1008, 1008-10 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating in an ADEA case that the showing of
discrimination turned on the defendant's intent and noting that issues of motive and intent
are not appropriately resolved on summary judgment); cf. Brookins, supra note 7, at 953-
57 (criticizing Hicks as adopting anti-plaintiff evidentiary standards).
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to overcome summary judgment could still allow courts to include the
inference of discrimination from the showing of pretext along with
other evidence of discrimination, and thus would permit a more fact-
sensitive approach to summary judgment motions. In turn, courts
would gain more flexibility to allow potentially meritorious claims to
go forward.217 Ultimately, the Supreme Court or Congress should
address the growing debate among the circuits so that courts can
apply a uniform standard of proof for overcoming summary judgment
under Title VII and the ADEA.2 18
JESSICA MOLLIE MARLIES
217. Compare Hajoca, 864 F.3d at 319-21 (including the evidence offered to show
pretext in the pool of evidence showing discrimination), with Vaughan, 145 F.3d at 201-02
(stating that a plaintiff may. survive a motion for summary judgment if she has produced
some evidence on which a jury could base a finding of discrimination). See generally
Moheban, supra note 95, at 955-58 (praising the First Circuit's flexible interpretation of
Hicks as allowing motions for summary judgment by defendant's to be upheld or denied
on a showing of a prima facie case and pretext).
218. Cf Brookins, supra note 7, at 994-95 (stating that the decision in Hicks was an
intentional attack on Title VII and that Congress should come forth with evidentiary and
procedural rules under Title VII).
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O'Brien v. O'Brien: The Changing Nature of Property Under
the Equitable Distribution Laws in North Carolina
When a husband and wife seek a divorce, the trial court is faced
with the daunting task of equitably distributing the couple's marital
property between the two.' Equitable distribution of marital property
does not necessarily require an equal division.2 Rather, it requires a
fair division that allows for the return of each spouse's investment in
property acquired by the marital estate Consequently, equitable
division of marital property furthers the state's policy of treating
marriage as a partnership.' It also ensures that each spouse's
contributions made prior to or during the marriage are returned to
that spouse at the end of the marriage.'
In 1981, the North Carolina legislature adopted the Equitable
Distribution Act (the "Act") to facilitate the division of property
upon divorce.' Before a trial court divides a couple's property, the
Act requires the court to classify each item as "marital" or "separate"
property The court is allowed to divide marital property equitably
1. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a) (1995 & 1998 Supp.) ("[T]he court shall
determine what is marital property and shall provide for an equitable distribution of the
marital property . ").
2. See Sally Burnett Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable
Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REV. 195, 244 (1987). Amendments to the
Equitable Distribution Act, however, have created a statutory presumption that equitable
means equal. See id. Thus, the trial court must divide the property equally unless one of
the parties can establish that an unequal distribution is equitable. See White v. White, 312
N.C. 770, 776, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832-35 (1985). The trial court must make detailed findings
of fact to support an unequal property distribution. See § 50-200).
3. See generally Suzanne Reynolds, Increases in Separate Property and the Evolving
Marital Partnership, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 249-58 (1989) (tracing the concept of
returning each spouse's investment back to Spanish civil law and concluding that the
modern common law's treatment of marriage as a partnership is based on this concept).
4. See Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665, 668-69, 321 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1984); White
v. White, 64 N.C. App. 432, 432-33, 308 S.E.2d 68, 69 (1983), modified and aff'd, 312 N.C.
770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985); Sharp, supra note 2, at 198.
5. See Reynolds, supra note 3, at 249; Sharp, supra note 2, at 198; Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REV. 21, 43 (1994).
6. See Act of July 3,1981, ch. 815,1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, 50-21 (1995 & 1998 Supp.)).
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a) (requiring courts to classify property by allowing
courts to only distribute marital property). Marital property is defined by the statute as all
property acquired during marriage and before separation "except property determined to
be separate property." § 50-20(b). Marital property is thought of as property that goes
into the "marital pot." See Harriet N. Cohen & Patricia Hennessey, Valuation of Property
in Marital Dissolutions, 23 FAM. L.Q. 339, 342 (1989); Sally Burnett Sharp, Step By Step:
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between the divorcing couple, while separate property goes to the
spouse that owns it.8 One question that has consistently plagued the
courts is how to classify increases in the value of separate property
that occur during the marriage.9
In North Carolina, equitable distribution has undergone a series
of changes since the adoption of the Act.10 The statute was amended
most recently in October 1997 to create a third category of property-
"divisible property."" No cases interpreting the 1997 amendments
have reached the North Carolina Court of Appeals. 2 In O'Brien v.
O'Brien,3 however, the appellate court recently decided issues under
the earlier version of the equitable distribution statute that also will
affect the interpretation of the newest amendments.'4 In O'Brien, the
court of appeals examined the classification and distribution of the
appreciation in an investment account where the account was
The Development of the Distributive Consequences of Divorce, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2017,2120
(1998). Only the property in this "marital pot" is subject to division and distribution
between the parties. See § 50-20(a). Because it distinguishes between marital and
separate property, North Carolina is considered a dual-property state. See Reynolds,
supra note 3, at 245. Some states, on the other hand, divide all property owned by both
spouses or either spouse at divorce. See id. The newest amendments to North Carolina's
Equitable Distribution Act have created a third category- "divisible property." See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4) (1998 Supp.). Now, trial courts must determine whether
property is marital, separate or divisible. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text
(discussing divisible property in more detail).
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a)-(b) (1995 & 1998 Supp.). For further discussion
of separate property, see infra notes 55-66.
9. See Reynolds, supra note 3, at 245; infra notes 63-97 (discussing post-separation
appreciation).
10. See generally Sharp, supra note 2, at 198 (surveying changes in case law and
legislative changes to the equitable distribution statute).
11. See Act of July 7, 1997, chs. 212, 302, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 406, 712 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, 50-21 (Supp. 1998)) (amending the Equitable
Distribution Act to allow for distribution of divisible property and retirement benefits);
Kelly Falls Miller, Family Law, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 459,461 (1998) (discussing divisible
property and what is included within the statutory definition); Sharp, supra, note 7, at 2119
(defining divisible property as marital and separate property that increases or decreases in
value between the date of separation and the date of distribution); see also infra notes 98-
103 and accompanying text (discussing divisible property).
12. The amount of time it takes to get to the appellate courts has, as of yet, precluded
appellate interpretation of the 1997 amendments. None of the property divisions that has
reached the appellate courts to date has been decided after October 1997, when the
amendments took effect. See § 50-20; see also Sharp, supra note 7, at 2107 (discussing the
slow pace of the appellate process as the reason for the lack of interpretation of the
amendments).
13. 131 N.C. App. 411, 508 S.E.2d 300 (1998), disc. rev. denied, 350 N.C. 98 (1999).
14. The amendments only applied to equitable distribution proceedings filed on or
after October 1, 1997. See Act of July 7, 1997, ch. 302, § 3, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 712, 717.
O'Brien was not decided pursuant to the 1997 amendments because the property
distribution took place in May 1997. See id. at 414, 508 S.E.2d at 304.
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separate property. 5 The court held that the appreciation was also
separate property and, therefore, was not subject to equitable
distribution despite active management of the account by both
spouses during the marriage. 6
This Note discusses the facts of O'Brien, its history in the trial
court, and the appeals court's disposition of the case. 7 The Note then
reviews the evolution of the distinction between "passive" and
"active" increases in the value of property under North Carolina law
and the effect that distinction has on the distribution of property.18
Next, the Note discusses O'Brien's impact on the classification and
valuation of separate property. 9 Finally, the Note examines the
holding's potential effects on future equitable distribution issues
regarding investment accounts in the context of separate property,
which was at issue in O'Brien, and in the context of divisible property,
the new classification of property created by the 1997 amendments. 0
Richard and Mabel O'Brien were married for more than twenty
years.2' After the couple had been married for approximately ten
years, Mrs. O'Brien received a large inheritance from her father,
which she placed in an investment account titled in both her
husband's name and her own. When it was opened, the account
contained $168,000.3 The O'Briens deposited $4500 of marital funds
and withdrew $38,658 from the account for marital purposes over the
course of the next few years.24 At one point, a drop in the stock
market reduced the account's value by approximately $20,000. 2 By
the time of the divorce, however, the investment account had
increased in value by $44,000 over the original balance due to market
15. See id. at 420,508 S.E.2d at 306.
16. See id. at 421, 508 S.E.2d at 307.
17. See infra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 44-103 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 104-45 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
21. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 414,508 S.E.2d at 303.
22. See id. Following an investment broker's suggestion, Mrs. O'Brien listed the
account as a joint account with right of survivorship. See id. In North Carolina, the titling
of an account as joint property is irrelevant to its categorization upon dissolution of the
marriage. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §50-20(b)(2) (1995 & 1998 Supp.). Rather, any
inheritance or gift received by either spouse is treated as separate property pursuant to the
statutory definition of separate property. See id. ("[P]roperty ... shall remain separate
property regardless of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife or both
23. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 414,508 S.E.2d at 303.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 415, 508 S.E.2d at 303. At this time, the account was worth
approximately $119,000. See id.
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gains, dividends, and share reinvestment.26
When the O'Briens filed for divorce, Mr. O'Brien argued that
the appreciation in the account was marital property because it was
the result of investment decisions that the couple made together
during the marriage. As a result, he asked the court to classify both
the account and the appreciation as marital property subject to
division and distribution under the Equitable Distribution Act.27 The
trial court, however, classified the entire investment account as the
separate property of Mrs. O'Brien 8 The court found that only $4550
of the investment account came from marital funds, and that those
funds were consumed when the couple made their first withdrawal
from the account.2 9 Therefore, no marital funds remained in the
account at the time of separation. 0
Addressing the appreciation claim, the court ruled that the
appreciation's classification as marital or separate property depended
on whether the increase in value was the result of active efforts during
26. See id. at 415,508 S.E.2d at 304. The account value also increased because of gifts
from Mrs. O'Brien's aunt, Mabel Dozier Stone. See id. at 415, 508 S.E.2d at 303-04.
During the course of two years, Ms. Stone attempted to take advantage of the gift tax
exemption, that allows people to give up to $10,000 annually to each relative tax-free. See
26 U.S.C.A. § 2001 (1998 Supp.); O'Brien, 113 N.C. App. at 415, 508 S.E.2d at 304.
Consequently, Ms. Stone gave Mr. and Mrs. O'Brien $10,000 each two years in a row, but
sent a note to Mr. O'Brien with each gift indicating that the money actually was intended
for his wife. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 422, 508 S.E.2d at 308. Approximately $25,000
of this gift money was deposited in the investment account, and $10,000 was spent on the
purchase of a car for Mrs. O'Brien. See id Based on the intent of the donor, the court
characterized the $20,000 in gifts from Ms. Stone to Mr. O'Brien as gifts to Mrs. O'Brien
and, therefore, as part of Mrs. O'Brien's separate property. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at
423,508 S.E.2d at 308; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (including gifts received by
either spouse during marriage within the definition of separate property).
27. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 419-420,508 S.E.2d at 306-07.
28. See id. at 421, 423, 508 S.E.2d at 306, 307. The title to the investment account was
irrelevant to the categorization of the property because property remains separate
"regardless of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife or both." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1995 & 1998 Supp.).
29. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 419, 508 S.E.2d at 306. The court used $4550
because this figure was the amount of marital funds deposited into the account over the
course of three years. See id. at 414, 508 S.E.2d at 303. During that same period, the
couple withdrew $38,658. See id. The court stated that these withdrawals were for marital
purposes. See id. The court of appeals has previously held that separate property retains
its separate character in a bank account if the account level never drops below the amount
of separate property invested in the account. See Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C. App. 332, 334,
324 S.E.2d 287, 288 (1985). In addition to arguing about the $4550, Mr. O'Brien argued
that the amount given to him by his wife's aunt should have been treated as a deposit of
his separate property into the account, but the trial court treated that money as a deposit
of Mrs. O'Brien's separate property, pursuant to Ms. Stone's intent. See O'Brien, 131 N.C.
App. at 423, 508 S.E.2d at 308.
30. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 419, 508 S.E.2d at 304.
1999] 2283
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the marriage or passive appreciation." Active appreciation occurs
when marital efforts or funds are expended to increase the value of an
asset.32 Such appreciation is considered marital property by the North
Carolina courts and, therefore, can be divided and distributed.33
Passive appreciation typically refers to growth that results from
events outside the control of either spouse, such as inflation or
interest, and is classified as separate property not subject to division
and distribution.Y The O'Brien trial court found that the increase
had been passive despite Mr. O'Brien's meeting with an investment
broker and selecting investments based on the broker's advice.35
Therefore, the court ruled that the account was not subject to
distribution between the parties.36 Based on the trial court's findings,
Mrs. O'Brien was entitled to the entire investment account, including
its accumulated appreciation.3 7
Mr. O'Brien appealed the trial court's findings regarding the
separate nature of the investment account itself, as well as its
appreciation. 8 The court of appeals upheld the findings on both
issues.39 The appellate decision regarding the passive appreciation of
the account is the first in North Carolina to discuss the passive/active
distinction with respect to the appreciation of stocks, securities,
mutual funds, or investment accounts. 0
In addressing the passive/active issue, the court of appeals
developed a multi-factored test to evaluate whether a spouse's
involvement with investments is substantial enough to classify
appreciation in the investment as active and, therefore, marital
31. See id. at 420, 508 SE.2d at 307.
32. See id. at 420,508 S.E.2d at 306.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 421, 508 S.E.2d at 307.
36. See id; see also Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 379-81, 325 S.E.2d 260, 268-69
(1985) (discussing the differences between passive and active appreciation for the
purposes of property distribution); infra notes 44-103 and accompanying text (discussing
the development of the definitions of passive and active appreciation).
37. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 421,508 S.E.2d at 307.
38. See idL at 416,508 S.E.2d at 304.
39. See id. at 421, 423, 508 S.E.2d at 306, 307. The standard of review for findings
regarding property distribution is abuse of discretion. See id. at 416, 508 S.E.2d at 304; see
also Beightol v. Beightol, 90 N.C. App. 58, 60, 367 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1988) ("The
distribution of marital property is vested in the discretion of the trial courts and the
exercise of that discretion will not be upset absent clear abuse."). The court of appeals
noted in O'Brien that this standard required it to uphold the trial court's findings unless
they were "unsupported by any competent evidence." O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 416-17,
508 S.E.2d at 304 (citing Beightol, 90 N.C. App. at 60,367 S.E.2d at 348).
40. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 420,508 S.E.2d at 307.
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property subject to equitable distribution.4' The court held that trial
judges should consider the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case, such as
(1) the nature of the investment; (2) the extent to which the
investment decisions are made only by the party or parties,
made by the party or parties in consultation with their
investment broker, or solely made by the investment broker;
(3) the frequency of contact between the investment broker
and the parties; (4) whether the parties routinely made
investment decisions in accordance with the
recommendation of the investment broker, and the
frequency with which the spouses made investment
decisions contrary to the advice of the investment broker;
(5) whether the spouses conducted their own research and
regularly monitored the investments in their accounts, or
whether they primarily relied on information supplied by the
investment broker; and (6) whether the decisions or other
activities, if any, made solely by the parties directly
contributed to the increased value of the investment
account.42
In O'Brien, the court held that the husband's meetings with the
investment broker, along with his selecting from investment
alternatives based on the broker's advice, did not constitute
substantial activity sufficient to establish active appreciation.43
The distinction between passive and active appreciation at issue
in O'Brien is important in two areas of equitable distribution law in
North Carolina. The first, illustrated by the O'Brien case itself, is in
determining whether the appreciation of separate assets that occurs
during the course of a marriage is marital or separate property. The
second is in the disposing of appreciation of marital assets that
accrues after a divorcing couple separates, but before the couple's
property is divided by the courts.
Property distribution in North Carolina requires three steps. The
court must (1) classify what part of the property is marital and what
part is separate, (2) calculate the net value of the marital property,
41. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a) (1995 & 1998 Supp.); O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at
421, 508 S.E.2d at 307.
42 O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 421,508 S.E.2d at 307.
43. Id. Because establishing the appreciation as active converts it from separate
property into marital property, the appreciation would be part of the "marital pot" subject
to equitable division if the court had held that the appreciation was active. See § 50-20(a).
Conversely, the court's holding that it was passive appreciation rendered the property
separate and, therefore, outside the scope of property division. See id.; O'Brien, 131 N.C.
App. at 421, 508 S.E.2d at 307.
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and (3) distribute the marital property equitably based on a number
of factors." Classification, the first step of property distribution, was
the central issue in O'Brien.' To determine what is marital property
and what is separate property, North Carolina courts first consider
the definition of those terms in the Equitable Distribution Act.46 The
Act defines marital property as property that was acquired by one or
both spouses during the course of the marriage before separation and
that is still owned by the spouses at the time the court distributes the
marital assets. The statute establishes a presumption that "all
property acquired after the date of marriage and before the date of
separation is marital property except property which is separate
property .... This presumption may be rebutted by the greater
weight of the evidence."4
The court of appeals has developed a scheme of dual burdens of
proof to classify property as either marital or separate under the
statute.49 According to this scheme, the party seeking to classify an
44. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 417, 508 S.E.2d at 304-05 (citing Beightol, 90 N.C.
App. at 63, 367 S.E.2d at 350); Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 470, 433 S.E.2d 196, 202
(1993), rev'd on other grounds, 336 N.C. 575, 444 S.E.2d 420 (1994); McIver v. McIver, 92
N.C. App. 116, 124, 374 S.E.2d 144, 149 (1988); Seifert v. Seifert, 82 N.C. App. 329, 334,
346 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1986), affd and remanded, 319 N.C. 367, 354 S.E.2d 506 (1987); Cable
v. Cable, 76 N.C. App. 134, 137,331 S.E.2d 765,767 (1985).
Under the statute, equitable factors considered by the courts include the duration
of the marriage, the age and health of both parties, the expectation of pension or
retirement rights that are not marital property, direct or indirect contributions made by
one spouse to the education or career of the other, and tax consequences to both parties.
See § 50-20(c)(1)-(12).
45. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 417,508 S.E.2d at 305.
46. See id.; see also Cable, 76 N.C. App. at 137,331 S.E.2d at 767 ("Classification must
be according to the statutory definitions of separate property and marital property.").
47. See § 50-20(b)(1).
48. Id. Nine states have created a statutory presumption that property that is
acquired during the marriage by either spouse is marital property. See LAWRENCE J.
GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 5.03, at 94-95 & n.10 (1983) (listing
Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia). In 1985, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided two cases that adopted
this presumption. See McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 157, 327 S.E.2d 910, 918
(1985) (speaking of the presumption of marital property as a "judicial gloss" on the
language of the statute); Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 209, 324 S.E.2d 33, 38 (1985)
("Guided by the legislative intent, we hold that the language of the Act ... creates a
presumption that all property acquired by the parties during the course of the marriage is
'marital property.'" (citations omitted)). To the extent that these cases purported to
create a presumption of marital property, they were overruled by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1986. See Johnson v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 437, 454 n.4, 346 S.E.2d 430,
440 n.4 (1986).
49. See Atkins v. Atkins, 102 N.C. App. 199, 207, 401 S.E.2d 784, 788 (1991). In
Atkins, the husband's mother gave the husband and wife a tract of land titled in both their
names as tenants by the entirety. See id. at 202, 401 S.E.2d at 786. The husband argued
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asset as marital property must demonstrate that the property meets
the requirements as defined in the Equitable Distribution Act."
Then, the burden shifts to the party seeking to classify the property as
separate5 to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property meets the definition of separate property found in the Act.52
If both parties meet their burdens of proof, the statutory scheme
requires the court to classify the property as separate. 3
The categorization of marital property, then, by definition,
depends on the definition of separate property.54 Separate property is
defined as "all real and personal property acquired by a spouse
before marriage or acquired by a spouse by bequest, devise, descent,
or gift during the course of the marriage."'55 When separate property
is sold or otherwise exchanged, the statute states that the new assets
remain separate property regardless of whether the title is in the
name of the husband, wife, or both, "unless a contrary intention is
expressly stated in the conveyance. '56  The statute also classifies
"[t]he increase in value of separate property and the income derived
from separate property... [as] separate property. 57
As originally applied by the courts, the statute created a broad
definition of separate property58 that threatened to defeat the
purposes of the Equitable Distribution Act-to treat marriage as a
partnership and repay each spouse's contributions to the marital
estate. 9 The North Carolina Court of Appeals began to rein in the
that the tract of land was separate property because he received it from his mother in
exchange for separate property. See id. at 206, 401 S.E.2d at 787. The court of appeals
held that the wife met her burden of proving the marital nature of the property, and that
the husband failed to meet his burden of proof that the property was separate. See id. at
207, 401 S.E.2d at 788. Thus, the trial court appropriately characterized the property as
marital. See id. The court of appeals concluded that the party seeking to classify property
as marital or separate must prove the nature of the property by the preponderance of the
evidence. See id.
50. See id. For a list of the requirements, see supra text accompanying note 47.
51. See Atkins, 102 N.C. App. at 206,401 S.E.2d at 787-88.
52 See id. Separate property is defined as property acquired by one spouse before
marriage or by bequest, gift, devise or dissent during marriage. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(b)(2) (1995 & 1998 Supp.); infra text accompanying notes 55-57.
53. See Atkins, 102 N.C. App. at 206,401 S.E.2d at 788.
54. For further discussion of how this statutory definition of marital property creates
contradictory conclusions when compared with the statutory definition of separate
property, see Farleigh Hailes Earhart, Note, McLean v. McLean: North Carolina Adopts
the Gift Presumption in Equitable Distribution, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1990).
55. § 50-20(b)(2).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Sharp, supra note 2, at 222.
59. See Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665,668-69,321 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1984); White
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expanding scope of separate property in Wade v. Wade.60 In Wade,
the husband purchased a tract of land prior to marriage and titled it
solely in his name. During the marriage, he constructed a house on
the land, using some of his own funds and some of his wife's funds. 61
Upon divorce, he argued that the house and the land were his
separate property because the land was acquired before marriage and
the house constituted merely'an increase in the value of the
property.62 The court of appeals held that the statutory definition of
separate property, which classifies increases in value of separate
property as separate,63 was referring only to passive increases. 64 The
court explained that passive increases result from forces such as
inflation, rather than contributions, monetary or otherwise, by one or
both spouses.' Passive appreciation remains separate property, but
active contribution to separate property is considered marital
property and, therefore, is subject to equitable distribution.66
Since Wade, the North Carolina courts have refined the
distinction between passive and active appreciation to determine
when increases in value can be treated as marital property. In
Lawing v. Lawing,67 for example, the court of appeals elaborated on
its definition of passive appreciation. The Lawings had been married
v. White, 64 N.C. App. 432, 432-33, 308 S.E.2d 68, 69 (1983), modified and affd, 312 N.C.
770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985); Sharp, supra note 2, at 198; Sally Burnett Sharp, Equitable
Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C. L. REV. 247,
260-61 (1983); see also infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text (explaining how an
expanded definition of separate property defeats the goals of the Act).
60. 72 N.C. App. 372,325 S.E.2d 260 (1985).
61. See id. at 377,325 S.E.2d at 267.
62. See id. at 378-79, 325 S.E.2d at 267. The Act defines increases in the value of
separate property as separate property. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1995 & 1998
Supp.); see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing this provision).
63. See § 50-20(b)(2).
64. See Wade, 72 N.C. App. at 380,325 S.E.2d at 268.
65. See id. at 379, 325 S.E.2d at 268. The court explained its creation of a distinction
between passive and active appreciation by detailing the unfair results that had been
occurring based on a literal reading of the statute. See id. For example, if a husband
entered into marriage owning his own business, it would be considered his separate
property. Even if the wife helped him run the business for twenty years of marriage, upon
divorce, a literal reading of the statute required that the entire appreciation of the business
would go to the husband. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Leatherman, 297 N.C. 618, 619-22, 256
S.E.2d 793, 794-96 (1979). The Wade court noted that this result is inequitable, and stated
that the Act should be construed broadly as a remedial provision, in that it was "enacted
to ensure a fairer distribution of marital assets than under the common law rules." Wade,
72 N.C. App. at 379, 325 S.E.2d at 267-68. In essence, the court of appeals rewrote the
statute because the legislature originally wrote it in a way that produced unfair results.
66. See § 50-20(a).
67. 81 N.C. App. 159,344 S.E.2d 100 (1986).
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for more than forty years when they sought a divorce." Both the
husband and wife disputed the trial court's classification of various
family businesses. In particular, the wife argued that the appreciation
in shares of a closely held family business that the husband had
inherited from his father should have been classified as marital
property.69 The court of appeals noted that "increases in value
remained separate property only to the extent that the increases were
passive, as opposed to active appreciation resulting from the
contributions of the parties during the marriage. '7  The parties
agreed that the wife was very active in the management and
operation of the business during the marriage.71 The court of appeals,
however, held that the appreciation in the shares resulted in part from
the active efforts of a third party who managed the corporation.
Based on this management, the court rejected the wife's argument
that the entire appreciation was marital property, stating that it saw
no distinction between "'passive' increases in separate property
(interest, inflation) and 'active' increases brought about by the labor
of third parties for whom neither spouse has responsibility." 3 Thus,
the court held that the portion of the increase in value that was
attributable to the marital efforts of either spouse should be classified
as marital property, but the portion attributable to the efforts of a
third party would be classified as passive and, therefore, separate
property.7 4
In determining whether appreciation is active, courts focus on
whether marital funds or marital efforts have been invested in the
separate property to generate the increase in value7 The court of
appeals articulated the amount of effort necessary to establish active
appreciation in Beightol v. Beightol.76 The husband in Beightol
68. See id. at 161, 344 S.E.2d at 103.
69. See id. at 176, 344 S,E.2d at 110. The inheritance itself was separate property
regardless of when it was received under the statutory definition of separate property. See
§ 50-20(b)(2).
70. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. at 174, 344 S.E.2d at 111 (citing McLeod v. McLeod, 74
N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910 (1985); Phillips v. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. 68, 326 S.E.2d 57
(1985)).
71. See id. at 176,344 S.E.2d at 112.
72. See id. at 175,344 S.E.2d at 111.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 176, 344 S.E.2d at 112. By characterizing the increase in value as passive,
the court of appeals necessarily categorized it as the separate property of the husband. It
is unclear why the husband was any more entitled than the marital estate to the
appreciation -attributable to a third party.
75. See GOLDEN, supra note 48, § 5.39, at 159 (Brett R. Turner, ed., Supp. 1993).
76. 90 N.C. App. 58,61-62,367 S.E.2d 347,349 (1988).
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asserted that rental income earned during marriage from his
separately owned condominium property was passive appreciation in
value and should be treated as separate property.77 The wife argued
that the property's increased value was the result of active
appreciation because both personal efforts and marital funds were
expended in maintaining it.78 Her personal efforts included making
mortgage payments, communicating with the property manager, and
cleaning and decorating the condominium.79 The husband conceded
these actions but argued that they fell within the wife's spousal duty
of support"0 and, therefore, were de minimis contributions."' The
court of appeals disagreed, holding that the property's increased
value was active appreciation due to the wife's efforts and the
expenditure of marital funds for mortgage paymentsY2 It dismissed
the husband's characterization of the wife's marital efforts, explaining
that "no rule of law ... even intimates that a non-titled spouse should
be penalized and not allowed a return on his or her investment
because the efforts expended were characteristic of those which a
caring and loving spouse would have performed in any event."' 3
Courts have often struggled with changes in property value that
occur after separation but before property distribution.84 In 1988, the
court of appeals held in Truesdale v. Truesdale"5 that post-separation
appreciation is not marital property-and therefore not subject to
equitable distribution-because it does not occur while the marriage
is still intact.8 6 Instead, the spouse who is awarded the underlying
77. Id. at 59-60, 367 S.E.2d at 348-49.
78. See id. at 60,367 S.E.2d at 349.
79. See id.
80. The duty of support refers to the personal obligation of each spouse to support the
other. See, e.g., Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 357, 430 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1993)
(noting that the duty of support arises from the marital relationship).
81. See Beightol, 90 N.C. App. at 60,367 S.E.2d at 349.
82. See id. at 62,367 S.E.2d at 349-50.
83. Id. at 60-61, 367 S.E.2d at 349.
84. North Carolina courts have traditionally evaluated marital property for the
purposes of equitable distribution based on the date of separation. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-20(a), (b)(1) (1995 & 1998 Supp.) (stating that the court only has the power to divide
marital property, and defining marital property as property acquired before the date of
separation). However, the value of the property may change significantly between that
date and the date the division takes place, since the most common form of divorce can be
obtained only if the parties separate for at least one year. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6
(1995). The legislature created "divisible" property to address this problem. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4)(a)-(d) (1998 Supp.); see also infra notes 98-103 (discussing
divisible property). The new category allows courts to divide some property acquired
after separation, but before distribution. See § 50-20(b)(4)(a)-(d).
85. 89 N.C. App. 445,446,366 S.E.2d 512,514 (1988).
86. See id. at 448, 336 S.E.2d at 514; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1)-(2)
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asset receives the full amount of appreciation.' However, the court
held that trial judges should take into account the causes and effects
of post-separation appreciation along with the other factors identified
by the Act in devising the most equitable distribution of the marital
assets.s In other words, while post-separation appreciation is not
included in the marital pot, courts can adjust the way they divide
marital property based on the fact that one spouse will receive the
benefit of the post-separation appreciation. 9
In 1994, the North Carolina Supreme Court handed down a
ruling in Smith v. Smith" suggesfing that post-separation appreciation
may also be a positive factor in equitable distribution where a spouse
has worked actively to achieve the growth. Toward this end, the
court held that trial courts are required to make findings of fact
concerning whether post-separation appreciation is active or passive
to help weigh the appreciation against other equitable distribution
factors.91  The court held that findings of fact are required-even
though post-separation increases cannot be distributed as marital
property-because the trial court must take the parties' post-
separation activities into account in distributing the marital
property.92 This additional fact-finding is helpful because if the court
(1995 & 1998 Supp.) (defining marital and separate property); Sharp, supra note 2, at 204
(discussing difficulties of defining marital and separate property at the date of separation,
rather than the date of distribution).
87. See § 50-20(a), (b)(2).
88. See Truesdale, 89 N.C. App. at 448-49, 366 S.E.2d at 514-15. In Truesdale, the
issue was the appreciation of the parties' marital home after their separation. See id. at
446,366 S.E.2d at 514.
89. The effect of this holding can be illustrated with a hypothetical couple who have a
marital home worth $100,000 and a business in one spouse's name, which is operating at a
loss at the time of separation, but is worth $500,000 on the date that equitable distribution
takes place. Cf. Nye v. Nye, 100 N.C. App. 326, 327, 396 S.E.2d 91, 92 (1990) (involving
the equitable distribution of a couple's assets where the defendant's business had no net
value at the date of separation, but was worth $568,547.35 at distribution). If the court
treats the increase in business value as part of the marital pot, it will divide the $600,000 in
total assets between the husband and wife. However, if the increase in value is not
included within the marital pot and instead is treated merely as a distributionial factor, the
owner of the business will get the full $500,000 increase, and the court will only have the
authority to divide the value of the $100,000 home. Even if the court determines that the
most equitable distribution is to give the bulk of the marital estate to the spouse that does
not own the business, that spouse will receive far less than if the business was included in
the marital pot. See Chandler v. Chandler, 108 N.C. App. 66, 68, 422 S.E.2d 587, 589
(1992); GOLDEN, supra note 48, § 5.02, at 93.
90. 336 N.C. 575,444 S.E.2d 420 (1994).
91. See idL at 580,444 S.E.2d at 423.
92. See id.; see also § 50-20(c)(11a) (stipulating that when developing an equitable
distribution plan, courts should consider, among other factors, each party's efforts to
expand, preserve, or waste the marital assets); Mishier v. Mishler, 90 N.C. App. 72, 77-78,
1999] 2291
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
is to determine which distributional factors to consult upon division of
the property, it must have a record of whether the post-separation
increases in value were the result of a spouse's efforts. 3 If a spouse is
actively responsible for the post-separation appreciation of an asset,
presumably those actions would benefit the spouse as a consideration
in the equitable distribution of the marital property. Although the
appreciation for which the spouse may have been responsible is not
divided as marital property, that spouse may receive a larger portion
of the marital estate to compensate him for his efforts.
By holding as it did, the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated
the majority of the court of appeals decision and implicitly adopted
the reasoning of Judge Greene, who had concurred in part and
dissented in part on the court of appeals.94 In his opinion, Judge
Greene equated the definition of active appreciation of pre-
separation appreciation with the definition of active appreciation of
post-separation appreciation.9 He first stated that evidence of the
"acts" of either spouse is important in two separate and distinct
distributional factors. 6 He then noted, "[a]ny resulting increase (or
decrease) in the value of marital property is 'active' in nature, as that
term has been used in the context of separate property occurring during
the marriage."' His analysis equated the definitions in this one
sentence, as if it was obvious that the definitions would be the same in
the two different contexts.
The entire case law on post-separation appreciation, however,
has been thrown into question by the passage of the 1997
amendments to the Equitable Distribution Act. The amendments
created a new category of property-"divisible property"-to resolve
the problems raised in Truesdale and later cases about property
367 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1998) (remanding case for the trial court to consider whether the
post-separation appreciation was active or passive).
93. See Smith, 336 N.C. at 580, 444 S.E.2d at 423. If the increase was "passive"-that
is, if it resulted from forces other than a spouse's efforts-the court must consider the
distributional factors under section 50-20(c). As one commentator has explained, "A
court cannot determine which distributional factor is applicable if it does not first
distinguish between post-separation increases in value due to a spouse's efforts (active
appreciation) and the increases due to other causes (passive appreciation)." K. Edward
Greene, Active/Passive Appreciation, Post-Separation Activity and Income, EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION (Wake Forest University Continuing Legal Education, Winston-Salem,
N.C.), Feb., 1994, at 227.
94. See Smith, 336 N.C. at 580,444 S.E.2d at 423.
95. See Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 518-19, 433 S.E.2d 196, 230-31 (1993) (Greene, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. See id. at 518,433 S.E.2d at 231.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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gained after the date of separation.98 Under the amended Act,
divisible property is subject to division and distribution by the courts
even though it is not technically marital property. The amendments
recognize four categories of divisible property: (1) appreciation and
diminution in value of marital property not attributable to post-
separation activities of a spouse; (2) property or property rights such
as commissions or contract rights acquired as a result of efforts of
either spouse during the marriage and before separation; (3) passive
income from marital property such as dividends or interest; and (4)
increases in marital debt, interest on the debt, and financing charges. 99
In dividing property after the effective date of the 1997
amendments, the court will divide appreciation that qualifies as
divisible property, rather than treating such appreciation merely as a
distributional factor.100 At least one commentator has noted that the
new classification rescues a significant amount of property acquired
after separation but before distribution from the "black hole" of
North Carolina's equitable distribution case law. 10' Many people
abused the pre-1997 law, the commentator notes, by structuring
payments to occur after separation, thereby shielding assets from a
spouse."° The divisible property amendments ensure that judges in
equitable distribution proceedings can distribute passive appreciation
that accrued during the period of separation. 3
In light of the history of equitable distribution law in North
Carolina, O'Brien v. O'Brien is important for two reasons: First, it is
the first North Carolina case to apply the passive/active analysis to
investment accounts. Second, it has implications for passive/active
analysis under the 1997 amendments. The multi-factor test adopted
and applied in O'Brien appears to modify the nature of the marital
contribution previously required by North Carolina courts to
constitute active appreciation."°  This modification expands the
98. See Act of July 7, 1997, ch. 302, N.C. Sess. Laws 712 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, 50-21 (Supp. 1998)); see also Sharp, supra note 7, at 2111
(concluding that the new category of divisible property ameliorates some of the problems
associated with property valuation at the date of separation).
99. See § 50-20(b)(4)(a)-(d).
100. See generally Sharp, supra note 7, at 2111-16 (discussing divisible property and its
effect on distribution of appreciation).
101. See ia. at 2115.
102. See id. at 2113. Professor Sharp concludes that the "analytically challenged"
results of North Carolina courts have exacerbated problems with the date of separation
rule. See id. at 2112-16.
103. See id. at 2111-16 (discussing the effect of the divisible property amendments on
the discretion of judges).
104. See infra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
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definition of passive appreciation under the North Carolina statutory
scheme, with important implications for both pre-separation
appreciation0 5 and post-separation appreciation 06
As noted previously, North Carolina courts have traditionally
looked to two items-the use of marital funds and the use of marital
efforts-to determine whether appreciation in a separately owned
asset is marital property.'0 State case law has presumed that
appreciation in separate property is active and, therefore, marital
unless it resulted from factors such as inflation or government action,
which are completely outside the control of either spouse.08 In
O'Brien, however, the court suggests through its development and
application of the multi-factored test that certain marital efforts may
no longer suffice to establish active appreciation. 09 The case also
suggests that the expenditure of marital funds, such as the $4550
deposit in the O'Briens' account, will not establish active appreciation
of an investment account."0 As a result, O'Brien alters the nature of
the marital contribution required to establish active appreciation.
In developing the multi-factored test, the O'Brien court
acknowledged that the question of investment account appreciation
was new to North Carolina and looked to other jurisdictions for
guidance."' The court focused on a Missouri case dealing with the
105. See infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text,
106. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Ciobanu v. Ciobanu, 104 N.C. App. 461, 465, 409 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1991)
(stating that the marital estate is entitled to the share of appreciation acquired through
"financial, managerial, and other contributions" of the marital estate); supra notes 75-83.
108. See Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 474, 433 S.E.2d 196, 204 (1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 336 N.C. 575, 444 S.E.2d 420 (1994); Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159,
175, 344 S.E.2d 100, 111 (1986); McCleod v. McCleod, 74 N.C. App 144, 148, 327 S.E.2d
910, 913 (1985). The party seeking to have the property classified as passive bears the
burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 418,
508 S.E.2d at 306.
Some states have distinguished between different types of marital efforts in
determining what suffices to establish marital property. See, e.g., In re Herr, 705 S.W.2d
619, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (listing cases from multiple states holding that homemaker
services are not considered a marital contribution to appreciation of property).
109. See supra text accompanying note 42 for the O'Brien test.
110. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (noting the O'Brien court's failure
to discuss the expenditure of marital funds in the context of investment accounts).
111. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 420-21, 508 S.E.2d at 306-07. The court did not
make clear why the established precedent regarding the active/passive distinction with
respect to close corporations was not suited for application in the context of investment
accounts. It also did not make clear why its analysis of the law of other jurisdictions was
limited to Missouri case law, when it stated that it was looking to other jurisdictions for
guidance. See id.
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appreciation of an investment account. 2 In Hoffman v. Hoffman,
the Missouri Court of Appeals defined the scope of marital efforts
much more narrowly than North Carolina courts had defined such
efforts in their earlier cases regarding family-owned businesses." 3 It
held that the wife's personal services and efforts as a homemaker
were not "sufficiently extensive to warrant additional compensation
by sharing in her husband's separate property.""4 Missouri reiterated
this analysis in 1992 when it distinguished the wife's contributions
from other types of marital efforts by holding that the wife's actions
were merely ordinary and "usual spousal duties," which did not
amount to marital efforts."'
North Carolina explicitly rejected this distinction between
spousal duties and other types of marital efforts in Beightol v.
Beightol."6 Yet the O'Brien court embraced Missouri's definition of
marital efforts, stating that Missouri's approach is consistent with the
public policy embodied in the North Carolina Equitable Distribution
Act, even though Missouri's definition of marital efforts is
inconsistent with the definition used in North Carolina." 7
The multi-factored test in O'Brien indicates that, with respect to
investment accounts, appreciation likely will remain separate
property."8 Whether this test applies outside the context of
investment accounts is unclear."9 If so, the O'Brien test modifies the.
112. See id.
113. 676 S.W.2d 817, 826 (Mo. 1984) (en bane) (holding that the wife's contributions as
homemaker, travelling companion, and entertainer did not constitute marital efforts).
114. Id.
115. In re Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
116. 90 N.C. App. 58, 60-61, 367 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1988) ("[N]o rule of law ... even
intimates that a non-titled spouse should ... not [be] allowed a return on his or her
investment because the efforts expended were characteristic of those which a caring and
loving spouse would perform in any event."). For a discussion of Beightol and spousal
duties, see supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
117. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App at 421,508 S.E.2d at 307.
118. Because investment activity carries a presumption of being outside the control of
either spouse, the same rule may apply to retirement benefit increases, life insurance
increases, or any other "natural increases" in the value of separate investment property.
See Mary Moers Wenig, Increase in Value of Separate Property During Marriage:
Examination and Proposals, 23 FAM. L.Q. 301, 330, 336 (1989); see also infra notes 136-45
and accompanying text (discussing how the multi-factored test restricts the scope of active
appreciation).
119. See Wenig, supra note 118, at 330. Professor Wenig argues that the rationale
courts give for refusing to grant marital status to appreciation of investments is that such
appreciation is attributable solely to time, rather than to the industrious labor of either
spouse. See id. If this is the rationale for not classifying investment appreciation as
marital property, she argues that other types of appreciation are subject to the same
labeling as separate property, such as the "natural increase" in the value of a family home
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law North Carolina courts use to examine marital efforts and the
appreciation of separate property.120 With respect to family-owned
businesses, the state's courts have never held that the marital effort
had to reach a threshold level of activity or go beyond "mere" spousal
duties.121 Yet, based on O'Brien, courts now may require more than
the performance of spousal duties to establish marital efforts for the
purpose of labeling appreciation as active. Such a requirement would
call Beightol into doubt."'
Many state courts distinguish between different types of assets
when evaluating the question of active appreciation t 3 At least one
commentator has noted that investment accounts, by their nature, are
more susceptible to market forces that are outside the control of
either spouse 2 4 For instance, where one or both spouses make
physical improvements to their marital home by expending personal
effort, courts can easily identify the effort behind the improvements
and the increased value in the marital home. In the context of an
investment account, however, courts cannot easily identify such
personal, physical effort. One commentator has noted that if this fact
is a relevant distinction between investment accounts and other types
of assets, then courts should be able to distinguish that portion of the
increase in value to the marital home that results from market forces
and treat it in the same manner as investment accounts.1 2m Courts
rarely, however, engage in this type of analysis; when they do, it
results in a confusing doctrinal analysis. 26 This commentator believes
that there is not a logical reason for the distinction between assets and
that courts should treat all types of assets consistently within the
active/passive appreciation analysis.127
Even if O'Brien applies only to investment accounts, it
or increases in the value of retirement plans. See id. at 336.
120. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of what previously
has constituted sufficient marital efforts under North Carolina law.
121. See Beightol, 90 N.C. App. at 61,367 S.E.2d at 349.
122. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing Beightol).
123. See Wenig, supra note 118, at 322-30 (discussing the different types of assets as
"prototypes" and describing the different rules applicable to each).
124. See iL at 326; see also Reynolds, supra note 3, at 249-52 (explaining that the
distinction between "natural cause" appreciation and appreciation resulting from marital
contributions was derived from Spanish civil law principles).
125. See Wenig, supra note 118, at 326-28 (discussing different methods of
apportionment depending on the different asset to be divided, and stating that
apportionment of "natural" increases does not take place when dividing value of the
home, although a court could determine the portion attributable to "natural" causes).
126. See id. at 322-23, 327-28.
127. See id. at 327, 330-31 (stating that the inconsistencies only lead to one conclusion:
"[Tlhe courts do not know what they are doing.").
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establishes a more restrictive definition of marital efforts than
Beightol did in the family-business context. The multi-factored test in
O'Brien focuses on, among other considerations, the frequency of
contact between one or both spouses and a broker, whether the
spouse(s) made independent investment decisions without any help
or advice from the broker, and whether those completely
independent decisions were a direct contribution to the increase in
value of the investment account.128 The level of activity required by
this test disregards decision-making by one or both spouse(s) as a
sufficient marital effort in itself.29 Prior cases held that anything
within the control of either spouse constituted appropriate marital
effort sufficient to classify the increase in value as marital.30 For
example, in a case involving a family-owned business, the court held
that decision-making by one spouse was sufficient to establish active
appreciation. 13' O'Brien modifies the presumption of active
appreciation and raises the threshold of what qualifies as sufficient
marital effort to establish active appreciation, at least with respect to
investment accounts.
O'Brien also calls into question North Carolina courts'
traditional approach to expenditures of marital funds that generate
appreciation of separate property. 32 As discussed above, the courts
have categorized appreciation of separate property as a marital asset
where the appreciation is the result of marital efforts or the
expenditure of marital funds.33 The O'Brien court noted that $4550
of marital funds was deposited in the investment account in its
discussion of other classification issues,"M yet did not examine the
expenditure of marital funds as an action that could have led to the
increase in the value of the investment account. In the court's
opinion, the expenditure of marital funds did not even warrant
128. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 421,508 S.E.2d at 307.
129. See Reynolds, supra note 3, at 287-88.
130. See Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 175, 344 S.E.2d 100, 111 (1986) (holding
that appreciation resulting from a third party's actions rather than factors within control of
the spouses was passive); McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 148, 327 S.E.2d 910, 913,
(1985) (holding that the existence of a decision that was within the control of a spouse was
sufficient to classify resulting appreciation as active).
131. See McLeod, 74 N.C. App. at 151, 327 S.E.2d at 915 (holding that a decision to
redeem shares established active appreciation).
132. O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 419, 508 S.E.2d at 306; see also Greene, supra note 93,
at 220 (explaining that North Carolina considers the expenditure of either marital funds or
marital efforts upon separate property to be a marital contribution).
133. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 420, 508 S.E.2d at 306; supra notes 75-83, 107 and
accompanying text.
134. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 419,508 S.E.2d at 306.
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discussion in the context of the investment account's appreciation. At
least one commentator has noted that courts are more willing to treat
a portion of an investment account as marital property if the
expenditure of marital funds went into the initial purchase of the
account. 35  O'Brien's lack of discussion about the marital
expenditures, together with the adoption of the more limited
definition of marital efforts, leaves open the question of what exactly
it will take for a court to characterize increases in investment accounts
as marital property.
The second issue raised by O'Brien is whether the court's
application of the passive/active distinction broadens the scope of
separate property in North Carolina. Under the O'Brien analysis,
more property will be classified as separate because parties will be
unable to meet the new, higher standards required to establish a
marital contribution. By exempting more property from division and
distribution, the O'Brien court frustrates the Equitable Distribution
Act's goal to treat mariage as a partnership.136
One commentator has observed that the Uniform Partnership
Act ("UPA"), which governs business partnerships, can provide
useful principles for equitable distribution. 37 When a partnership
dissolves, the UPA reimburses the contribution of each partner's
separate property at its original value.3 ' All profits are then divided
equally. 39 Included within the definition of profits is any increase in
value of the separate property, be it passive or active.' Thus, all
increases in value are divided among the partners, regardless of
whose efforts accounted for the appreciation.' 41 Application of the
UPA approach to marriage assumes that the partners contributed
equally to the separate property, and that all increases in value should
135. See Reynolds, supra note 3, at 290. In O'Brien, the initial account was opened
with separate property, specifically money from Mrs. O'Brien's inheritance. See O'Brien,
131 N.C. App. at 414,508 S.E.2d at 302; supra note 22 and accompanying text.
136. Cf. Reynolds, supra note 3, at 293-94 (explaining that requirements that the effort
.be a direct cause of the appreciation undercut the notion of marriage as a partnership);
Sharp, supra note 2, at 198-201 (discussing the policy of the Equitable Distribution Act to
treat marriage as a partnership).
137. See Wenig, supra note 118, at 332-33.
138. UNuF. PARTNERSHnP Acr § 18(a) (1914 ); see also Wenig, supra note 118, at 332
(discussing the reimbursement rule and the Uniform Partnership Act).
139. See UNri. PARTNERSHIP ACr § 18(a); Wenig, supra note 118, at 332-33 (calling
for the reimbursement of separate contributions by spouses at their original value based
on the UPA).
140. See Wenig, supra note 118, at 333.
141. See id.
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be divided equally according to those equal contributions. 142
Likewise, if marriage is considered a partnership in which each
spouse is assumed to be contributing equally, each spouse should be
allowed to share equally in any property value increases which occur
during the marriage.143 Consequently, upon divorce, only the original
value of the separate property should be reimbursed to the spouse
who brought the separate property into the marital estate.
This partnership approach is markedly different from the one
taken in O'Brien, in which the court attempted to distinguish active
appreciation from passive appreciation by examining the nature of
the contributions of each spouse." Only if one spouse was
industrious or put a great deal of effort into the appreciation of the
separate property will the appreciation be deemed marital property.
The O'Brien approach assumes unequal contributions of the spouses
and, therefore, is inconsistent with the partnership approach to
marriage. 4 5
The third issue raised by O'Brien is the implications of the
court's holding regarding the amount of marital efforts necessary to
establish active appreciation for the disposition of "divisible
property" under the 1997 amendments to the Equitable Distribution
Act." In particular, O'Brien may play a role in two categories of
divisible property: increases in the value of marital property that are
"not attributable to post-separation activities of a spouse"'147 and
passive income from marital property, such as dividends and
interest." Because the first category of divisible property depends
on appreciation not attributable to the activities of a spouse, it seems
to require appreciation based on events outside of either party's
control. Likewise, the definition of what is passive income may refer
to events outside of either party's control. Thus, the interpretation of
the divisible property amendment may require courts to use the
distinction between active and passive appreciation that was
previously established in Smith."9  Accordingly, although the
142. See id.
143. See id. But see Reynolds, supra note 3, at 251-52 (arguing that the modem
concept of marital partnership derives from the Spanish civil law's concept of marital
partnership, which embraces a more individualistic approach to the efforts of each
spouse).
144. See O'Brien, 131 N.C. App. at 420-21, 508 S.E.2d at 306-07.
145. See Wenig, supra note 118, at 333.
146. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(4) (Supp. 1998).
147. Id. § 50-20(b)(4)(a).
148. Id § 50-20(b)(4)(c).
149. See Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460,518,433 S.E.2d 196,231 (1993) (Greene, J.,
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passive/active distinction traditionally has applied only to increases in
the value of separate property, the 1997 amendments' creation of
divisible property means that the passive/active distinction may apply
with respect to increases in the value of all marital property which
occur after separation and before distribution.
In Smith, Judge Greene's opinion on the court of appeals
suggested that the analysis of whether appreciation is active or
passive is the same, regardless of whether the court is examining
appreciation before or after separation.15 0 If a court finds a marital
contribution resulted in active appreciation to separate property
before separation, it will classify the appreciation as marital and
divide it equitably. Within the context of post-separation
appreciation, however, a finding of sufficient post-separation
activities has the opposite effect. In cases where courts find that
appreciation has occurred because of the active efforts of a spouse
after separation, that appreciation would no longer meet the
definition of divisible property.15' Since the increase in value
occurred after separation and is not divisible property as defined by
the statute, it is not subject to distribution. Whether this increase in
value is to be treated as the separate property of the spouse
responsible for the post-separation activity, or as an "other factor" to
be weighed under Truesdale is not clear. 52 At least one commentator
has noted this gap in the statute and the potential problems it may
pose.5 3
The O'Brien decision, by raising the level of activity required for
a finding of active appreciation, makes it more difficult for courts to
take post-separation increases in the value of property out of the
marital pot. Because of the difficulty in meeting the requirements of
the multi-factored test, rather than the more lenient rule that
activities outside the control of either spouse constitute passive
appreciation, spouses will have more trouble proving that post-
concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd in part, 336 N.C. 575, 444 S.E.2d 420
(1994). Judge Greene's position was adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court with
its reversal of this portion of the court of appeals' holding. See Smith, 336 N.C. 575, 444
S.E.2d 420; supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (discussing the court's implicit
adoption of Judge Greene's opinion).
150. See Smith, 111 N.C. App. at 518, 433 S.E.2d at 231 (Greene, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
151. See § 50-20(b)(4)(a)-(d).
152. Truesdale v. Truesdale, 89 N.C. App. 445,450,366 S.E.2d 512,516 (1988).
153. See Sharp, supra note 7, at 2144 n.501 ("The statute also excludes from divisible
property increases or decreases in value of marital or divisible property that are the result
of the activities of either spouse after separation. This provision in the new amendments is
especially likely to cause difficulties for practitioners and the courts." (citations omitted)).
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separation appreciation was due to active efforts and, therefore, does
not qualify as divisible property subject to equitable distribution. In
this context, then, O'Brien is consistent with the purpose of the Act
and the 1997 amendments-to treat more property as subject to
division. Because the date between separation and distribution is at
least one year in every case of property distribution in North
Carolina,54 O'Brien may recapture a good deal of property that
could have fallen into the cracks of the equitable distribution statute.
If the property had not met the definition of divisible property, it may
have been subject to treatment as an equitable factor under the
Truesdale rule, which is often unpredictable and inequitable.155 By
treating more property as subject to division, O'Brien furthers the
goals of treating marriage as a partnership and returning to each
spouse their individual contributions to the marriage. It also
promotes certainty and fairness.
One remaining question the North Carolina courts must resolve
is whether the O'Brien test applies only to investment activities while
leaving intact prior precedent analyzing active vs. passive
appreciation of family-owned businesses. O'Brien signals that North
Carolina courts may have begun to distinguish among types of assets
within the active/passive analysis, although it did not provide
sufficient explanation for this change. It is unclear why the court
needed to develop a test for determining whether appreciation of an
investment account was passive or active, instead of applying the tests
it had developed throughout the years with respect to family-owned
businesses.
If the court intends to apply this test only to investments, and not
to family-owned businesses, this differing approach will need to be
justified at some point, and the court will have to further define what
qualifies as an investment subject to the O'Brien analysis. For
example, it is unclear whether this investment analysis is limited to
bank accounts and other types of fungible assets, or whether it could
be applied to any investment activity-such as an art collection, or a
hired property manager. In Lawing, the court applied the traditional
active/passive appreciation analysis to determine that a third person's
management of a family-owned business is not within the control of
either spouse, and is therefore passive.'56 Whether the situation
154. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1995).
155. See Sharp, supra note 7 at 2114-16 and accompanying footnotes (discussing illogic
of Truesdale and manner in which property that does not fall clearly within one of the
statutory definitions may come within the Truesdale rule).
156. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing Lawing v. Lawing and
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described in Lawing would now be treated as an investment activity
subject to the O'Brien analysis, or whether it would be analyzed as a
case of appreciation within the context of a family-owned business is
not clear. If O'Brien applies to all types of assets, the court will not
need to justify treating investment activities differently than other
types of assets, or to define further what constitutes an investment
activity. The significance of the O'Brien analysis will only be fully
understood once the court begins to address these lingering questions.
STEPHANIE A. EAKEs
the active/passive analysis).
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Keith v. Northern Hospital District of Surry County and
Rule 9(j): Preventing Frivolous Medical Malpractice Claims at
the Expense of North Carolina Courts' Equitable Powers
Rule 90) ("the Rule") was added to the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure on January 1, 1996.1 The Rule requires that plaintiffs
alleging medical malpractice have a qualified expert review the case
prior to filing a complaint This expert must be willing to testify that
the medical care rendered failed to meet the applicable standard of
care Most importantly, Rule 9(j) states that any medical malpractice
complaint that does not specifically assert compliance with the expert
certification requirement "shall be dismissed."4 Keith v. Northern
Hospital District of Surry County represents the first challenge to
Rule'9(j).5
Judy Ann Keith filed a pro se medical malpractice claim against
Northern Hospital District of Surry County (hereinafter the
"Hospital" or "Northern Hospital") in October 1996.6 Keith's
complaint failed to assert that she had complied with the expert
certification requirements of 9(j). 7  Realizing her mistake, Keith
moved to amend her complaint, but her motion was denied.8 The
case was dismissed with prejudice for failing to comply with Rule
90).9
On appeal, Keith claimed that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her motion to amend.'0 The central issue in
1. See Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 611 (codified at N.C. R.
Civ. P. 90)).
2 See N.C. R. Civ. P. 90).
3. See id. Rule 9(j) requires that an expert for these certification purposes be
qualified under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. See id. at 90)(1).
4. Id.
5. See Keith v. Northern Hosp. Dist. of Surry County, 129 N.C. App. 402, 499 S.E.2d
200, cert. denied, 348 N.C. 693, 511 S.E.2d 646 (1998); Transcript of Motions Hearing at 3,
Keith (No. COA 97-825) (stating that Keith is governed by the "new amendments"
enacted to Rule 9).
6. See id. at 403, 499 S.E.2d at 201.
7. See iL
8. See id. at 403-04, 499 S.E.2d at 201. Keith filed for leave to amend on January 23,
1997. See id. at 403, 499 S.E.2d at 201. The motion came before the trial court on March
10, 1997, and was considered at the same time as the Hospital's motion to dismiss. See id.
at 404, 499 S.E.2d at 201.
9. See id. at 404,499 S.E.2d at 201.
10. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 8, Keith (No. COA 97-825).
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Keith was whether Rule 9(j) required the court, as a matter of law, to
dismiss a medical malpractice complaint that failed to meet its expert
certification requirements or whether Rule 90) allowed amendment
under Rule 15 to include the certification." The North Carolina
Court of Appeals did not directly answer this question and only held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Keith's
motion to amend the pleadings.
Although the court of appeals panel agreed on the result, its
members failed to reach a consensus on whether Rule 90) mandated
that the trial judge deny Keith's motion. 3 Granting leave to amend
traditionally has been left to the discretion of the courts, but North
Carolina's Rules of Civil Procedure state that leave is generally to be
granted freely. 4 Rule 90) arguably strips North Carolina courts of
this traditional equitable power.
This Note examines whether a judge is required, as a matter of
law, to dismiss a complaint that fails to comply with Rule 9(j)'s expert
certification requirements. First, this Note recounts the essential facts
of Keith's case 5 and describes in detail the holding of the three
appellate judges who took part in this decision. 6 Next, the Note
reviews the judicial standard employed in granting leave to amend 7
and the law governing how the courts are to interpret statutes.18 This
Note then examines the opinions of Judges Greene and Timmons-
Goodson regarding whether Rule 9(j)'s language is "clear and
unambiguous" 9 before attempting to ascertain how the North
Carolina legislature intended the Rule to operate.20 The Note next
compares Rule 9(j) with the statutes of other states that employ
expert certification requirements.2' The Note then analyzes various
policy issues involved in taking leave to amend out of the equitable
11. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 404,499 S.E.2d at 202.
12. See id. at 406, 499 S.E.2d at 203.
13. See itt; see also infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text (discussing the court of
appeals' decision).
14. See N.C. R. CIv. P. 15(a) (stating that "leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires"); infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text; see generally Saintsing v. Taylor, 57
N.C. App. 467, 291 S.E.2d 880 (1982) (holding that leave to amend should be freely
granted); Carolina Garage, Inc., v. Holston, 40 N.C. App. 400,253 S.E.2d 7 (1979) (same).
15. See infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 110-34 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 135-53 and accompanying text.
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powers of the court.22 Finally, this Note concludes that the legislature
created a Rule that strips the courts of discretion in granting leave to
amend, unwisely requiring judges to dismiss potentially valid medical
malpractice claims.
On June 9, 1993, Judy Ann Keith entered Northern Hospital
experiencing abdominal cramps and irregular menstrual periods.
Keith's doctors ordered a hysterectomy as the method of treatment,
and, as is the case with most major medical procedures, an
intravenous drip ("I.V.") to deliver fluids and medicine.24 By Keith's
second day in the hospital, her left hand, the site of the I.V. insertion,
began to swell.2s On the third day, the I.V. was moved to her right
hand, but upon insertion, Keith complained immediately of pain and
mentioned that it felt as if the needle hit bone. Later that day Keith
experienced swelling in her right hand.2 6 After the I.V. was removed,
Keith complained to two nurses that she had no feeling in two fingers
of her right hand Keith obtained counsel in 1995 to handle her
malpractice claim.'
On June 5, 1996, Keith's counsel filed a motion to extend the
statute of limitations for the filing of a medical malpractice claim.29
The superior court judge granted the motion 0 pursuant to North
Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 90). 31  By October 1996 the
22. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
23. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 3.
24. See id.
25. See id
26. See id.
27. See id. at 4.
28. See id The numbness in her right hand never subsided and this injury is the
source of her malpractice claim.
29. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 403, 499 S.E.2d at 201. The statute of limitations for a
medical malpractice claim is three years. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(C) (1996). The
incident of which Keith complained occurred on June 12, 1993, causing the statute of
limitations to expire in June 1996. See Transcript of Motions Hearing at 3. The motion to
extend included an averment stating "Complainant believed she had obtained an expert
witness to testify on her behalf .... Complainant was made aware during the week of May
20, 1996, that said expert would be unable to testify ... due to a conflict of interest."
Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 5.
30. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 403, 499 S.E.2d at 201. Although there was some
controversy regarding exactly when the statute of limitations should have run, the trial
court's order granting the motion to extend contained a handwritten note at the end of the
first paragraph stating "the statute of limitations will expire in this matter on June 9,
1996." Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 5.
31. N.C. R. Civ. P. 90). Rule 90) provides that a potential medical malpractice
complainant may file a motion to extend the applicable statute of limitations by a period
not to exceed 120 days. See id. The complainant must file the motion within the original
statute of limitations. See id. The motion may be granted upon a determination that there
is good cause for the extension and that the ends of justice would thereby be served, See
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numbness in Keith's hand still had not subsided, and, on October 4,
Keith filed her medical malpractice complaint against the defendant
Hospital. 2
The Hospital sought in its answer to have Keith's complaint
dismissed on the grounds that it failed to comply with the expert
certification requirements of Rule 90).33  The Rule states that a
medical malpractice complaint "shall be dismissed" unless a pleading
specifically asserts that the medical care at issue has been reviewed by
a person who is expected to qualify as an expert witness and that the
same person will testify that the standard of care was not met in the
instant case?' After the Hospital filed its answer, Keith moved to
id
32. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 403, 499 S.E.2d at 201. Keith originally sued three
other parties in addition to the Hospital: Kenneth D. Gitt, M.D., Tom J. Vaughn, M.D.,
and the Mt. Airy OB-GYN Center. See id. The trial court dismissed the claims against
these three parties for failure to state a claim and failure to comply with the expert
certification requirements of Rule 90). See id. Keith did not appeal these dismissals,
leaving the Hospital as the sole defendant. See i&
Keith's original attorney withdrew from the case, yet there was no order or other
record indicating that her original counsel was allowed to withdraw. See Plaintiff-
Appellant's Brief at 5 n.2. By the deadline for filing the complaint, Keith was without
legal representation and was forced to file pro se. See Transcript of Motions Hearing at
15. The Court at the motions hearing recognized that "the problem is Ms. Keith did not
have an attorney. And that makes it even more difficult for the Court [to determine] what
standard we hold her to." Id.
There was some discrepancy over exactly when the 120-day extension took effect.
See Transcript of Motions Hearing at 7. The motion to extend was filed on June 5, 1996;
accordingly, Northern Hospital argued that the 120-day extension should run from that
point and end on October 3, 1996, one day before Keith filed her pro se complaint. See id.
at 6. Keith's new attorney argued that the 120-day extension began on June 9, 1996, the
date the trial judge noted as the end of the period for the statute of limitations to run. See
id. at 7. Under Keith's interpretation, the statute of limitations would not run until
October 7, 1996, meaning that she had filed the complaint in a timely fashion. See id.
33. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 403, 499 S.E.2d at 201. The Hospital filed its answer
on November 14, 1996. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 2. The Hospital additionally
sought dismissal under N.C. Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
See id. This issue was not addressed on appeal, and, therefore, this Note will not examine
in depth the validity of that argument. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 404, 499 S.E.2d at 202
(stating that the dispositive issue at appeal was whether a complaint that fails to comply
with Rule 90) can subsequently be amended pursuant to Rule 15).
34. N.C. R. CIv. P. 90). The relevant part of the rule provides:
Any complaint alleging medical malpractice by a health care provider as defined
in G.S. 90-21.11 in failing to comply with the applicable standard of care under
G.S. 90-21.11 shall be dismissed unless:
(1) The pleading specifically asserts that the medical care has been reviewed
by a person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under
Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence and who is willing to testify that the
medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care;
(2) The pleading specifically asserts that the medical care has been reviewed
by a person that the complainant will seek to have qualified as an expert
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amend the pleadings to include an allegation that an expert had
reviewed the case and was willing to testify that the care rendered
failed to comport with the applicable standard of care.35  The trial
court denied Keith's motion to amend and granted the Hospital's
motion to dismiss.3 6 The court dismissed the case with prejudice.
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals agreed that the dismissal was proper; the judges did not
agree, however, on a particular rationale. The court's opinion,
written by Judge Greene, was joined by two concurrences in result
only. Thus, the holding of the court of appeals was limited to a
finding that the lower court did not-abuse its discretion by denying
Keith's motion for leave to amend.
Judge Greene read Rule 90) to require a judge to dismiss a
complaint that fails to meet the Rule's expert certification
requirements. 9 Judge Greene noted that "although Rule 9(j)
mandates the dismissal of the pleading, it does not preclude a
dismissal without prejudice."'  In his opinion, the decision of whether
or not to dismiss without prejudice remains within the sound
discretion of the trial court.4' Judge Greene's interpretation focused
on a determination that Rule 9(j)'s "shall be dismissed" language was
unambiguous. 42 Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous,
witness by motion under Rule 702(e) of the Rules of Evidence and who is
willing to testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable
standard of care, and the motion is filed with the complaint....
Id.35. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 403-04, 499 S.E.2d at 201. Keith made her motion for
leave to amend on January 23, 1997, some three months after the filing of her complaint
and two months after the other three claims were dismissed for failure to comply with
Rule 9(j). See id. The motion to amend included an affidavit of a registered nurse with 20
years of experience. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 7. The affidavit stated that the nurse
would testify to the standard of care and that it was not met in this case. See id.
36. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 404,499 S.E.2d at 201.
37. See id. The trial court did not state a reason for denying Keith's motion to amend.
See id.
38. See id. at 406, 499 S.E.2d at 203.
39. See id. at 405,499 S.E.2d at 202. Judge Greene wrote that "because the complaint
in this case alleged a claim for medical malpractice ... and did not include the necessary
Rule 90) certification, the trial court was required to dismiss it." Id. (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 403 n.3, 499 S.E.2d at 202 n.3.
41. See id. The statute of limitations had run by June 9, 1996. See discussion supra
note 32. Therefore, when the trial court dismissed the case on March 18, 1997, the
decision of whether to dismiss with or without prejudice was essentially irrelevant because
even if the dismissal was without prejudice, Keith was barred from refiling by the statute
of limitations.
42. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 404,499 S.E.2d at 202.
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the court is not to indulge in judicial construction, but is to give effect
to the statute in accord with its plain and definite meaning.43
Judge Greene also examined the objective of Rule 9(j), which
was passed in January 1996 as part of a bill that sought to prevent the
filing of frivolous medical malpractice claims.' Keith asserted that a
Rule 90) deficiency could be remedied by amending the complaint
according to Rule 15(a), adding the 9(j) certification, and having the
amendment relate back, under Rule 15(c), to the date of the filing of
the complaint.45 Judge Greene explained, however, that this "file
first, review later, relate back" argument would recreate the very
situation the legislature sought to eradicate-the "filing of
malpractice actions before the plaintiff had ascertained the existence,
in fact, of the expert opinion evidence necessary to establish a breach
of the applicable standard of care. ' 46 Judge Greene concluded that
Keith's reading of the statute was impermissible because a statutory
construction that "defeat[s] or impair[s]" the intent of the legislature
43. See id. at 404-05, 499 S.E.2d at 202 (citing Avco Fin. Servs. v. Isbell, 67 N.C. App.
341,343, 312 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1984)).
44. See id at 405, 499 S.E.2d at 202. Judge Greene listed the title of the session law
containing Rule 90) as an "'Act To Prevent Frivolous Medical Malpractice Actions By
... Requir[ing] Expert Witness Review As A Condition Of Filing A Medical Malpractice
Action.' " aId; Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 611, 611 (codified at
N.C. R. CIV. P. 90)).
45. See id. at 406, 499 S.E.2d at 203. Rule 15(a) states that "a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of the court." N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Rule 15(c) adds that "[a]
claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the
claim in the original pleading was interposed" as long as the original complaint gave notice
of the events to be proved by the amended pleading. Id. at 15(c).
Judge Greene rejected Keith's relation back argument on the ground that only
claims, and not particular pleadings, relate back. See Keith at 406, 499 S.E.2d at 203.
Here, Keith only sought leave to amend in order to plead a matter that was to be averred
specifically in the complaint. See id. Judge Greene reasoned that because Keith was not
asserting new claims, she was not permitted to employ the relation back doctrine under
Rule 15(c). See id.
Judge Greene also rejected Keith's argument that the trial court should be
reversed because it failed to state a reason for denying her motion to amend. See id.
Judge Greene admitted that the denial of leave without a justifying reason is reversible
abuse of discretion. See id. (citing Coffey v. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. 717, 722, 381 S.E.2d 467,
471 (1989)). Judge Greene pointed out that a justifying reason need not be stated; rather,
it can be apparent from the record. See id. (citing Banner v. Banner, 86 N.C. App. 397,
400, 358 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1987)). Such "'[j]ustifying reasons' include 'undue delay, bad
faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice and futility of
the amendment.'" Id. (quoting Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 722, 381 S.E.2d at 471). The
denial of leave without a stated reason did not constitute reversible error in Keith because
"the amendment seeking to add the 9(j) certification cannot constitute compliance with
Rule 9(j), [therefore] its filing would have been futile." Id.
46. Keith at 405-06, 499 S.E.2d at 202 (quoting Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 6).
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must be avoided where-possible.47
Writing in concurrence, Judge Walker stated simply that "[a]fter
considering plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, the trial court
found 'that justice does not require the amendment' under the facts
of this case. Therefore, I conclude there was no abuse of discretion
by the trial court."48
Judge Timmons-Goodson joined the two other judges in
upholding the trial court's denial of leave,49 but she disagreed that
Rule 9(j) was immune from the effects of Rule 15.50 Judge Timmons-
Goodson began her analysis with the premise that leave to amend is
to be granted freely, unless material prejudice would result." Judge
Timmons-Goodson then moved to an examination of claims that are
to be pled with particularity 2 Significantly, she noted that under
Rule 9, heightened pleading is required in matters of legal capacity,53
in allegations of fraud, duress, or mistake,54 and in denials of
performance or occurrence of a condition precedent.5 Each of these
subsections of Rule 9 employs mandatory language, and failure to
comply with the pleading requirements may result in a 12(b)(6)
dismissal for failure to state a claim.5 6  Despite this mandatory
language, however, the Judge noted that amendment under Rule 15
47. Id. at 405, 499 S.E.2d at 202 (citing State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 80, 213 S.E.2d 291,
295 (1975)) (alteration in original).
48. Id at 406-07, 499 S.E.2d at 203 (Walker, J., concurring in the result) (citation
omitted).
49. See id. at 407,499 S.E.2d at 203 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result).
50. See id. (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result). Although Judge
Timmons-Goodson stated that she "[took] issue with the majority," there was no actual
majority holding regarding whether or not Rule 9(j) required dismissal as a matter of law.
Id.; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of the case).
Judge Walker did not address the issue and Judges Greene and Timmons-Goodson were
split on whether Rule 9(j)'s language mandates dismissal. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 404,
499 S.E.2d at 202; IL at 407, 499 S.E.2d at 203 (Walker, J., concurring in the result); IcL
(Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result).
51. See iL at 407, 499 S.E.2d at 203 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result)
(citing Saintsing v. Taylor, 57 N.C: App. 467, 471, 291 S.E.2d 880, 883 (1982)).
52. See id. (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result). Rule 9's title is "Pleading
Special Matters," and it includes 9(j) in its provisions. N.C. R. Civ. P. 9. These matters
require more than mere notice pleading. See id-
53. N.C. R. CIV. P. 9(a); see also Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 407, 499 S.E.2d at 203
(Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result) (discussing Rule 9(a)).
54. N.C. R. CIV. P. 9(b); see also Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 407, 499 S.E.2d at 203
(Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result) (discussing Rule 9(b)).
55. N.C. R. CIV. P. 9(c); see also Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 407, 499 S.E.2d at 203
(Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result) (discussing Rule 9(c)).
56. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 407, 499 S.E.2d at 203-04 (Timmons-Goodson, J.,
concurring in the result).
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has saved numerous defective Rule 9 pleadings.17
Judge Timmons-Goodson then took issue with Judge Greene's
assertion that the "shall be dismissed" language of Rule 9(j) is clear
and unambiguous.58 She noted that, while the General Assembly
passed Rule 9(j) as part of a bill to prevent the filing of frivolous
medical malpractice claims, the legislature failed to mention that it
intended Rule 9(j) either to preclude amendment under Rule 15 or to
be exempt from the operation of the other Rules of Civil Procedure.5 9
Thus, "[it would constitute a grave injustice to preclude as a matter
of law such amendment in light of the lack of any direct evidence that
the General Assembly intended by the creation of Rule 9(j) to carve
out an exception to the equitable powers of the court under Rule
15."1 Judge Timmons-Goodson concluded that Rule 15, in her
opinion, could be employed to save a 9(j) defect.61 The Judge claimed
that such a reading does not offend the statutory language, but rather
it "merely construe[s] the two Rules in para [sic] materia so as to give
meaning to both Rule 9(j) and Rule 15."62 Even though Judge
Timmons-Goodson concluded that the trial court properly dismissed
this particular cause of action, she envisioned a situation where
amendment under Rule 15 would be needed "to save an otherwise
meritorious medical malpractice action."'6 The judge asserted that
the discretion to allow such an amendment "is best left in the quarter
of the trial court" and should not be dictated by an ambiguous
statute.64
Before analyzing Rule 90) and the holding of Keith, it may be
helpful to review the two main areas of law upon which the analysis
will hinge. Because much of the controversy in Keith turns on the
granting of leave to amend, this Note will conduct an overview of the
57. See id. (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result). Judge Greene addressed
this argument, stating that although "amendments pursuant to Rule 15 have been allowed
to correct other Rule 9 deficiencies .... only Rule 90) ... specifically states that failure to
allege particularities requires dismissal of the pleading." Id. at 405 n.4, 499 S.E.2d at 202
n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
58. See id. at 408,499 S.E.2d at 204 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result).
59. See id. (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result).
60. Id. (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result).
61. See id. (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result).
62- I- (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result). Black's Law Dictionary
defines "in pari materia" as "[o]f the same matter; on the same subject." BLACK's LAW
DICrIONARY 1115 (6th ed. 1990). Where a statute's meaning is ambiguous, statutes that
govern the same subject matter "must be construed with reference to each other." Id.
63. Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 408, 499 S.E.2d at 204 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring
in the result).
64. Id. (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result).
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standard employed in granting leave.6 Second, because the opinions
of Judges Greene and Timmons-Goodson are each predicated upon
opposite findings regarding the legislative intent of the "shall be
dismissed" language in Rule 9(j), 66 this Note will explore the standard
that courts are supposed to employ in statutory interpretation,
specifically focusing on the "clear and unambiguous" test to which
both Judges Greene and Timmons-Goodson referred.67
Generally speaking, leave to amend is to be granted freely.6 The
court's decision hinges upon whether the grant is required by justice.69
If so, the matter is left within the discretion of the judge.70
Nevertheless, amendment should be allowed unless the party
objecting to the amendment will suffer material prejudice 7 The
party objecting to the grant bears the burden of demonstrating that
he will be prejudiced by allowing the amendment. 2 The philosophy
underlying these rules is that decisions are to be made on the merits
of each case, not upon mere technicalities.73
The trial court is afforded broad discretion in permitting or
denying amendments to a complaint.74 The "[r]easons for justifying
denial of an amendment are (a) undue delay, (b) bad faith, (c) undue
prejudice, (d) futility of amendment, and (e) repeated failure to cure
defects by previous amendments. '75 The trial court is not required to
65. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 39-64 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
68. See N.C. R. CIV. P. 15(a); see generally Saintsing v. Taylor, 57 N.C. App. 467, 291
S.E.2d 880 (1982) (holding that leave to amend should be freely granted); Carolina
Garage, Inc., v. Holston, 40 N.C. App. 400,253 S.E.2d 7 (1979) (same).
69. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (stating "leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires").
70. See Galligan v. Smith, 14 N.C. App. 220, 226, 188 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1972); Helson's
Premiums & Gifts, Inc. v. Duncan, 9 N.C. App. 653,657,177 S.E.2d 428,431 (1970).
71. See Mauney v. Morris, 316 N.C. 67, 72, 340 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1986) (holding that
leave to amend should be allowed freely except upon the demonstration of material
prejudice); Phillips v. Phillips, 46 N.C. App. 558,560-61,265 S.E.2d 441,443 (1980) (same);
Mangum v. Surles, 12 N.C. App. 547, 550, 183 S.E.2d 839, 842 (1971) (same), rev'd on
other grounds, 281 N.C. 91, 98-99, 187 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1972).
72. See Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 654, 231 S.E.2d 591, 596 (1977); Gro-Mar Pub.
Relations, Inc. v. Billy Jack Enters., Inc., 36 N.C.App. 673, 678, 245 S.E.2d 782,785 (1978).
73. See Mangum, 281 N.C. at 98-99, 187 S.E.2d at 702; Phillips, 46 N.C. App. at 560-
61,265 S.E.2d at 443.
74. See Galligan, 14 N.C. App. at 221, 188 S.E.2d at 35; Helson's Premiums & Gifts,
Inc., 9 N.C. App. at 657, 177 S.E.2d at 431.
75. United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 60 N.C. App. 40,42-43,298 S.E.2d 409,411 (1982).
This list of justifications was established by the United States Supreme Court in Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In the absence of such factors, the Supreme Court stated
that amendment is to be given freely at the discretion of the judge. See id. "[O]utright
refusal to grant the leave [to amend] without any justifying reason appearing for the denial
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state a reason for denial of the amendment, and in the absence of a
stated reason, the appellate court may examine any apparent reasons
for the denial.7 6 Generally, denial of a motion to amend is not
reviewable on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion."
Denial of a motion to amend, without a stated justifying reason and
with no showing of prejudice to the defendant, is reversible error.
The court's role in interpreting statutes is well established.79
Where the language is clear and unambiguous "there is no room for
judicial construction, and the statute must be given effect in
accordance with its plain and definite meaning."8 In construing a
statute, the court's primary goal is to assure that the legislature's
intent is achieved.8' Moreover, the legislature is assumed to
comprehend the importance of the words it uses. 2 Thus, "[w]here the
words of a statute have not acquired a technical meaning, they must
be construed in accordance with their common and ordinary meaning,
unless a different meaning is apparent or readily indicated by the
context in which they are used."'  Therefore, the court's primary
is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion with the spirit of the
Federal Rules." Id North Carolina has adopted the language as well for its nearly
identical state rules of civil procedure. See, e.g., Martin v. Hare, 78 N.C. App. 358, 361,
337 S.E.2d 632,634 (1985); Gro-Mar, 36 N.C. App. at 678,245 S.E.2d at 785.
76. See Banner v. Banner, 86 N.C. App. 397, 400, 358 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1987),
overruled on other grounds, Stachlowski v. Stach, 328 N.C. 276, 401 S.E.2d 638 (1991);
United Leasing Corp., 60 N.C. App. at 42-43, 298 S.E.2d at 411; Kinnard v. Mecklenburg
Fair, Ltd., 46 N.C. App. 725, 727, 266 S.E.2d 14, 16, affd, 301 N.C. 522, 271 S.E.2d 909
(1980); Gro-Mar, 36 N.C. App. at 678-79, 245 S:E.2d at 785.
77. See Tyson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 82 N.C. App. 626, 629, 347 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1986);
Carolina Garage, Inc. v. Holston, 40 N.C. App. 400, 403, 253 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1979); Mangum,
12 N.C. App. at 550, 183 S.E.2d at 842.
78. See Henry v. Deen, 61 N.C. App. 189, 193-94, 300 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1983) (citing
Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 233-34, 271 S.E.2d 393, 398-99(1980)), rev'd on
other grounds, 310 N.C. 75,310 S.E.2d 326 (1984).
79. See Avco Fin. Servs. v. Isbell, 67 N.C. App. 341, 343, 312 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1984).
For additional information regarding statutory interpretation, see Stephen Breyer, On the
Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848-61 (1992);
Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-
System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 240-315 (1997); Richard A. Posner,
Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431, 431-34 (1989); David A.
Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1565-82 (1997).
80. Wiliams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180,261 S.E.2d 849,854 (1980).
81. See Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294
(1991); In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1978); D.G. Matthews &
Son, Inc. v. State ex reL McDevitt, 131 N.C. App. 520, 522, 508 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1998); see
also State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503,520,243 S.E.2d 338,350 (1977); State v. Hart, 287 N.C.
76,80,213 S.E.2d 291,294-95 (1975).
82- See State v. Baker, 229 N.C. 73,77,48 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1948); North Carolina Div. of
Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Faulkner, 509 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1998).
83. D.G. Matthews & Son, Inc., 131 N.C. App at 522, 508 S.E.2d at 333 (citing State v.
2312 [Vol. 77
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
mode of statutory analysis is to examine the words of the statute to
determine whether the meaning is plain and unambiguous. s4 Where
there is no ambiguity, there is "no room for judicial construction." 85
In clear cases, "courts are without power to interpolate or
superimpose provisions or limitations not contained in the statute. 8 6
But when a literal reading of the statute yields either absurd results or
contravenes clearly expressed legislative intent, then the literal
meaning must be disregarded and a judicially imposed interpretation
is appropriateY Thus, where the language of a statute is unclear or
ambiguous, the courts are to ascertain the intent of the legislature and
construe the statute in a way that effectuates the General Assembly's
intention.88 Where two statutes address a single subject, the courts
are to construe the statutes in pal materia, 9 so that, if possible, they
can harmonize the statutes into a unified'law on the subject that
comports with legislative intent."
The court's role in conducting statutory interpretation was at the
core of the dispute in Keith. The determinative issue was whether
Rule 9()'s "shall be dismissed" language was clear and
unambiguous. 91 A finding that the "shall be dismissed" language of
9(j) is clear and unambiguous almost mechanically leads to the result
that the court has no discretion in this area and is required to dismiss
claims that are deficient under 9(0). Likewise, only a finding that
9()'s language is unclear will allow the court to construe the statute
liberally.
In Keith, the two judges who considered the issue were split on
whether the "shall be dismissed" language was clear and
unambiguous 2 Judge Greene held that the language was clear, thus
Koberlein, 309 N.C. 601, 605,308 S.E.2d 442,445 (1983)).
84. See Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 895-96 (1998) (relying on
Correll v. Division of Soc. Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232,235 (1992)).
85. Williams, 299 N.C. at 180,261 S.E.2d at 854.
86. Koberlein, 309 N.C. at 605, 308 S.E.2d at 445 (citing In re Banks, 295 N.C. at 239,
244 S.E.2d at 388-89).
87. See Mazda Motors v. Southwestern Motors, 296 N.C. 357, 361,250 S.E.2d 250,253
(1979); Avco Fin. Servs. v. Isbell, 67 N.C. App. 341, 343, 312 S.E.2d 707, 708 (1984) (citing
State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621, 625, 107 S.E. 505, 507 (1921)).
88. See Brown, 349 N.C. at 522, 507 S.E.2d at 896; Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh,
Inc., 326 N.C. 205,209,388 S.E.2d 134,136-37 (1990).
89. See definition supra note 62.
90. See Brown, 349 N.C. at 523-24,507 S.E.2d at 896; Board of Adjustment v. Town of
Swansboro, 334 N.C. 421, 427, 432 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1993); Williams, 299 N.C. at 180-81,
261 S.E.2d at 854.
91. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 403,499 S.E.2d at 202.
92. Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 404-08,499 S.E.2d at 201-04. Judge Walker's opinion only
concurred in the result and did not address the language of 9(j). See id. at 406-07, 499
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requiring the trial court to dismiss Keith's claim.93 Judge Timmons-
Goodson, on the other hand, believed that the language was unclear,
and thus concluded that the trial court was not required, as a matter
of law, to dismiss Keith's case. 4 Judge Timmons-Goodson decided'
that because of this ambiguity, the proper way to read 90) was to
construe it as being consistent with Rule 15's order to grant leave to
amend freely, as justice requires."
Judge Greene offered little explanation as to why 9(j)'s "shall be
dismissed" should be considered clear and unambiguous. 6 In reading
the language as it naturally appeared, he concluded that a statute that
says an action "shall be dismissed" unless it complies with certain
requirements plainly means a trial court is required to dismiss a non-
complying action.97  In contrast, Judge Timmons-Goodson was
unwilling to require a trial court to dismiss a 9(j) deficient complaint
absent some "direct evidence" that the General Assembly explicitly
intended to create an exception to the court's equitable powers under
Rule 15.98
Of the two opinions, Judge Greene's comports more closely with
the traditional rules of statutory construction. Unless the words of a
statute are facially unclear or have acquired a technical meaning, the
court must give effect to their plain and ordinary meaning.99 Judge
Timmons-Goodson's belief that she could not read "shall be
dismissed" as clear without some "direct evidence" on the point is not
well grounded in law. The plain reading of "shall be dismissed" is
that a deficient claim must be dismissed. To show a lack of clarity,
Judge Timmons-Goodson might have demonstrated that the words
"shall be dismissed" have a technical meaning, or she could have
asserted that there is a plain interpretation of "shall be dismissed"
that comports with her argument. She did neither. Thus, when the
legislature says a case "shall be dismissed," there is no reason to
assume it means otherwise.
S.E.2d at 203 (Walker, J., concurring in result).
93. See id at 404-05,499 S.E.2d at 202; supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
94. See id at 408, 499 S.E.2d at 204 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result);
supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
95. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 408, 499 S.E.2d at 204 (Timmons-Goodson, J.,
concurring in the result).
96. See id. at 404-05,499 S.E.2d at 202.
97. See id.
98. See id at 408,499 S.E.2d at 204 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result).
99. See State v. Koberlein, 309 N.C. 601, 605, 308 S.E.2d 442, 445 (1983) (holding that
words must be given their plain meaning unless they have acquired a technical meaning);
D.G. Matthews & Sons, Inc. v. State ex reL McDevitt, 131 N.C. App. 520, 522, 508 S.E.2d
331,333 (1998) (same).
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In addition to relying upon the "direct evidence" argument,
Judge Timmons-Goodson made a second point that may have been
her most convincing argument had she supported it with relevant case
law.100 This latter argument focused on the rules of statutory
interpretation which say that when a literal reading of a statute either
conflicts with clearly expressed legislative intent or yields absurd
results, then the literal meaning may be disregarded and a judicially
imposed reading may be substituted. 10 The legislative intent of Rule
90) is not clearly expressed, yet an analysis of the legislative intent
indicates that the General Assembly probably did envision that Rule
90) would require courts to dismiss defective complaints.'02 Thus, a
literal reading of Rule 9(j) probably does not conflict with clearly
expressed legislative intent. One could argue, however, that a literal
reading of 90) requires courts to dismiss defective, yet otherwise
meritorious, complaints and thereby diminishes the court's equitable
powers. Under such a literal reading, the court could be required to
dismiss an otherwise meritorious medical malpractice claim, and, if
the complaint was filed at the end of the statute of limitations, the
plaintiff could be barred from refiling. Such a result would bring
Rule 90) into discord with the Rules of Civil Procedure's preference
for deciding cases on the merits.0 3
This argument, however, also has flaws. Judge Timmons-
Goodson's compared 90) to the other Rule 9 pleading requirements
that employ the word "shall"'" and asserted that even though each of
these sections use the word "shall," a deficiency in pleading one of
these requirements may be saved by a Rule 15 motion for leave to
amend.0 The judge overlooked the fact, however, that while each of
these rules uses the word "shall," none uses the phrase "shall be
dismissed." In Rules 9(a)-(c), "shall" is used as a filing requirement
100. Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 408,499 S.E.2d at 204 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring
in the result).
101. See Mazda Motors v. Southwestern Motors, 296 N.C. 357,361,250 S.E.2d 250,253
(1979); Avco Fin. Servs. v. Isbell, 67 N.C. App. 341,343,312 S.E.2d 707,708 (1984) (citing
State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621,625,107 S.E. 505,507 (1921)).
102. See infra notes 110-34 and accompanying text (analyzing the General Assembly's
likely intent for the operation of Rule 90)).
103. See Phillips v. Phillips, 46 N.C. App. 558, 560-61, 265 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1980);
Mangum v. Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 98-99,187 S.E.2d 697,702 (1972).
104. See Ud at 407, 499 S.E.2d at 203-04 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the
result); supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (explaining that Rules 9(a), (b), and (c)
all use "shall" but that this mandatory language is not understood to require a dismissal in
the case of non-compliance).
105. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 407, 499 S.E.2d at 203-04 (Timmons-Goodson, J.,
concurring in the result).
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and deficiencies may be cured by amendment because nothing in
those statutes mandates dismissal.10 6 If 9(j) were worded to say that a
pleading "shall include expert certification," it would then mirror the
phrasing of Rules 9(a)-(c). Comparing the use of "shall" in Rules
9(a)-(c) to that in 9(j) is of low probative value because 9(j) does not
state that a pleading "shall include expert certification."' 10 Rather,
Rule 9(j) uses entirely different language that facially indicates an
intent that malpractice cases be treated differently, without
forgiveness for defects in the expert pleading requirement."0 ' Thus,
"[i]t is only Rule 9(j) ... that specifically states that the failure to
allege particularities requires dismissal of the pleading," which would
seemingly preclude Rule 15 amendment in medical malpractice
cases.
109
As argued above, the "shall be dismissed" language of Rule 9(j)
seems clear and unambiguous. However, assuming arguendo that
9(j)'s language is unclear, it is informative to examine the legislative
history of the Rule to ascertain the General Assembly's intent in
enacting it. The legislature passed Rule 9(j) in 1995 as part of a
package of measures designed to prevent frivolous malpractice
suits.110 The legislative history of Rule 9(j) is sparse. When the bill
was originally introduced in the N.C. House of Representatives, the
initial version read that a complaint "must be dismissed unless" either
the complainant pled that an expert was willing to testify at trial that
the applicable standard of care was, not met or that the pleading
alleged facts establishing negligence under res ipsa loquitur.111 Thus,
the earlier draft language supports a conclusion that the legislature, in
using the words "shall be dismissed," had in mind that a deficient
complaint "must be dismissed."
106. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
107. N.C. R. Civ. P. 90). For the language of Rule 9(j), see supra note 34.
108. N.C. R. Civ. P. 90); see also Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 405 n.4, 499 S.E.2d at 202 n.4
(noting the difference in language).
109. Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 405 n.4, 499 S.E.2d at 202 n.4.
110. See Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 611 (codified at N.C. R.
Civ. P. 9G)). Chapter 309 is entitled "To Prevent Frivolous Malpractice Actions By
Requiring That Expert Witnesses in Medical Malpractice Cases Have Appropriate
Qualifications to Testify on the Standard of Care at Issue and to Require Expert Witness
Review as a Condition of Filing a Malpractice Action." Id. In addition to Rule 9(j)'s
pleading requirements, the law also included a provision that modified Rule of Evidence
702, which concerns the testimony of experts. See N.C. R. EvID. 702. Under the modified
Rule 702, the standards for qualifying an expert witness to testify in a medical malpractice
case are more cumbersome than the standards for qualifying experts in other kinds of
actions. See id.
111. 1995 Daily Bull.: Actions by the N.C. Gen. Assembly (Legis. Reporting Serv.,
N.C. Inst. Gov't), at 10-11 (Apr. 3, 1995).
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The title of the Act that enables Rule 9(j) reads, in pertinent
part, that it is an Act to "Require Expert-Witness Review as a
Condition of Filing a Malpractice Action.'' 1 2 This title also indicates
an intent that the certification be a prerequisite to filing a malpractice
complaint.
Further, 9(j) contains a provision allowing for a 120-day
extension of the statute of limitations." This extension provision
would be unnecessary if the legislature envisioned that the action
"could be filed first, with the review and an amendment to the
complaint following thereafter.""' 4 Rather, the extension provision
indicates that the legislature intended for the expert certification to
be completed prior to filing the complaint." 5 The extension provision
evinces that the legislature foresaw that the pre-filing certification
requirements could place serious burdens on a plaintiff, especially
one who was pressed by the statute of limitations."6 Moreover, it
displays that the legislature understood that some actions might be
barred by the statute of limitations if the complaint was dismissed for
failure to comply with the expert certification requirements." 7 The
legislature seemed willing to take that risk in its efforts to limit the
number of medical malpractice suits. The statute of limitations
extension would be wholly unnecessary if the legislature intended for
a plaintiff to be able to cure a 9(j) expert certification deficiency
through amendment of the complaint."'
The original version of Rule 9(j), the title of the Act, and the
provision allowing for an extension in the statute of limitations all
indicate that the legislature intended that the expert certification be
completed before filing a complaint. A plaintiff's failure to comply
with the expert certification requirement prior to filing the complaint
results in dismissal. If that dismissal bars the plaintiff from refiling
because the statute of limitations has expired, the plaintiff is left
without a remedy under Rule 9(j) or any other rule.
112. Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 611, 611 (codified at N.C. R.
Civ. P. 9(j)) (emphasis added).
113. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j). A judge "may allow a motion to extend the statute of
limitations for a period not to exceed 120 days to file a complaint ... in order to comply
with this Rule." Id.
114. Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 5. Here, such an extension of the statute of
limitations was granted under Rule 9(j), yet Keith still failed to obtain expert certification
during that time. See Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 403, 499 S.E.2d at 201.
115. See Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 5.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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Considering the legislative history, it seems unobjectionable to
presume that the legislature intended to make it more difficult to
bring medical malpractice claims, frivolous or otherwise." 9 Even
assuming that the "shall be dismissed" language is unclear or
ambiguous, as suggested by Judge Timmons-Goodson, the court
should construe the statute consistently with the legislature's
discernable intent.120 While Judge Timmons-Goodson admitted that
the General Assembly "promulgate[d] this Act to avoid the filing of
frivolous medical malpractice claims,"121 she did not dig deeper into
the General Assembly's intent. If she had, she would have
encountered strong evidence that the legislature intended exactly the
result that she disfavors." Instead, Judge Timmons-Goodson stated
that to construe Rule 9(j) as requiring a court to dismiss a deficient
complaint "would constitute a grave injustice. '' " While her
sympathy for potential medical malpractice plaintiffs is
understandable, the judge's approach is at odds with both the
language of the statute and the traditional method of statutory
interpretation.
In her defense, Judge Timmons-Goodson attempted to interpret
Rule 9(j) consistently with Rule 15's order to grant leave to amend
freely.124 This approach is in accord with the rule that when two or
more statutes address a single subject, the court is to construe them in
pari materia so as to effectuate them in a non-contradictory
manner."z Thus, the court's "task is to give effect, if possible, to all
sections of each statute and to harmonize them into one law on the
119. At the very least, obtaining expert review prior to filing a complaint has the
practical effect of forcing a plaintiff to bear the substantial expense of acquiring an
expert's services earlier in the litigation process. This expense applies to all medical
malpractice complainants, regardless of the merits of their claims. Many medical
malpractice cases are taken on a contingency fee basis, so this may mean that the expense
will actually fall on an attorney, and, thus, it may discourage attorney's from taking on
potentially meritorious cases. Of course, the Act enabling Rule 9(j) is designed to prevent
frivolous filings, so this added expense to attorneys who take close cases on a contingency
fee basis seems quite intentional.
120. See Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998); Burgess v.
Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205,209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (1990).
121. Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 408, 499 S.E.2d at 204. (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring
in the result).
122. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
123. Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 408,499 S.E.2d at 204. (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring
in the result).
124. See id (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in the result).
125. See Brown, 349 N.C. at 523-24, 507 S.E.2d at 896; Board of Adjustment v. Town of
Swansboro, 334 N.C. 421, 427, 432 S.E.2d 310,313 (1993); see also supra note 62 (defining
in pari materia).
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subject."'16 When it is not possible to read two statutes consistently,
the court must give effect to the legislature's intent, even if the court
is not pleased with the result.27
The intention of the legislature in enacting Rule 9(j) is
reasonably evident. The Rule was designed to prevent the filing of
frivolous medical malpractice claims."2 The original version of Rule
9(j) used the words "must be dismissed" instead of "shall be
dismissed."' 29 In addition, the language allowing for an extension of
the statute of limitations indicates a desire on the part of the General
Assembly that the expert certification be completed before the
complaint is filed."0 The intent of the legislature was to force
potential medical malpractice plaintiffs to obtain expert certification
before filing. If they do not, the complaint must be dismissed. Judge
Timmons-Goodson, in reading 9(j) as not requiring a dismissal, would
effectively render Rule 9(j) meaningless. Under her view, a plaintiff
need not bother obtaining expert certification until after the
complaint is filed: The complaintant could simply file, obtain expert
certification (if possible) after filing, and amend the complaint to
include the certification. This reading is inconsistent with the
legislature's intent.
It seems that the North Carolina General Assembly has, in Judge
Timmons-Goodson's words, "carve[d] out an exception to the
equitable powers of the court.' 13' In removing this discretion from
the hands of the court, the legislature has significantly altered the
court's traditional equitable powers to grant leave to amend deficient
pleadings.'32 The desirability of this change is debatable.
When read as the legislature intended, Rule 9(j) contravenes the
judicial policy that cases are to be decided on the merits, not on the
basis of a mere technicality. 33 A meritorious medical malpractice
126. Brown, 349 N.C. at 524, 507 S.E.2d at 896 (emphasis added) (citing Williams v.
Williams, 299 N.C. 174,180-81,261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980)).
127. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing the court's duty in
interpreting statutes).
128. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text (discussing legislative intent in
drafting Rule 9(j)).
129. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing text of prior versions of
Rule 9j)).
130. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 9(j)'s 120-day
statute of limitations extension provision).
131. Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 408, 499 S.E.2d at 204 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring
in the result).
132. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional standard
for granting leave to amend).
133. See Mangum v. Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 98-99, 187 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1972); Phillips v.
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complaint that fails to obtain pre-filing expert certification should not
suffer an automatic dismissal. Even if such a dismissal is without
prejudice, if the complaint is filed at the end of the statute of
limitations, the plaintiff will be barred from refiling. A plaintiff with a
valid claim could be barred from pursuing it because she failed to
comply with a technical requirement. Moreover, this harsh result is
not ameliorated when the plaintiff, like Keith, files pro se, as nothing
in Rule 90) creates an exception for pro se plaintiffs. Speaking to the
severity of 9(j), the trial judge stated, "I think it's a harsh rule, but I
think it's a rule. The purpose of the rule was to cut off these things
.... I feel sorry for Ms. Keith. She may have a cause of action that
may not get litigated." 134
North Carolina has created a harsh rule that removes discretion
in granting leave to amend from the purview of the trial courts. The
severity of this rule becomes more apparent when compared to the
laws of other states that use the same methodology. While some
states require plaintiffs to submit potential claims to expert review
panels before they may be filed, 35 many others, like North Carolina,
require expert certification as a pre-requisite to filing a medical
malpractice claim. Many of these states mandate either that potential
medical malpractice plaintiffs obtain expert review as a prerequisite
to filing an action or that they procure expert review within a number
of days after the defendant's response.1 36 The mandatory language is
typically phrased along the lines that the plaintiff's complaint "shall
include expert certification. ' 137 Though other states use mandatory
Phillips, 46 N.C. App. 558,560-61,265 S.E.2d 441,443 (1980).
134. Transcript of Motions Hearing at 16.
135. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-8-4 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.47 (West 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.016 (Michie 1997); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-5-14 (Michie 1998); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 27 § 166i (1997); see also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 231 § 60B (1998) (requiring every medical malpractice action to be heard by a
special tribunal consisting of a superior court justice and a licensed physician); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring health care claims to go
through mediation before trial).
136. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766,104
(West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1993 & Supp. 1998); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-622 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b)
(1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912d (West Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. § 145.682
(1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 1998); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a
(McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.011 (Anderson 1999);
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i § 13.01 (West 1997). Most of these laws have been
enacted within the last 15 years.
137. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (stating that no medical malpractice
action "shall be filed ... unless the party filing the action has made a reasonable inquiry
... to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been injury."
The complaint "shall contain a certificate" of the good faith inquiry, established by
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language, the courts of those states have consistently ruled that
dismissal is not mandatory, but remains within the discretion of the
trial court.3 8  Thus, the North Carolina legislature is alone in its
decision to strip the court of its traditional discretionary power to
grant leave to amend.
North Carolina's Rule 9(j) is also arguably more punitive than
comparable rules in Minnesota and Maryland.139  The Minnesota
statute holds that the plaintiff's attorney "must" provide an affidavit
stating the attorney has consulted with an expert who has found that
the standard of care has not been met.40 If such review cannot be
obtained because of statute of limitations pressures, the plaintiff has
ninety days after the commencement of the action to file the
certifying affidavit and 180 days to serve affidavits identifying the
consulting with an expert); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (stating that in a medical
malpractice action, the plaintiff "shall file an affidavit" certifying that she consulted an
expert, or that she was unable to consult an expert because of statute of limitations
constraints or from the defendant's refusal to turn over relevant records); MICH. CoMP.
LAWs ANN. § 600.2912d (stating that in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff "shall
file with the complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (stating that in a medical malpractice action the plaintiff shall, within
60 days of defendant's answer, file a certificate verifying consultation with an expert); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3012-a (stating that in a medical malpractice action the "complaint shall be
accompanied by a certificate" declaring that the plaintiff has consulted with an expert, or
that she was unable to obtain such a consultation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.011
(stating that in a medical malpractice case, after the responsive pleadings have been filed,
the plaintiff "shall file with the court a certificate of merit" affirming that he has consulted
with an expert who is willing to testify'or that the plaintiff intends to rely on a theory of
liability that does not require expert testimony); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i
§ 13.01 (stating that within 90 days after filing a medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff
shall either post a $5000 bond for each claim or file an expert report certifying the prima
facie validity of the claim).
13A. See, e.g., Finnegan v. University of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 249
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating proper action for failure to file expert certification is "to afford
the [plaintiff] 30 days to comply with the statute"); Lindgren v. Moore, 907 F. Supp. 1183,
1192 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (stating that under Illinois law, whether to dismiss a medical
malpractice complaint for failure to obtain expert certification is within the sound
discretion of the trial court judge); LeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1, 7 (Conn. 1990)
(noting that dismissal of complaint for filing false certificate of good faith is discretionary,
rather than required); Gabrielle v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 635 A.2d 1232, 1232-36 (Conn.
App. 1994) (stating that failure to attach certificate is curable by timely amendment); Apa
v. Rotman, 680 N.E.2d 801, 804 (Ill. App. 1997) (noting that the decision to dismiss
medical malpractice complaint for failure to conform with expert certification requirement
is within discretion of the trial court); Lombardo v. Seydow-Webber, 529 N.W.2d 702, 703
(Minn. App. 1995) (stating the court is to exercise discretion in deciding whether or not to
dismiss a medical malpractice action for procedural irregularities).
139. These two states are significant because they both contain strong mandatory
language that is particularly comparable to 9(j)'s language.
140. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682, subd. 2-3 (West 1998).
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experts that will testify at trial. 4 ' Further, the statute holds that
failure to comply with the demand for expert certification
requirements "results, upon motion, in mandatory dismissal with
prejudice of each cause of action as to which expert testimony is
necessary to establish a prima facie case." '142 The federal courts have
interpreted this requirement strictly, holding that dismissal on
procedural grounds follows from failure to comply with certification
requirements. 43 Yet even though the statute says the dismissal with
prejudice is mandatory, a plaintiff may still avoid dismissal for
noncompliance in one of two ways. Upon a showing of excusable
neglect, the court may extend the time limit for obtaining the expert
certification 44 Alternatively, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
prima facie case may be proven without expert testimony, the expert
certification requirement can be dispensed with altogether.45 The
Minnesota courts have recognized that "the penalty for
noncompliance is harsh," and have held that, if a dismissal is
warranted, it must be with prejudice. 46 The courts still retain broad
discretion in deciding the preliminary issue, whether or not to dismiss
the complaint. 47 Thus, the court may allow a plaintiff a great deal of
leeway in complying with the expert certification even after the time
141. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682, subd. 3-4 (West 1998).
142. Id. at subd. 6 (emphasis added).
143. See Bellecourt v. United States, 784 F. Supp. 623, 636 (D. Minn. 1992). Bellecourt
involved a former federal inmate who brought an action against his prison officials and the
prison doctor alleging medical malpractice, cruel and unusual punishment, and civil rights
violations. See id. at 626-27. The plaintiff suffered a heart attack and claimed that the
prison officials and the physician ignored his requests for treatment. See id. at 627. The
plaintiffs medical malpractice claim was dismissed with prejudice because he failed to file
the expert affidavits in a timely manner, nor could he show that his neglect was excusable
or that expert testimony was not necessary to establish negligence. See id. at 637.
144. See iL at 636.
145. See id.
146. Lombardo v. Seydow-Webber, 529 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn. App. 1995). In
Lombardo, the plaintiff alleged medical malpractice for failure to detect fetal distress. See
id. at 702. Six months after the commencement of the action, the plaintiff had not
complied with the expert certification requirements. See id. The defendant doctors
sought dismissal with prejudice due to the lack of certification compliance; the plaintiff
sought a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. See id. The trial court granted the
plaintiffs motion for dismissal without prejudice, concluding that Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 41.01(b), which provides voluntary dismissals are to be without prejudice,
superseded the expert certification statute. See id. The issue on appeal was whether, in
the absence of facts showing excusable neglect, a plaintiff could take a voluntary dismissal
in order to avoid the dismissal with prejudice demanded by the expert certification statute.
See id. The appellate court held that if a case is to be dismissed for failure to comply with
the expert certification requirements, by operation of the statute it must be dismissed with
prejudice. See id. at 705.
147. See id. at 704.
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for compliance has technically expired.1'8
The Maryland statute also uses strong mandatory language.149
Specifically, the statute says a medical malpractice claim "shall be
dismissed, without prejudice, if the claimant fails to file a certificate of
a qualified expert."'"0  Unlike Rule 9(j), however, the Maryland
statute contains a second mandate, ordering that the panel chairman
"shall grant an extension" of 90 days to file the certificate if the
statute of limitations has expired or if the failure to file was neither
willful nor grossly negligent.'5' Although the courts are required to
dismiss a complaint that fails to comply with the expert certification
requirements, the Maryland legislature has established a safety net
whereby a technical failure will not bar a litigant from pursuing her
claim.5 2
While the expert certification statutes of both Minnesota and
Maryland contain strong mandatory language, these statutes have
been interpreted by the courts to prevent a plaintiff's claim from
being decided on the basis of a technicality. Rule 9(j)'s wording
simply does not allow for such a result. Although Rule 9(j) permits
an extension of the statute of limitations, it states that such an
extension may be granted upon a motion by the complainant "prior
to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations."' 53  A
plaintiff must therefore anticipate a statute of limitations problem
and file for an extension before such a problem arises; unlike
Minnesota and Maryland law, North Carolina's Rule 9(j) does not
14. See id. (holding that the court "exercises its discretion in deciding whether to
dismiss a medical malpractice action for procedural irregularities"); see also Sorenson v.
St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. 1990) (stating that a trial court's
dismissal of an action for procedural irregularity is only reversible upon a showing of
abuse of discretion). To claim excusable neglect, the plaintiff must show that: (1) plaintiff
has a reasonable case on the merits; (2) plaintiff has a reasonable excuse for his failure to
meet the statutory time limits; (3) plaintiff proceeded with due diligence after notice of
statutory time limitations; and (4) no substantial prejudice will result to the defendant by
an extension. See Bellecourt, 784 F. Supp. at 636-37.
149. MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i) (1998).
150. Id..
151. Id. § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(ii). The Maryland statute requires claimants to file the expert
certification to the Director of the State Board of Physician Quality Assurance and to the
Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of the State of Maryland. See id. § 3-2A-04(a). An
arbitration panel then hears the case. See id.
152. See generally Edward W. McCready Mem. Hosp. v. Hauser, 624 A.2d 1249, 1255-
56 (Md. 1993) (holding that the Maryland legislature intended the 90-day extension to be
granted automatically in lieu of dismissal).
153. N.C. R. Civ. P. 90) (emphasis added). The court should grant an extension to the
statute of limitations upon a showing that good cause exists for the extension and the ends
of justice would therein be served. See id.
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provide a process for extending the certification requirements or
remedying the defect after the action commences. While Maryland
and Minnesota have cast their statutes in a manner that is consistent
with the courts' traditional powers of discretion and the policy of
liberal amendment, the North Carolina legislature has not followed
their example.
Rule 9(j) appears to require North Carolina courts to dismiss
complaints that fail to comply with its expert certification
requirements. The result is the same when the plaintiff acts pro se, or
when a dismissal without prejudice will still result in the claim's
termination because the statute of limitations has run. The legislature
has constructed Rule 90) to require a strict and literal reading, 154 and
in so doing, it has stripped the courts of their powers of discretion in
granting leave to amend.
This may ultimately be an undesirable result. Because there was
no majority holding regarding whether 9(j) mandated dismissal, the
question is still open. This Note asserts that plaintiffs who do not
comply with Rule 90) in their original pleadings must have their cases
dismissed entirely. Judge Timmons-Goodson raised valid concerns
about the loss of trial court discretion and the injustice that may result
from a literal reading of Rule 90).155 All other states that employ
malpractice claim procedural requirements have set up safety valves
to ensure that a litigant's claim is not decided solely on technical
grounds. North Carolina law does not provide a comparable
mechanism. This result is contrary to the liberal amendment policy of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and prevents cases from
being heard on the merits. In Judge Timmons-Goodson's words,
"[s]uch discretion is best left in the quarter of the trial court."' 56
The General Assembly should revise Rule 90). Frivolous
medical malpractice suits are a strain on the state's legal system that
certainly should be discouraged, but Rule 90) does so at great cost.
In seeking to prevent frivolous medical malpractice actions, the
legislature has established a rule that not only strips the courts of
their traditional equitable powers, but may also compromise the
rights of individuals who have valid malpractice claims. Rule 9(j)
needs a safety valve to assure that potentially meritorious complaints,
filed near the end of the statute of limitations, are not permanently
154. See discussion supra notes 110-34 and accompanying text.
155. See discussion supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
156. Keith, 129 N.C. App. at 408, 499 S.E.2d at 204 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring
in the result).
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barred because of a technical 90) deficiency. The legislature could
allow the courts to exercise their traditional discretionary powers and
permit amendment of the complaint under Rule 15. The legislature
also might retain the non-discretionary dismissal provision, but
stipulate that, where necessary, a mandatory dismissal results in an
automatic short term extension of the statute of limitations. Either of
these potential solutions would be a vast improvement over the
current Rule 90), which provides unsuspecting plaintiffs no recourse.
DANIEL BURT ARRINGTON
A Matter of (Statutory) Interpretation: North Carolina
Recognizes the Functional Test for Corporate Taxation in
Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman
In the world of American business, localism is largely a thing of
the past. Nation-wide corporate chains have all but replaced
neighborhood stores, and multi-state financial conglomerates now
stand in the place of local banks.' As a result of corporate expansion,
regional and national companies that derive income from business
conducted in several states are subject to corporate taxation in each
state that can claim a connection to the interstate activities2 The
1. The emergence of multi-state business in North Carolina, especially in the areas of
finance and technology, is evident from both the influx of national corporations into the
Research Triangle Park and the expansion of banking institutions in Charlotte to other
states. See Chris Burritt, North Carolina's Research Triangle Park- A Pioneer Turns 40,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 21, 1999, at D1 ("Cisco, based in San Jose, Calif.; Lucent,
based in Murray Hill, NJ.; and Nortel based in Brampton, Ontario, are pouring hundreds
of millions of dollars into the Research Triangle region.... The investments ... are ...
likely to lure other companies to the Research Triangle seeking to tap into the cutting-
edge developments."); Ken Elkins, Coast-to-Coast or Step-by-Step? Analysts Differ, Bus.
J. (Charlotte, N.C.), Jan. 22, 1999, at 53 (speculating about future out-of-state mergers by
the Charlotte-based First Union Corporation); Ken Gepfert & John McKinnon, Resilient
State Economies Defy Gloomy Forecasts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1999, at S1 (illustrating the
corporate boom in North Carolina by stating that "Charlotte and the Raleigh-Durham
area each have more than two million square feet of office space under construction,
fueled by vacancy rates in the 7% range"); John Helyar, Muscling In: Hard-Charging
NCNB Seizes a Large Share of Banking in Texas, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 1
(discussing one of the early expansions that helped to make Charlotte-based NationsBank
Corporation the largest financial institution in the southeast; NationsBank Corporation
has since become BankAmerica Corporation); Wendy Hower, City of Medicine Program
Out to Tend Local Needs, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 8, 1998, at 1B
(describing how "[v]ideos produced by the City of Medicine Program have helped
Durham attract dozens of corporations" and noting that a large Japanese pharmaceutical
company "set up shop in Research Triangle Park in November [1997] to make a drug to
treat Alzheimer's disease"); Michael E. Kanell, Industry Is Growing, but Isn't Yet an
Economic Force, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 14, 1998, at F2 ("In North Carolina, where
the Research Triangle Park has vied for status as a high-tech center, the North Carolina
Biotechnology Center ... has spent much of its energy luring biotech companies from
elsewhere to either move headquarters or do their manufacturing in North Carolina.");
Irwin Speizer, Wall Street, Charlotte-Style, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 15,
1999, at 1D (describing the purchase of Montgomery Securities of San Francisco by
BankAmerica Corporation and the merger of First Union with Wheat First Butcher
Singer of Richmond).
2. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 772 (1992). A
state has the power to tax a non-domiciliary corporation's income derived from multi-state
activity without violating either the Due Process or Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution, so long as there is a "'"minimal connection" between the interstate
CORPORATE TAXATION
states' ability to tax corporate income to which they are connected
can burden a large corporation with severe "multiple taxation. '3 In
an effort to address the problem of multiple taxation and to create a
uniform method for allocating corporate income among the states
entitled to tax a portion thereof, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association approved the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act ("UDITPA" or "Act")4 in 1957 and recommended the
Act for adoption by the states.5
UDITPA establishes a uniform method for allocating and
apportioning the income of multi-state corporations. The Act is
designed to simplify the reporting of income and the collection of
taxes and to make certain that 100% of a multi-state company's
income, no more and no less, is taxable by the eligible states.6 To
those ends UDITPA distinguishes between business and non-business
income.7 The Act apportions business income among the states in
activities and the taxing State.'" Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 436-37 (1980) (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273
(1978))).
3. See Frank M. Keesling & John S. Warren, California's Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act, 15 UCLA L. REv. 156, 156 (1967). The possibility of
multiple taxation arises from the fact that, among the states possessing the constitutional
power to tax a portion of a particular multi-state corporation's income, "the conceptions
of source [of income] and the methods of computing income attributable to sources within
the respective states vary greatly." IL at 156 (citing REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITrEE ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE COMMITrEE
OF THE JUDICIARY, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-1480 (1964)); see also Marissa R. Arrache,
Comment, Factor Representation in the Apportionment of Income from Intangibles, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 485, 496 (1996) ("The threat of double taxation exists when
jurisdictions differ in their approach to taxation, for instance, when allocation or
apportionment is used inconsistently across jurisdictions.").
4. 7A U.L.A. 356 (1995) [hereinafter UDITPA].
5. See Walter Hellerstein, Construing the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act: Reflections on the Illinois Supreme Court's Reading of the "Throwback"
Rule, 45 U. CM. L. REV. 768,769 (1978).
6. See id.; Ryan Pace, Note, A Review of Kansas Tax Law Governing the Allocation
and Apportionment of Income for Multistate Corporations Doing Business in Kansas, 37
WASHBURN LJ. 703, 706-07 (1998); Robert Khuon Wiederstein, Comment, California
and Unitary Taxation: The Continuing Saga, 3 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 135, 138
(1992); see also Keesling & Warren, supra note 3, at 156 (describing California's "almost
verbatim" adoption of UDITPA and noting that the objectives of the Act are "(1) to
promote uniformity in allocation practices among the 38 states which impose taxes on or
measured by the income of corporations, and (2) to relieve the pressure for congressional
legislation in [the field of state corporate taxation]")..
7. See UDITPA § 1; see also Keesling & Warren, supra note 3, at 163 (noting that
"the Uniform Act sharply distinguishes between business income which is to be
apportioned by formula and nonbusiness income which is to be allocated specifically to
the situs of the property which produces the income or to the commercial domicile of the
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which the corporation does business-using a formula based upon the
amount of the company's property, payroll, and sales attributable to
each state-and allocates non-business income entirely to the state or
states "that are considered to be the source of the income, often on
the basis of the location of the property that gave rise to the income
or on the basis of the taxpayer's commercial domicile."' UDITPA
defines business income as "income arising from transactions and
activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and
includes income from tangible and intangible property if the
acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute
integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations."9
The Act broadly defines non-business income as "all income other
than business income."'" Thus, the decision whether to construe
income as business or non-business income is an important one for
states claiming a connection with a company's activities."
There are two tests for making the determination between
business and non-business income: the transactional test and the
functional test. 2 State supreme courts have disagreed over whether
recipient").
8. 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES
9.02 (3d ed. 1998); see also UDITPA §§ 4-9 (governing the allocation of business and
non-business income); Peter L. Faber, State and Local Income and Franchise Tax Aspects
of Corporate Acquisitions, TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
DIsPOsrIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS &
RESTRUCTURINGS at 91, 100-01 (PLI Tax Law & Practice Handbook Series No. J-423,
1998) (noting that states usually allocate non-business income entirely to the corporation's
commercial domicile); Keesling & Warren, supra note 3, at 164-67 (describing the process
of allocation for non-business income and the formula for the apportionment of business
income).
9. UDITPA § l(a).
10. Id. § l(e).
11. See generally James H. Peters, Revised Multistate Tax Commission Regulations
Define "Business" and "Nonbusiness" Income, 40 J. TAX'N 122, 122-24 (1974) (addressing
problems in applying the UDITPA definitions of business and non-business income in
light of the regulations issued by the Multistate Tax Commission). In order to maximize
its revenues, the state in which a multi-state corporation has its commercial domicile will
attempt to construe the company's gains as non-business income so that the income will be
allocated solely to it, thereby enabling the state to tax the full amount of the gain. See 1
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, 9.02. Conversely, a non-domiciliary state
will claim that the company's gain is business income so that it can tax the portion of that
income attributable to the corporation's activities within its borders. See id. ("Under
UDITPA and similar taxing regimes, all 'business income' is apportioned; all 'nonbusiness
income' is allocated." (citing UDITPA §§ 4, 9)).
12. See 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, 9.05[2]; Faber, supra note 8,
at 107; Dan A. Lisonbee, State of the Law of Nonbusiness Gain, 7 J. ST. TAX'N. 333, 334
(1989). Under the transactional test, a corporation's gain is characterized as business
income if the company "regularly engages in the type of transaction producing the gain."
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UDITPA defines business income by using only the transactional test
or by employing both the transactional and functional tests. 13 In
Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court
interpreted the North Carolina version of UDITPA and held, in a
matter of first impression, that the statute incorporates both the
transactional and functional tests into its definition of business
income.15
This Note discusses the facts of Polaroid, its history in the lower
courts, and the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court. 6 The
Note then examines the history of UDITPA and traces the split
among state supreme courts over whether the Act includes the
functional test in addition to the transactional test.'7  After
summarizing the basic tenets of statutory interpretation,18 the Note
compares the North Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of
UDITPA to the decisions of other states and examines the court's
application of the functional test to the facts of Polaroid9 The Note
also briefly considers the court's disposition of Polaroid's
constitutional arguments.2  Finally, the Note emphasizes the
potential significance of the court's holding for multi-state
corporations doing business in North Carolina.2'
The tax controversy in Polaroid provides the coda to a complex
patent dispute that began more than a quarter century ago in
Massachusetts between two titans of the photography industry. 2 In
1972, Polaroid Corporation, a company long at the forefront of "one-
step photography," introduced the SX-70, 3 the most sophisticated
Faber, supra note 8, at 108. Under the functional test, however, a corporation's gain is
treated as business income as long as corporate assets "were used to generate business
income, even if their sale is not a regular incident of the business." Id. at 110 (emphasis
added). The functional test, therefore, allows for a broader spectrum of gain to be
characterized as business income. See Lisonbee, supra, at 335 ("The extraordinary nature
or infrequency of a transaction is irrelevant under [the functional] test.").
13. See Faber, supra note 8, at 107-15; infra notes 107-48 and accompanying text.
14. 349 N.C. 290,507 S.E.2d 284 (1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 1576 (1999).
15. See id. at 301, 507 S.E.2d at 293.
16. See infra notes 22-59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 60-99 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 107-87 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
22- See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 292, 507 S.E.2d at 287 (describing the beginnings of the
conflict between Polaroid and Kodak).
23. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 831 (D. Mass. 1985)
(describing the SX-70 as "an elegant, highly sophisticated camera and film system").
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one-step camera-and-film system on the market at the time.24 The
camera was a major innovation in photography because it allowed the
user to obtain a finished color print by simply focusing the camera
and taking the snapshot30 Throughout the course of developing the
SX-70, Polaroid secured patents for numerous innovations pertaining
to both the film and camera.26
During this period, Polaroid also informed its negative supplier,
Eastman Kodak Company, of the "radically new film" that was the
prototype of the SX-70Y The two companies, which had signed an
agreement in 1957 under which Polaroid disclosed certain aspects of
its color technology in exchange for Kodak supplying negative
material for earlier cameras, 28 discussed but never completed an
agreement for licensing and supply of film for the SX-70.29 In April
1969, Kodak notified Polaroid that it intended to terminate the 1957
agreement. °
At the time of the termination notification, Kodak already had
begun its own campaign to launch an instant camera-and-film
system." In 1972, however, after purchasing large quantities of the
new SX-70 for testing purposes, Kodak's management declared that
its own product, "as it then existed, was only 'marginally acceptable'"
and, thus, should be abandoned in favor of a new design that would
approach the standard set by Polaroid.3 2 Kodak's change in direction
eventually led to the company's unveiling of an instant camera-and-
film system in April 1976.33 Polaroid opposed the new product line,
24. See id. at 830-31. Unlike other cameras at that time, the SX-70 contained a motor
and a gear train designed to eject the film after processing. See id. In addition, the film
used for the camera developed upon exposure to daylight. See id.
25. See id. at 831.
26. See id. Among the numerous filings made by Polaroid in connection with the
invention of the SX-70 were patents for a "polymeric acid layer for stabilizing color
diffusion transfer film units" and a "detachable spread roller housing arrangement" that
comprised part of the SX-70's front-loading film mechanism. Id. at 837, 873-74.
27. Id. at 831.
28. See id. (noting that, until 1963, the two companies periodically conducted research
meetings in furtherance of the agreement).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. Kodak's campaign consisted of many early projects that were abandoned
by the company after failing to meet the standard set by the Polaroid products. See id. at
831-32 (describing Kodak's failed projects such as the "Lanyard" camera, which required
the user to eject the film manually by pulling on a lanyard device).
32. Id. at 832 (explaining that Kodak's "Lanyard camera was too large by comparison
to that marketed by Polaroid").
33. See id. (describing Kodak's introduction of the EK-4 and EK-6 cameras and PR-
lO fim).
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however, and sued Kodak under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 34 to recover
damages and to enjoin Kodak from infringing Polaroid patents
relating to the instant-camera technology.35
In 1985, nine years after Polaroid filed its lawsuit, the United
States District Court for Massachusetts ruled that several of
Polaroid's patents had been violated, and the court enjoined Kodak
from further infringement.5 In 1990, after a separate trial and a
complex and lengthy opinion on damages issues, the district court
held that Kodak had not willfully infringed the patents and, in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 284,37 awarded Polaroid more than $900
million in compensatory damages and interest.38 Because the court
did not find Polaroid's case to be "exceptional" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285, it refused to award attorney's fees.39 The following year, the
district court issued a second opinion that acknowledged several
mistakes in its prior damage calculations40 and reduced Polaroid's
damages by some $36 million, leaving the company with a final award
of $873 million.4'
Polaroid did not utilize the proceeds from the patent-
34. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (stating that "whoever without authority makes, uses or
sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent
therefor [sic], infringes the patent").
35. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 292, 507 S.E.2d at 287 (describing the lawsuit filed by
Polaroid against Kodak in 1976).
36. See Polaroid, 641 F. Supp. at 876-78 (describing the judgment of the court as to
Polaroid's various patent infringement claims and enjoining Kodak from further
infringement by "manufacture, use or sale of PR-10 film and EK-4 and EK-6 cameras").
The court declined to rule on the amount of damages to be awarded, choosing to delay its
determination until completion of a subsequent trial on the issue. See id
37. 35 U.S.C. § 284. Section 284 states:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement but, in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use of the invention made by the infringer, together
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In
either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.
Id
38. See id
39. See id. Section 285 states that the "court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." Id To award attorney fees under the
provision, "the trial court must have found unfairness, bad faith or inequitable or
unconscionable conduct on the part of the losing party." Uniflow Mfg. Co. v. King-Seeley
Thermos Co., 428 F.2d 335, 341 (6th Cir. 1970).
40. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711,1711 (D. Mass. 1991).
41. See id. at 1714. The revised award consisted of $240,467,854 in reasonable
royalties, $233,055,432 in lost profits, and $435,635,685 in interest. See id. Polaroid
ultimately collected $924,526,554 in damages because of additional post-judgment interest.
See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 292 n.1, 507 S.E.2d at 287 n.1.
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infringement award in its regular course of business in North
Carolina, but instead used the money to pay taxes, to repay debt, to
provide bonuses to its employees, and to redeem shares of its stock.42
In 1991, Polaroid classified the judgment award as "non-business
income" for North Carolina corporate income tax purposes, choosing
instead to allocate the entire award to its commercial domicile of
Massachusetts.4 3 The North Carolina Department of Revenue
disagreed with Polaroid's classification of the damages award and
characterized it instead as "business income," thereby increasing
Polaroid's North Carolina tax liability by nearly $500,000. 44 After the
Secretary of Revenue upheld the Department's classification in an
administrative hearing, Polaroid paid the increased tax and filed a
refund action under North Carolina General Statutes section 105-
241.4.45
In December 1996, Polaroid and the Secretary of Revenue filed
cross motions for summary judgment on the refund issue in Wake
County Superior Court, and the trial judge granted the Secretary's
motion but denied Polaroid's. 46 Subsequently, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that because the
damages award was properly classified as non-business income,
Polaroid was entitled to a refund.4 7  In assessing Polaroid's
classification of its patent-suit award as non-business income, the
court of appeals interpreted North Carolina General Statutes section
105-130.4, which defines business income as "income arising from
transactions and activity in the regular course of the corporation's
trade or business and includes income from tangible and intangible
property if the acquisition, management, and/or disposition of the
property constitute integral parts of the corporation's regular trade or
business operations."'  In focusing specifically on the words "and
includes," the court anchored its interpretation of section 105-130.4
with the premise that any "'doubt as to the meaning of a statute
levying a tax ... is to be strictly construed against the State and in
42- See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 292-93,507 S.E.2d at 287.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. Section 105-241.4 explains that a "taxpayer who has obtained an
administrative review.., and who is aggrieved by the decision of the Board may ... pay
the tax and bring a civil action for itsrecovery." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-241.4 (1997).
46. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 293,507 S.E.2d at 288.
47. See Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 128 N.C. App. 422, 427, 496 S.E.2d 399, 402,
rev'd, 349 N.C. 290, 507 S.E.2d 284 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1576 (1999).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.4(a)(1) (1997); see also Polaroid, 128 N.C. App. at 424-
26, 496 S.E.2d at 401-02 (discussing the statute).
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favor of the taxpayer.' ,9 Drawing upon the North Carolina
Supreme Court decision of Miller v. Johnston," the court of appeals
interpreted "and includes" to mean "and some examples are.""1
Thus, the court concluded that section 105-130.4 posits only one
definition of business income-income arising from transactions
performed in the regular course of business-and that the language
describing income derived from property is merely illustrative.52
After determining that the parties agreed that the damages award was
not gained through Polaroid's regular course of business, the court of
appeals held that Polaroid had correctly classified the award under
section 105-130.4 and remanded the case for summary judgment in
favor of Polaroid. 3
In April 1998, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted a
petition for discretionary review filed by the Secretary of Revenue to
determine whether Polaroid's patent-suit award constituted business
or non-business income under section 105-130.4.14 In a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Wynn,55 the court reversed the court of
appeals and held that the Secretary properly classified Polaroid's
damages award as business income.5 6 Because North Carolina's
corporate tax provision derives from UDITPA, the court centered its
analysis of the North Carolina statute around whether the Act
includes both the functional test and the transactional test within its
definition of business income. 7 In making its determination on a
matter of first impression, the court based its interpretation of section
105-130.4 on the "canons of statutory construction, pertinent
administrative rules, and the legislative history surrounding both the
49. Polaroid, 128 N.C. App. at 424, 496 S.E.2d at 400 (quoting In re Clayton-Marcus
Co., 286 N.C. 215,219,210 S.E.2d 199,202 (1974)).
50. 173 N.C. 62, 69, 91 S.E. 593, 597 (1917) (noting that "includes" is not synonymous
with the phrase "in addition to").
51. Polaroid, 128 N.C. App. at 425,496 S.E.2d at 401.
52- See id.
53. See id. at 427,496 S.E.2d at 402.
54. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 293,507 S.E.2d at 288.
55. Judge Wynn served on the North Carolina Court of Appeals from 1990 until he
was appointed to the North Carolina Supreme Court in fall 1998 by Governor Jim Hunt to
fill the seat vacated by Justice Webb. See Hunt Fills High-Court Vacancy, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 26, 1998, at A3. Soon after his appointment, however,
Justice Wynn lost the November 1998 election by a narrow margin to George Wainright.
See Gaston Glitch Puts Two Court Races in Limbo, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, Nov.
6, 1998, at lB. After the election, the Governor reappointed Judge Wynn to the court of
appeals. See John Wagner, Defeated Judges Named to Court, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 24, 1998, at A3.
56. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 315,507 S.E.2d at 301.
57. See id. at 298,507 S.E.2d at 290.
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Act itself and UDITPA.'58  The court was also guided by the
decisions of other state supreme courts that had addressed the issue. 9
The constitutional issues implicated by apportionment schemes
such as UDITPA arise from the general principle that a state may not
tax income that is earned beyond its borders.60 In the case of a
company that does business in several states, however, the task of
accounting separately for the company's activities within each state
claiming the right to tax can be inexact or unfeasible. 61 In an effort to
provide a coherent solution to this problem, plans such as UDITPA
attribute a portion of a corporation's total income to the taxing state
by means of formulae that give reasonable weight to the company's
in-state and out-of-state activities.62 Nevertheless, the measures have
been attacked as unconstitutional under both the Commerce Clause63
58. Id. at 297, 507 S.E.2d at 290; see also infra notes 156-82 and accompanying text
(analyzing the court's methodology for interpreting section 105-130.4).
59. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 297-301,507 S.E.2d at 290-93 (citing Texaco-Cities Serv.
Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 695 N.E.2d 481, 485 (Ill. 1998); Kewanee Indus. v. Reese, 845 P.2d
1238,1242 (N.M. 1993); Simpson Timber Co. v. Department of Revenue, 953 P.2d 366,370
(Or. 1998); Laurel Pipe Line Co. v. Commonwealth Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 642 A.2d 472,
475 (Pa. 1994)).
60. See ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307,315 (1981).
61. See E. George Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary
Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171, 171 (1970); see
also Jerome R. Hellerstein, The Unitary Business Principle and Multicorporate Enterprises:
An Examination of the Major Controversies, 27 TAX EXECUTIVE 313, 316-17 (1975)
(arguing that separate accounting is defective, inter alia, because it is "fearfully
expensive"). The United States Supreme Court has noted that "separate accounting,
while it purports to isolate portions of income received in various States, may fail to
account for contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of
management, and economies of scale." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,
438 (1980) (citing Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1942)). Considerations
such as these have led the Court to hold that separate accounting among the states,
although useful for internal auditing purposes, is not constitutionally required for state
taxation of a corporation's multi-state income. See id.
62. See Rudolph, supra note 61, at 171; see also infra notes 82-88 and accompanying
text (describing the formulae for apportionment and allocation set forth in UDITPA).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (bestowing upon Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes").
The Commerce Clause pertains to state taxation because of the "dormant Commerce
Clause" principle. See Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation of Interstate and
Foreign Commerce: The Second Best Solution, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 1425, 1437 (1996).
Although the Commerce Clause does not place express limitations on the taxing power of
the states, the "negative implications" in the clause have often provided a basis for the
regulation of state and local taxation of interstate and foreign commerce. See id. at 1436.
In order to comport with the Commerce Clause, a state tax that applies to interstate
commerce must "(1) apply to an activity (property or person) with a substantial nexus to
the taxing state; (2) be fairly apportioned; (3) avoid discrimination against interstate or
international commerce; and (4) be fairly related to services or benefits provided by the
state." RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUIONAL
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and the Due Process Clause.6'
The United States Supreme Court has answered constitutional
challenges to apportionment formulae for the taxation of multi-state
corporations by upholding the plans as long as the state establishes "a
'minimal connection' between the interstate activities and the taxing
State."'  The Court has also held that the state must show a rational
relationship between the income attributed to it and the intrastate
value of the corporate enterprise.66 The Court's decisions concerning
the constitutionality of state taxation of multi-state corporate income
describe what has become known as the unitary business principle.67
This principle prescribes that a state does not violate the Constitution
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 13.4 (2d ed. Supp. 1999).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ...").
Courts will often frame their analysis of a state tax on interstate commerce in due process
terms when attempting to determine "the question of whether the multistate business'
income can be 'fairly' attributed to the in-state business activities in the taxing state."
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 63, § 13.4. According to some commentators, however,
the Due Process Clause adds "little, if anything," to the Commerce Clause analysis. Id.
("The due process requirement of a state having a fair connection to the taxed activity
may be seen as merely a part of the basic commerce clause restrictions on state or local
taxation of interstate or international commerce.").
65. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 436-37 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-
73 (1978)); see also Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from
Intangibles: Allied-Signal and Beyond, 48 TAX L. REV. 739, 745 (1993) (noting that the
"minimum connection" requirement is derived from the "virtually axiomatic proposition"
that the state's power to tax a multi-state corporation's activities stems from the benefits,
opportunities, and protections that the state provides to the company). Professor
Hellerstein asserts that in the absence of a link between the state and the corporation's
activities, the state lacks the power to tax because "it has not 'given anything for which it
can ask return.' " Hellerstein, supra, at 745 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311
U.S. 435,444 (1940)).
66. See Mobil, 445 U.S. at 436-37.
67. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778, 781
(1992) (stating that the unitary business principle is necessary because the value of a multi-
state corporation stems from "the enterprise as a whole," rather than from the parts of the
business "that happen to be located within a State's borders" and noting that the indicia of
a unitary business are "(1) functional integration; (2) centralization of management; and
(3) economics of scale"); Mobil, 445 U.S. at 436-42 (describing Mobil's business as unitary
and holding that Mobil's "foreign-source dividends have not been shown to be exempt, as
a matter of due process, from apportionment for state income taxation by the State of
Vermont"); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 509 (1942) (upholding a California
apportionment scheme as a proper reflection of the "just proportion of the profits earned
by [Butler Brothers] from [its] unitary business"). In the context of a corporation having
affiliates in several states, the key factors in determining whether the corporation's
business is unitary are the extent to which the related businesses are integrated and the
amount of control exerted by the parent corporation over the affiliates. See The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 86,89-91 (1982).
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by taxing a corporation's income-even if that income can be
attributed to another state by means of separate accounting-as long
as the company's activities inside and outside of the tax-imposing
state form part of a "single unitary business."' The unitary business
principle, therefore, provides the constitutional foundation for
apportionment devices such as UDITPA.69
In 1957, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law and the American Bar Association approved UDITPA and
recommended its adoption by the states.7" The goal of UDITPA is to
foster uniformity among the states in the taxation of multi-state
businesses.71  Specifically, the Act seeks to protect multi-state
companies from "arbitrary tax assessments" and to minimize double
taxation of interstate and foreign commerce.' As a means of
promulgating the principles of tax uniformity espoused in UDITPA,
the National Association of Attorneys General and the National
Legislative Conference, working together as the Council of State
Governments, enacted the Multistate Tax Compact ("Compact")73 in
1966.74
The Compact reflects the purposes of UDITPA,75 and its
68. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438. Under the unitary business principal, in order for a
company to challenge successfully a state's apportioned tax, the company must prove that
the income was derived from a "discrete business enterprise" conducted in a separate
state. Id. at 439.
69. See Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 786 (noting that UDITPA "may be quite compatible
with the unitary business principle" (citing Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. 159, 167 (1983))); Hellerstein, supra note 65, at 751-53 (noting that "UDITPA's
definition of apportionable business income is no different in substance from the Court's
definition of income arising from a unitary business"). But see Walter Hellerstein, State
Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations, Part II: Reflections on ASARCO
and Woolworth, 81 MICH. L. REV. 157, 184-87 (1983) (describing two of the Court's pre-
Allied-Signal decisions that overturned state apportionments under UDITPA because the
apportionments overstepped the unitary business principle).
70. See Hellerstein, supra note 5, at 769; Arthur D. Lynn, Jr., The Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act, 19 OHIO ST. LJ. 41, 41 (1958).
71. See Wiederstein, supra note 6, at 138; Lynn, supra note 70, at 42 (noting that
UDITPA might be viewed as a "step forward" by persons concerned about state tax
uniformity).
72. See Wiederstein, supra note 6, at 138.
73. 1 All St. Tax Guide (CCH) % 701-783 (1994) [hereinafter Tax Guide]; UDITPA§§ 1-9.
74. See Tax Guide 551.
75. The MTC declares that its purposes are to:
1. Facilitate proper determination of State and local tax liability of multistate
taxpayers, including the equitable apportionment of tax bases and settlement of
apportionment disputes.
2. Promote uniformity or compatibility in significant components of tax
systems.
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-guidelines for allocation and apportionment of a corporation's multi-
state income reproduce the UDITPA mandates almost verbatim.76 In
fact, the Compact provides the corporate taxpayer with the option of
using the UDITPA formulae to apportion or allocate income
between statesY7  The Multistate Tax Commission oversees and
coordinates the Compact,78 and states that choose to adopt the
Compact as part of their statutory law comprise the membership of
the Commission.7 9 In addition, states that have not formally adopted
the Compact in their statutes but that support its goal of uniformity in
apportionment may join the Commission as associate members."
Indeed, the majority of states have demonstrated their support of the
principles set forth in UDITPA through their affiliation with the
Multistate Tax Commission.8
UDITPA centers the choice between allocation and
apportionment of income on the question of whether the income at
issue is business or non-business income. The Act defines business
income as "income arising from transactions and activity in the
regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business ... includ[ing]
income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition,
management, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts
of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations."' UDITPA
broadly defines non-business income as "all income other than
business income. ' 3 The Act apportions business income between
eligible states by using a formula based upon the company's
property s4 payroll, 5 and sales8 6 both inside and outside of the taxing
3. Facilitate taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing of tax returns
and in other phases of tax administration.
4. Avoid duplicative taxation.
Id. [701.
76. See id. 559.
77. See id. 556.
78. See id. 554.
79. See id. 564. At present, 20 states, as well as the District of Columbia, have
joined the Commission as members. See id.
80. See id. 565. Nineteen states, including North Carolina, form the associate
membership of the Commission. See id.
81. See 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, 9.05[1][a].
82. UDITPA § 1(a).
83. Id. § l(e).
84. See id. § 10 (stating that the property factor is represented by a fraction with a
numerator composed of "the average value of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal
property owned or rented and used in this state during the tax period" and a denominator
derived from "the average value of all the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property
owned or rented and used during the tax period").
85. See id. § 13 (stating that the payroll factor is a fraction in which the numerator
represents the total amount of compensation paid by the company to its employees in the
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state." UDITPA allocates non-business income, however, solely to
the state to which the income is most closely associated, which is often
the state of the company's commercial domicile.88 Thus, for states
claiming the right to tax the income of a multi-state company, the
classification of the income as business or non-business takes on
primary importance."9
Two tests have emerged for determining whether a corporation's
income should be classified as business or non-business income for
purposes of UDITPA. Under the transactional test, the corporation's
gain is business income if it was produced by a type of transaction in
which the company regularly engages in its normal course of
businessf0  A variety of factors influence the determination
concerning whether the enterprise from which the income was
derived is a regular part of the company's business.91 Whereas the
taxing state and in which the denominator represents the total compensation paid by the
company in its operation as a whole).
86. See id. § 15 ("The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total
sales of the taxpayer in [the taxing] state during the tax period, and the denominator of
which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period.").
. 87. See generally Lynn, supra note 70, at 46-52 (describing the apportionment
formulae for business income under UDITPA).
88. See UDITPA §§ 4-8; see also Lynn, supra note 70, at 43-46 (discussing the
allocation formulae for non-business income derived from rents, tangible royalties, capital
gains, interest, dividends, and patent and copyright royalties). A corporation's
commercial domicile-as opposed to its legal domicile, which is the business's "jurisdiction
of incorporation"-is the state where the company has its "principal place of business."
HARRY G. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 81
(2d ed. 1983); see also 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, 9 9.03[2] ("In the
context of state corporate income taxation, the corporation's 'commercial domicile'-the
principal place from which the corporation's business is directed-gradually replaced the
corporation's 'legal domicile'--the state of its incorporation-as the situs to which income
was assigned under the mobilia principle." (citing UDITPA § 1(g))). The concept of
allocating income to a corporation's commercial domicile originates from the ancient legal
doctrine of mobilia sequunter personam, or "'movables follow the person,'" which
required that movable property, whether tangible or intangible, be taxed at the owner's
domicile. Id 9.03[1]. In fact, the mobilia rule underpins the commercial domicile
doctrine, which states that where a corporation merely keeps its formal corporate
documents in its state of incorporation while managing the corporate business in another
state, the latter state should have the power to tax the corporation's intangibles. See id.
9.03[2] (citing Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193,211-12 (1936)).
89. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the importance of the
distinction between non-business and business income).
90. See Faber, supra note 8, at 108.
91. The factors considered in applying the transactional test include: (1) whether sale
of the property was part of the company's primary business activity; (2) whether similar
sales by the company were common, although not a normal business activity; (3) whether
the sales were frequent or infrequent; (4) whether the proceeds from the sale were
dispersed in liquidation or reinvested in the company; (5) whether the sale was instigated
under extraordinary circumstances; and (6) whether the size of the transaction was
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transactional test is a relatively narrow test that examines the nature
of the income-producing transaction based upon the company's
general business practices, the functional test is a broader test that
classifies gain as business income based on the nature of the asset
from which the gain was derived. 92 Consequently, the functional test
characterizes gain as business income, regardless of whether the
transaction was a regular part of the corporation's business, as long as
the asset was used by the company to generate business income.93
Proponents of the transactional and functional tests both claim
that the tests are derived from the definition of business income
found in UDTPA. 4 The transactional test is based upon the first
clause of the business income definition.95 Those who interpret
UDITPA to contain only the transactional test view the second
clause, beginning after the "and includes" language, as merely
illustrative of the first.96 Advocates of the functional test, however,
argue that the second clause of the definition establishes an
alternative, independent test for business income.97  State supreme
courts that have reviewed their state's version of the UDITPA
definition of business income have differed in their interpretations,98
with some courts holding that the statute contains only the
transactional test and other courts holding that the statute embodies
both the transactional and functional tests.99
congruous with the normal transactions of the business. See id. at 109-10.
92. See id. at 110.
93. See id
.94. See UDITPA § 1(a) (stating that business income "means income arising from
transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and
includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and
disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or
business operations" (emphasis added)).
95. See id.
96. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 295, 507 S.E.2d at 289; see also Lisonbee, supra note 12,
at 335 (describing the second clause of the business income definition as "clarifying
language of the transactional test, which must be satisfied along with the transactional
test"); Maxwell A. Miller & Randy M. Grimshaw, Reach Out and Tax Someone: State
Taxation of Income from the Sale of Intangibles, UTAH B.J., June-July 1995, at 12, 15
(criticizing the functional test as being contrary to the wording of the UDITPA and
praising the transactional test for its "fidelity to statutory language").
97. See Faber, supra note 8, at 111 ("States adopting this interpretation hold that
income will be business income if it meets either the transactional or the functional test.").
98. See generally Larry D. Schaefer, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 8 A.L.R.4th 934, 939-43 (1981 & 1998
Supp.) (comparing different state courts' interpretations of UDITPA and the Act's
definition of business income).
99. Compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 551 N.W.2d
608, 610 (Iowa 1993) (holding that the test for business income under an Iowa statute "is
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Before comparing the differing state interpretations of UDITPA,
it is helpful to review briefly the fundamental principles of statutory
interpretation. 10 The cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is
to give effect to the meaning and intent of the legislature. 1' The
proper starting point for this endeavor is a reading of the statutory
language itself.1' 2 Furthermore, as long as such an interpretation is
basically transactional"), In re Appeal of Chief Indus., Inc., 875 P.2d 278, 286 (Kan. 1994)
(holding that a Kansas uniform taxation statute applies only the transactional test for
determining business income), and Federated Stores Realty, Inc. v. Huddleston, 852
S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that the functional test is "contrary to the plain
language" of the Tennessee statutory definition of business income-and holding that the
statute embodies only the transactional test), with Dover Corp. v. Department of
Revenue, 648 N.E.2d 1089, 1097 (Ill. 1995) (applying both the functional and transactional
tests in order to classify a corporation's royalties as business income), Polaroid, 349 N.C.
at 304, 507 S.E.2d at 294 (holding that the North Carolina legislature "adopted the
functional test as part of its definition of business income" in addition to the transactional
test), and Simpson Timber Co. v. Department of Revenue, 953 P.2d 366, 381 (Or. 1998)
(Durham, J., concurring) (stating that a condemnation award qualified as business income
under "both the transactional and functional tests").
100. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
1111-1380 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing the role of
the courts in statutory interpretation); Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory
Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585,594-633 (1996) (describing several different theories of
statutory interpretation); Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation,
13 TOURo L. REv. 595, 599-611 (1997) (evaluating the differences between statutory
interpretations performed by state and federal courts); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding
Common Law Originalismn in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications
for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10-37 (1998)
(discussing an empirical analysis of the Supreme Court's October 1996 Term designed to
gauge the Court's use of legislative history in statutory interpretation).
101. See 27 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX, Statutes § 29 (4th ed. 1994) ("The
intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute."); EARL T. CRAWFORD,
Tim CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 245 (1940) ("If the courts were permitted to ignore
the expressed intent of the legislature, they would invade the province of the legislature
and violate the tri-parte theory of government. The legislature would become a nonentity.
Legislative power would in fact be wielded by the judiciary."); Gonzalez, supra note 100,
at 605 (stating that intentualists "attempt to interpret statutory law in accord with the
intentions of the enacting legislature"). But see SIR RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 30 (Dr. John Bell & Sir George Engle eds., 2d ed. 1987) (noting that
under the English legal system "the intention of Parliament is not to be a dominant
ingredient in the formulation of our basic rules of interpretation"); Felix Frankfurter,
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527,539 (1947) ("We are
not concerned [when interpreting a statute] with anything subjective. We do not delve
into the mind of the legislators or their draftsmen, or committee members."); Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 16-18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (disagreeing with
the argument that the primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
intention of the legislature).
102- See STRONG'S, supra note 101, § 30 ("While a statute must be construed to carry
out the legislative intent, that intent must be found from the language of the act, its
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reasonable, a court should accord undefined words their plain
meaning. 3 A court should also evaluate the statute as a whole and
should not construe individual sections "in a manner that renders
another provision of the same statute meaningless."'" Lastly, when
interpreting tax statutes, any ambiguities should be strictly construed
in favor of the taxpayer and against the state.05 It is within the
legislative history, and circumstances surrounding its adoption. ); CRAWFORD, supra
note 101, at 256 (noting that "before the court can resort to any -other source for
assistance, it must first seek to find the legislative intention from the words, phrases and
sentences which make up the statute subject to construction"); Gonzalez, supra note 100,
at 603 (stating that under a textualist-intentualist view the "inscribed words of the statute
... are viewed as the most reliable predictor, and, by some, the only legitimate indicia of
an enacting legislature's intentions"); Scalia, supra note 101, at 22 ("The text is the law,
and it is the text that must be observed."). Justice Scalia criticizes intent-based statutory
interpretation that is "divorced from text," arguing that the practice is merely a
"subterfuge" used by judges to revise laws improperly. Scalia, supra note 101, at 21-22.
Justice Scalia, instead, promotes a philosophy of statutory interpretation known as
textualism. See id. at 23-25. The Justice posits that under a textualist view a court should
construe a statute reasonably, giving the words and phrases of the legislature the meanings
they fairly contain, without expanding on the limited range of meaning that can be
attributed to the words. See id. at 23-24 (citing the dissenting opinion in Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-47 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting), as an example of proper
textualist interpretation and explaining that in that case the phrase "uses a gun" should
have been limited to use of a gun for what guns are normally used for, that is, as weapons).
103. See STRONG'S, supra note 101, § 28 ("Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give it its
plain and definite meaning, and are without the power to interpolate, or superimpose
provisions and limitations not contained therein." (citations omitted)); CRAWFORD, supra
note 101, at 256-57 ("If the meaning of the language of the statute is plain, then according
to the rule announced in enumerable [sic] cases, there is really no need for construction as
the legislative intention is revealed by the apparent meaning, that is, the meaning clearly
expressed by the language of the statute."). But see Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax
Code, and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 771-72 (1997) (warning that a
strict plain meaning approach, focusing only on the language of the statute and not on the
legislative history or intent, "poses special dangers for tax law because of the rich range of
contextual and policy considerations that inform the Internal Revenue Code").
104. Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 297, 507 S.E.2d at 290; see also STRONG'S, supra note 101,
§ 36 (explaining that statutory words "may not be interpreted out of context so as to
render [them] inharmonious to the intent and tenor of the act" and noting that "individual
expressions must be construed as a part of the composite whole"); CRAWFORD, supra
note 101, at 258-59 (stating that because the language of a statute constitutes "the
depository or reservoir of the legislative intent, in order to ascertain or discover that
intent, the statute must be considered as a whole, just as it is necessary to consider a
sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true meaning."); CROSS, supra note 101, at 112
(noting that it "is scarcely necessary to cite authority for the proposition that Acts must be
construed as a whole").
105. See NORMAN J. SINGER, SuTHERLAND ON STATUTES & STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTON § 66.01 (5th ed. 1992) (noting that "it is a settled rule that tax laws are to
be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the taxpayer" and stating that
"[w]here there is reasonable doubt of the meaning of a revenue statute, the doubt is
resolved in favor of those taxed"); see also Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 297, 507 S.E.2d at 290
1999] 2341
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
context of these basic tenets of statutory interpretation that the state
supreme courts have analyzed the UDITPA definition of business
income.'06
In General Care Corp. v. Olsen," the Supreme Court of
Tennessee formally adopted the transactional test as the sole measure
of determining business income under the Tennessee version of
UDITPA. °8 The court based its holding on the plain language of the
statutory definition of business income, 09 stating that, in the absence
of textual ambiguity, precedent commands Tennessee courts to
restrict their interpretation of statutes to the "natural and ordinary
meaning of the language" used."0 Additionally, the court emphasized
that a statute must be viewed as a whole, with each word possessing
independent significance."' In applying these principles to the
Tennessee corporate-taxation provision, the court explained that the
statute's use of the words "transactions and activity in the regular
course of the taxpayer's trade or business""n 2 plainly incorporates the
transactional test into its business-income definition."3 The court also
construed the "or earnings from tangible and intangible property if
the acquisition, use, management, or disposition""' 4 language as
merely modifying the substantive portion of the definition contained
(stating that "an ambiguous tax statute shall be strictly construed against the state").
106. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 297-98, 507 S.E.2d at 290 (setting forth the rules of
statutory interpretation described above as its methodology for analyzing the North
Carolina definition of business income); see also Roy Pulvers & Wendy Willis, Revolution
and Evolution: What Is Going on with Statutory Interpretation in the Oregon Courts?, OR.
ST. BAR BuLL., Jan. 1996, at 13, 13-14 (describing the adoption by the Oregon Supreme
Court of a formal system of statutory interpretation that is strikingly similar to the
informal methodology used by the North Carolina Supreme Court).
107. 705 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn. 1986). The case involved a merger between two
corporations that was facilitated in part by the liquidation sale of several subsidiaries of
the target company. See id. at 643.
108. See id. at 648 (holding that "nothing in the language of the statute itself ...
indicate[s] that the General Assembly intended to create alternative tests [for defining
business income]").
109. The Tennessee Supreme Court explained that business earnings were defined
under state statute as "'earnings arising from transactions and activity in the regular
course of the taxpayer's trade or business and includes earnings from tangible and
intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property
constitute integral parts of the taxpayers regular trade or business operations.' " Id at 644
(quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-804(a)(1)).
110. Id at 648.
111. See id. at 646 (explaining the court's presumption that "every word used in a
statute was intended by the General Assembly to convey meaning and purpose").
112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-804(a)(1).
113. See General Care Corp., 705 S.W.2d at 644.
114. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-804(a)(1).
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in the first clause. 15 Accordingly, the court applied the transactional
test to the case before it, holding that the liquidation sale of the
plaintiff's hospital management subsidiaries did not constitute
business income because such sales were not a regular part of the
company's business."6
Similarly, in In re Appeal of Chief Industries, Inc.,"7 the Kansas
Supreme Court refused to overrule an earlier case in which it had
interpreted the Kansas statutory definition of business income to
include only the transactional test."3  In Western Natural Gas Co. v.
McDonald,"9 the same court had construed the Kansas corporate tax
provision 20 to embody a "narrowly-defined transactional test.' 2' In
upholding its previous interpretation, the Chief Industries court
addressed a regulation adopting the functional test'2 by stating that
115. See General Care Corp., 705 S.W.2d at 645.
116. See id. at 648; see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddeston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 92
(Tenn. 1993) ("In determining whether corporate income is 'business earnings' or
'nonbusiness earnings,' this Court has applied what is referred to as the 'transactional
test.' "); Federated Stores Realty, Inc. v. Huddleston, 852 S.W.2d 206, 212 (Tenn. 1992)
(reaffirming the transactional test approach adopted in General Care Corp. and holding
that proceeds from a real estate development company's liquidation of several shopping
centers were non-business income). In both Federated Stores and General Care Corp., the
court noted that the company's use of the proceeds from the sale was a significant factor in
determining whether the earnings were business income under the transactional test. See
Federated Stores, 852 S.W.2d at 212 (stating that the company "did not use the proceeds of
liquidation of its interests in regional shopping centers to acquire new assets for use in that
business" and noting that "[u]nder the transactional test, this use of proceeds is a factor
that indicates that the income derived from such liquidation should be classified as non-
business income"); General Care Corp., 705 S.W.2d at 644 ("Under the transactional test,
earnings held for use in the regular course of on-going business operations or expended to
acquire assets to be used in the regular course of future business activities, have been held
to be properly apportionable as business income.").
117. 875 P.2d 278 (Kan. 1994).
118. See id. at 286 (upholding Western Natural Gas Co., v. McDonald, 446 P.2d 781
(Kan. 1968)).
119. 446 P.2d 781 (Kan. 1968).
120. Kansas Statutes Annotated section 79-3271 reflects UDITPA in stating that
business income means "income arising from transactions and activity in the regular
course of the taxpayer's trade or business and includes income from tangible and
intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property
constitute integal parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations." KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 79-3271(a) (1997). Kansas also follows UD1TPA in bestowing non-business
income with the expansive definition of "all income other than business income." KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 79-3271(e).
121. Western, 446 P.2d at 783 ("It is not the use of the property in the business which is
the determining factor under the statute. The controlling factor by which the statute
identifies business income is the nature of the particular transaction giving rise to the
income.").
122. Kansas Administrative Regulation 92-12-73 adopts the functional test in providing
the following rules for distinguishing between business and non-business income:
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the "[a]dministrative regulations do not supplant statutory law nor do
they preempt judicial statutory construction."3 The court explained
that the legislature could have modified its earlier interpretation of
section 79-3271 by amending the statute; the court characterized the
legislative silence over the twenty-six years between Western and
Chief Industries as an implicit ratification of the transactional-test-
only view.124 Lastly, the court emphasized that the functional test is
contrary to the plain language of the statute because the functional
test ignores the requirement that the income constitute an "integral"
part of the taxpayer's business."2
Drawing support from the decisions in Tennessee and Kansas,
the Iowa Supreme Court also declared its allegiance to the
transactional test in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iowa Department of
Revenue and Finance.26 The Phillips Petroleum court held that the
proper test for determining business income under Code of Iowa
section 422.32127 was "basically transactional" and explained that the
last clause of the definition, upon which the Department of Revenue
had based its argument in favor of the functional test, was added
merely to "include transactions involving disposal of fixed assets by
taxpayers who emphasize the trading of assets as an integral part of
Gain or loss from the sale, exchange or other disposition of real or tangible or
intangible personal property constitutes business income if the property while
owned by the taxpayer was used in the taxpayer's trade or business. However, if
such property was utilized for the production of nonbusiness income or otherwise
was removed from the property factor before its sale, exchange or other
disposition, the gain or loss will constitute nonbusiness income.
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 92-12-73 (1992).
123. Chief Industries, 875 P.2d at 284-85 (stating that "[e]ven if the definition of
business income set forth by statute was unclear as to whether the functional test exists in
Kansas, the Board, like a reviewing court may not simply devise its own interpretation of
the statute because here, a valid administrative interpretation exists").
124. See id. at 284 (stating that legislative" ' "failure to act amounts to a ratification of
the interpretation placed upon [an] act by this court" '" (quoting Lees Adm'r v. White,
415 P.2d 255,258 (Kan. 1966) (quoting State v. One Bally Coney Island No. 21011 Gaming
Table, 258 P.2d 225, 228 (Kan. 1953)))).
125. See id. at 285-86. The court also stressed the fact that the functional test is
contrary to the requirement in the statute that the "disposition" of the property be an
integral part of the business. See id.; Lisonbee, supra note 12, at 335-36.
126. 511 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1993).
127. At the time Phillips Petroleum was decided, Section 422.32.2 borrowed from the
UDITPA in stating that business income "'means income arising from transactions and
activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and includes income from
tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the
property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations.'"
IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.32.2 (1998) (quoting the pre-1995 version of section 422.32.2 in
the Historical and Statutory Notes).
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regular business" within the transactional test.12 Thus, the supreme
courts of Tennessee, Kansas, and Iowa all based their rejections of
the functional test on the fact that the test was either unsupported by
or contrary to the text of the statutes being construed. However, the
legislatures in all three states subsequently amended their respective
statutes in order to include explicitly the functional test in the
definition of business income.29
Conversely, several state supreme courts have pointed to plain
language and legislative history in interpreting their state's version of
UDITPA to include both the transactional and functional tests.Y0 In
Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw,'3' the Illinois Supreme
Court acknowledged the coexistence of the transactional and
functional tests within the definition of business income set forth in 35
Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/1501132 and held that proceeds from the
sale of pipeline assets by a multi-state corporation were
apportionable to Illinois as business income. 33 The court based its
recognition of the functional test in part on its reading of the plain
language of the statute1 4 The court concluded that the second clause
128. Phillips Petroleum, 511 N.W.2d at 610.
129. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.32.2 (1998) (" 'Business income' means ... gain or
loss resulting from the sale, exchange or other disposition of real property or of tangible or
intangible personal property, if the property while owned by the taxpayer was
operationally related to the taxpayer's trade or business carried on in Iowa ... ."); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 79-3271 (1997) ("[Flor taxable years commencing after December 31, 1995,
a taxpayer may elect that all income derived from the acquisition, management, use or
disposition of tangible or intangible property constitutes business income."); TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 67-4-804(a)(1) (1998) (" 'Business earnings' means ... earnings from tangible and
intangible property if the acquisition, use, management or disposition of the property
constitutes an integral part of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations."); see
also Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 295, 507 S.E.2d at 289 (noting the amended laws).
130. See supra note 99; see also District of Columbia v. Pierce Assocs., 462 A.2d 1129,
1130 (D.C. App. 1983) (stating that the business income definition sets forth two
independent and alternative tests); Dover Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 648 N.E.2d
1089, 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("There are two alternative tests to be applied in
determining whether an item of income is business income.... These two tests are
referred to as the 'transactional' and 'functional' tests."); Ross-Araco v. Commonwealth
Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 674 A.2d 691, 693 (Pa. 1996) (holding that the income of a multi-
state corporation can be classified as business income for purposes of apportionment if
either the functional or transactional test is met).
131. 695 N.E.2d 481 (IIl. 1998).
132. The definition of business income found in 35 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/1501
was taken directly from the UDITPA and states that business income is "income arising
from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business...
and includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management,
and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or
business operations." 35 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/1501(a)(1) (West 1993).
133. See Texaco-Cities, 695 N.E.2d at 486-87.
134. See id. at 485 (noting that statutory interpretation "properly begins with an
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of the statute creates a second test for business income by enlarging
the definition to encompass income received from the sale of
property so long as that property-not the sale-was an integral part
of the company's business. 35 Furthermore, the court looked at the
legislative history of UDITPA, from which the Illinois statute was
derived, to support its holding that the definition encompassed the
functional test in addition to the transactional test. 36
Similarly, in Simpson Timber Co. v. Department of Revenue,'37
the Oregon Supreme Court used the plain-language approach to
validate both the transactional and functional tests as part of the
Oregon multi-state taxation statute.138  In holding that a multi-state
timber company received business income as a result of a
condemnation award from the government,'39 the Simpson court
sought to determine the legislative intent behind the Oregon
definition of business incomeP4 by focusing on the text and context of
the statute.'4' Employing the functional test, the court held that the
statute's plain language commanded that income derived from the
disposition-albeit involuntary-of property constituting an integral
examination of the statutory language" and that "[e]ach undefined word in the statute
must be ascribed its ordinary and popularly understood meaning").
135. See iL
136. The Texaco-Cities court drew support from the comment to UDITPA § 1, which
states that "'[i]ncome from the disposition of property used in a trade or business of the
taxpayer is includible within the meaning of business income.'" Id. at 486 (quoting
UDITPA § 1, cmt. (1966)).
137. 953 P.2d 366 (Or. 1998).
138. See id. at 368-69.
139. See id. at 370. The federal government had condemned 7654 acres of Simpson's
timberland, and 10 years after the taking, the government awarded the company
$49,846,000 in just compensation for the condemned property, in addition to a $79,160,218
delayed compensation award representing "an assumed investment return on the $49
million during the years that it was owed but not yet paid." Id. at 367. The delayed
compensation award was the income at issue in the case. See id. Justice Durham, in a
concurring opinion, stated that "the condemnation that occurred here satisfies both the
transactional and functional tests." Id. at 372 (Durham, J., concurring).
140. The Oregon definition is taken from UDITPA and follows the wording of the
Model Act almost verbatim, except that the Oregon statute includes "use or rental" as
part of the second clause. See OR. REV. STAT. § 314.610(1) (1987) (stating in the second
clause that business income includes income "from tangible and intangible property if the
acquisition, the management, use or rental, and the disposition of the property constitute
integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations" (emphasis added)).
The additional language, however, does not affect an analysis of the clause under the
functional test. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 299 n.4, 507 S.E.2d at 291 n.4.
141. See Simpson, 953 P.2d at 368-69 ("We seek to determine legislative intent initially
by a review of the statutory text and context.... In this step we apply the statutory
command that we neither omit anything from, nor add anything to, the words of a
statute." (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (1987); Portland Gen. Elec. v. Bureau of Labor
& Indus., 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993))).
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part of the company's business be classified as business income. 42
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also has recognized that the
Pennsylvania definition of business income encompasses both the
transactional and functional tests.43 In Laurel Pipe Line Co. v.
Commonwealth Board of Finance and Revenue,'" the court
acknowledged that business income, as defined in 72 Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes section 7401,145 contains "two alternative
tests.""4 In assessing whether the plaintiff was correct in classifying
the proceeds from its liquidation of a pipeline division as non-
business income, the court stated that "[i]ncome meets the functional
test if the gain arises from the sale of an asset which produced
business income while it was owned by the taxpayer."' 47 Although
the idle pipeline had once been an integral part of the company's
business, the court ruled that the property in its current state was not
integral and, thus, that the liquidation sale did not produce business
income.'4
Like the statutes described above, North Carolina's Corporate
Income Tax Act and its definition of business income are derived
from UDITPA. 49 The second clause of the North Carolina statute,
however, differs from UDITPA in a potentially significant way in that
it uses alternative conjunctions---"and/or" instead of the single
conjunction "and"-when describing the uses necessary to establish
142. See id. at 369-70. The court explained that "[n]othing in the statutory definition of
'business income' suggests that a disposition that is involuntary is any less a disposition, or
that the income therefrom is any less 'business income.' We cannot read into the statutory
definition of 'business income' the additional word 'voluntary' before the word
'disposition.'" Id.
143. See, e.g., Ross-Araco Corp. v. Commonwealth Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 674 A.2d
691, 693 (Pa. 1996).
144. 642 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1994).
145. The definition of business income found in the Pennsylvania statute was taken
directly from UDITPA. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7401(3)2.(a)(1)(A) (1990).
146. Laurel Pipe Line, 642 A.2d at 474.
147. Id. at 475.
148. See id. (disagreeing with the lower court's conclusion that "a singular disposition
of an unprofitable pipeline is an integral part of the company's regular business because, if
not sold, the company's other business would suffer financially").
149. See' National Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Powers, 98 N.C. App. 504, 506, 391 S.E.2d 509,
511 (1990). North Carolina General Statutes section 105-130.4 states that business income
"means income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the
corporation's trade or business and includes income from tangible and intangible property
if the acquisition, management, and/or disposition of the property constitute integral parts
of the corporation's regular trade or business operations." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
130.4(a)(1) (1997) (emphasis added). The statute also follows UDITPA in defining non-
business income as "all income other than business income." Id. § 105-130.4(a)(5).
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property as an "integral" part of the company's business.' ° Thus,
under the second clause of North Carolina General Statutes section
105-130.4(a)(1), the disposition of the property at issue does not have
to be an integral part of the company's business, so long as the
acquisition or management of the property "constitute[s an] integral
part[] of the corporation's regular trade or business operations." 151
The North Carolina statute, therefore, is arguably more broad in its
definition of business income than even UDITPA.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Polaroid also had to
contend with a section of the North Carolina Administrative Code
dealing with business and non-business income. 52 Although the
North Carolina Court of Appeals had previously addressed the issue
of whether the courts, under North Carolina General Statutes section
105-264,153 are bound by administrative interpretations,' 4  the
Polaroid court was nevertheless forced to address the Administrative
Code provision because of its relevance to patent royalties.' 5 Thus, it
was within the context of these North Carolina rules and statutes,
along with the rulings of the other state supreme courts, that the
Polaroid court interpreted section 105-130.4 to determine whether
the statute embraced the functional test in addition to the
transactional test.
150. See id. § 105-130.4(a)(1).
151. Id.
152. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 301, 507 S.E.2d at 293-94. The regulation states:
(2) A gain or loss from the sale, exchange or other disposition of real or personal
property constitutes business income if the property while owned by the taxpayer
was used to produce business income. However, the gain or loss will constitute
nonbusiness income providing:
(a) such property was subsequently utilized principally for the production of
nonbusiness income for a period of at least three years prior to the
disposition; and
(b) such property was reflected as nonbusiness income on the corporate
income tax returns filed for those years.
i5) Patent and copyright royalties are business income if the patent or copyright
was created or used as an integral part of a principal business activity of the
taxpayer.
N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, r. 5C.0703 (June 1998) (emphasis added).
153. The statute mandates that "[ilt shall be the duty of the Secretary to interpret all
laws administered by the Secretary" and declares that an "interpretation by the Secretary
is prima facie correct." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-264 (1997).
154. See National Serv. Indus., 98 N.C. App. at 507, 391 S.E.2d at 511 ("A reading of
the entire statute indicates that only the Secretary's decisions to initiate or propose
regulations that modify, change, alter or repeal existing regulations are prima facie
correct. This prima facie correct standard does not apply to administrative
interpretations.").
155. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 302-03,507 S.E.2d at 293-94.
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In addressing as a matter of first impression whether the North
Carolina definition of business income encompasses both the
transactional and functional tests, the North Carolina Supreme Court
based its analysis on "the canons of statutory construction, pertinent
administrative rules, and the legislative history surrounding both the
Act and the UDITPA."'16 Although the Polaroid court was at odds
with textualist notions of statutory interpretation1 7 when it asserted
that "the cardinal principle [of statutory interpretation] is to ensure
accomplishment of legislative intent,"'1 8 the court's views on the
primacy of legislative intent were supported by legal scholarship and
North Carolina authority.59 Furthermore, the court's view that
legislative intent should be derived, if possible, from a reading of the
statute's plain language finds support from both academics"6 and
other state supreme courts. 6'
In holding that North Carolina General Statutes section 105-
130.4 supports the functional test, the North Carolina Supreme Court
achieved a result consistent with the plain-meaning framework of
statutory interpretation. 62 Under the functional test, a multi-state
corporation's gain is considered business income "if the assets were
used to generate business income, even if their sale is not a regular
incident of the business."'63 Section 105-130.4 expands the second
156. Id. at 297,507 S.E.2d at 290.
157. See Scalia, supra note 101, at 16-18 (arguing against the idea that the primary goal
of statutory interpretation is faithfulness to legislative intention).
158. Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 297,507 S.E.2d at 290.
159. See, e.g., State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 520, 243 S.E.2d 338, 350 (1978); L.C.
Williams Oil Co. v. NAFCO Capital Corp., 130 N.C. App. 286,289-90, 502 S.E.2d 415,417
(1998); STRONG'S, supra note 101, § 29; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 101, at 244-45
(recognizing the importance of maintaining faithfulness to the "expressed intent of the
legislature").
160. See CRAWFORD, supra note 101, at 256 (explaining that before a court looks to
outside sources to uncover legislative intention it must first examine the language of the
statute itself); Gonzalez, supra note 100, at 603-605 (describing the textualist-intentionalist
school and its adherence to the principle that the text is the best source from which to
glean the intent of the legislature).
161. See, e.g., In re Appeal of Chief Indus., Inc., 875 P.2d 278, 282 (Kan. 1994) (stating
that non-technical words in a statute should be given their normal meaning in common
usage); General Care Corp. v. Olsen, 705 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tenn. 1986) (stating that the
court "will presume that every word used in a statute was intended by the General
Assembly to convey meaning and purpose").
162. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 297, 507 S.E.2d at 290 ("Under the preceding rules of
statutory construction [including the plain-meaning rule], we cannot agree with Polaroid's
contention that the second clause of N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(1) simply modifies that
section's first clause by providing examples of business income.").
163. Faber, supra note 8, at 110.
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clause of the UDITPA definition"6 by stating that business income
"includes income from tangible and intangible property if the
acquisition, management, and/or disposition of the property
constitute integral parts of the corporation's regular trade or business
operations."'65 The statute makes it clear that the asset from which
the income is derived does not have to be property that is normally
sold in the regular course of the company's business, so long as the
acquisition or management of the property is an integral part of the
taxpayer's operations.'66 By substituting the "and/or" for the "and"
used in the UDITPA definition, the North Carolina legislature
incorporated the functional test into the plain language of the second
clause of the definition of business income found in section 105-
130.4.167 Therefore, although the North Carolina Supreme Court
paralleled the transactional-test-only states by stressing the plain
language method of statutory interpretation, the court properly
arrived at the opposite result from those other states' courts because
of the clear language deviation in the North Carolina statute.'
Although the result arising from the plain meaning of the statute
would have ended the inquiry under a textualist interpretation, 7 ' the
North Carolina Supreme Court's reliance on the administrative
regulations lent additional support to its interpretation. The North
Carolina Administrative Code recognizes the functional test by
164. See UDITPA § 1(a) (stating that business income "includes income from tangible
property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute
integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations").
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.4(a)(1) (1997) (emphasis added).
166. See id.; see also 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, 9.05[2][c]
(noting that, under the standard UDITPA language, which does not use alternate
conjunctions, the statute plainly "requires that the 'disposition' ... of the property
constitute an integral part of the taxpayer's trade or business"). The North Carolina
Supreme Court correctly pointed out that the definition of business income contained in
section 105-130.4 "utilizes a compound predicate to illustrate that 'business income'
includes the definitions set forth in both the first and second clauses." Polaroid, 349 N.C.
at 298, 507 S.E.2d at 290-91.
167. See Faber, supra note 8, at 115 (citing North Carolina as a state that has "adopted
statutory language that clearly incorporates the functional test (by replacing the word
'and' before 'disposition' with the word 'or')"); see also 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 8, 9.05[2][c] (arguing that "[a]s a matter of state tax policy, there is much to
be said for adoption of the functional test."). Compare UDITPA § 1(a) (requiring that
"the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts" of
the business), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.4(a)(1) (requiring that "the acquisition,
management, and/or disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the
corporation's regular trade or business").
168. See supra notes 109-29 and accompanying text.
169. See Faber, supra note 8, at 114-15.
170. See Scalia, supra note 101, at 23-25.
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stating that business income includes gain from property used to
produce business income, even if such property is not typically
disposed of in the company's normal course of business.' 7 ' The court
was also correct in applying the rule set forth in North Carolina
General Statutes section 105-264 that an "interpretation by the
Secretary is prima facie correct.' 7 2  Because the Secretary's
interpretation of business income is embodied in a valid
administrative regulation, it is entitled to the presumption of prima
facie correctness, thereby making National Service Industries, Inc. v.
Powers'73 distinguishable. 174 Unlike National Service Industries, where
the Secretary had manifested Department policy only through an
interoffice memorandum,175 the Department's decision to apply the
functional test to patent royalties was "promulgated" in a
regulation.7 6 Furthermore, unlike the Kansas case, In re Appeal of
Chief Industries, Inc.,177 the North Carolina court properly gave due
consideration to the regulation because it did not contradict the
definition of business income found in the statute or in a previous
interpretation by the court.'78
171. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, r. 5C.0703(2) (June 1998) ("A gain or loss from the
sale, exchange or other disposition of real or personal property constitutes business
income if the property while owned by the taxpayer was used to produce business
income."). In a clause pertinent to Polaroid's claim, the regulation also states that
"[p]atent and copyright royalties are business income if the patent or copyright was
created or used as an integral part of a principal business activity." Id. r. 5C.0703(5).
Thus, the regulation clearly applies the functional test to patent royalties.
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-264 (1997).
173. 98 N.C. App. 504,391 S.E.2d 509 (1990).
174. See id. at 507, 391 S.E.2d at 511 ("Since defendant has not proposed or
promulgated a regulation regarding the treatment of these federal tax benefits in the
context of state corporate income taxation, G.S. 105-264 does not apply."). In National
Service, the defendant sought to apply the prima facie correctness standard not to a
regulation but rather to an administrative policy regarding safe harbor leases that was
"memorialized in an interoffice memo." Id.
175. See id.
176. See N.C. ADMN. CODE tit. 17, r.5C.0703(5).
177. 875 P.2d 278 (Kan. 1994); see also supra notes 117-25 (discussing Chief Industries).
17& See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 303, 507 S.E.2d at 294 (stating that "the legislature is
always presumed to act with full knowledge of prior and existing law and that where it
chooses not to amend a statutory provision that has been interpreted in a specific way, we
may assume that it is satisfied with that interpretation"). In Chief Industries, the Kansas
court held that a regulation interpreting the business income definition to include the
functional test was not properly relied upon because that administrative interpretation
conflicted with the express interpretation of the court that the definition contained only
the transactional test. See Chief Industries, 875 P.2d at 285 ("Administrative regulations
do not supplant statutory law nor do they preempt judicial statutory construction."). Chief
Industries is distinguishable from Polaroid, however, because the North Carolina court
was interpreting the business income definition as a matter of first impression. See
Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 296-97, 507 S.E.2d at 290.
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Although it probably did not need further analysis to prove that
the North Carolina definition of business income includes the
functional test, the court also found support for that position in the
legislative history of UDITPA . 79 The court began by stating that "it
is well established that the North Carolina Corporate Income Tax Act
was based upon UDITPA and prefaced upon meeting the goals of the
Multistate Tax Compact."'' °  The court's statement is easily
supported by the near verbatim use of UDITPA language in the
North Carolina statute and by the fact that section 105-130.4 was
created shortly after the adoption of the UDITPA.18 The court next
pointed out that UDITPA "finds its origins in early California
jurisprudence," a fact which supported the court's adoption of the
functional test because that is the test propounded by the California
courts.'s
179. Furthermore, the court's use of UDITPA history to support its functional test
analysis is in accord with the methodology of other state supreme courts. See District of
Columbia v. Pierce Assocs., Inc., 462 A.2d 1129, 1131 (D.C. App. 1983) (drawing upon
California case law to support the recognition of the functional test in the UDITPA
definition of business income); Texaco-Cities Serv. Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 695 N.E.2d
481, 486 (Ill. 1998) (concluding that the plain language of the Illinois definition of business
income supports its functional test interpretation); McVean & Barlow, Inc. v. New Mexico
Bureau of Revenue, 543 P.2d 489, 491 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (acknowledging California
case law to the contrary but holding that liquidation proceeds do not qualify as business
income under UDITPA).
180. Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 304,507 S.E.2d at 294.
181. See id. at 305, 507 S.E.2d at 295 ("Moreover, the timing of the adoption of the
North Carolina Corporate Income Tax Act--effective 1 July 1967-illustrates that North
Carolina was reacting to the nationwide trend of adopting legislation which increased the
uniformity and compatibility of state income-tax laws with respect to interstate
commerce.").
182. Id. at 304, 507 S.E.2d at 294-95 (citing In re Appeal of Borden, Inc., 1977 WL
3818, at *2 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Feb. 3, 1977)); see also Faber supra note 8, at 113-14 (stating
that the functional test is a valid interpretation of LDITPA-based statutes because
UDITPA is derived from California case law which held that "the fact that property was
used in the business was sufficient to make gain on its sale business income" (citing In re
Appeal of Velsicol Chem. Corp., 1965 WL 1377 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Oct. 5, 1965); In re
Appeal of W.J. Voit Rubber Corp., 1964 WL 1453 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. May 12, 1964); In re
Appeal of American President Lines, Ltd., 1961 WL 1396 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Jan. 5, 1961);
In re Appeal of American Airlines, Inc., 1952 WL 390 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Dec. 18, 1952)).
California's definition of business income is taken directly from UDITPA. See CAL. REV.
& TAX CODE § 25120(a) (West 1992) (stating that business income is "income arising
from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and
includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and
disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or
business operations"). There is no dispute, however, among the California courts about
the existence of the functional test as an independent counterpart to the transactional test.
See Robert Half Int'l, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 66 Cal. App. 4th 1020,1024 (1998) (noting
the presence of the two separate tests within the definition of business income); Borden,
1977 WL 3818, at *3 (holding that the business-income definition "authorizes a functional
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Finally, the Polaroid court's application of the functional test to
the lost profit award, reasonable royalties payments, and interest sum
was both correct and constitutional under the unitary business
principle.' In Polaroid, the parties did not dispute that the patents
at issue were business assets used as an integral part of the company's
business.18 Thus, gain derived from the patents would qualify as
business income under the functional test, whereby "gain is treated as
business income if assets were used to generate business income, even
if their sale is not a regular incident of the business."' "as The fact that
the gain was realized through litigation instead of through the normal
course of business was of no consequence because under the
functional test, "once a corporation's assets are found to constitute
integral parts of the corporation's regular trade or business, income
resulting from the acquisition, management, and/or disposition of
those assets constitutes business income regardless of how that income
is received."' 6 Accordingly, the damages award received by Polaroid
was income resulting from the company's management of its patents
and, therefore, constituted business income under the functional
test.y1
The court also held that "North Carolina can constitutionally tax
Polaroid's recovery from the Kodak lawsuit under the unitary
test" in addition to the transactional test). In support of the functional test, the Borden
court drew upon pre-UDITPA California decisions concerning "unitary income." Borden,
1977 WL 3818, at *2. The underlying theme of pre-UDITPA cases was that "any income
from assets which are integral parts of the unitary business is unitary income." Voit
Rubber, 1964 WL 1453, at *1; see also In re Appeal of Wesson Oil and Snowdrift Sales Co.,
1957 WL 1162, at *2 (Cal St. Bd. Eq. Feb. 5, 1957) (holding that proceeds from a partial
liquidation sale by a multi-state business yielded unitary income); In re Appeal of IBM
Corp., 1954 WL 581, at *2 (Cal. St. Bd. Eq. Oct. 7, 1954) (holding that gains from a multi-
state company's patent royalties were unitary income); American Airlines, 1952 WL 390,
at *3 (holding that money received by a multi-state corporation from the forced sale of
aircraft to the government constituted unitary income). Thus, the pre-UDITPA case law
in California created an even broader taxing power than the functional test for business
income under UDITPA. Cf. McVean, 543 P.2d 489, 492 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (holding
that proceeds from liquidation sales cannot be apportioned as business income under New
Mexico's version of UDITPA).
183. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (discussing the unitary business
principle).
184. See Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 306,507 S.E.2d at 295-96.
185. Faber, supra note 8, at 110.
186. Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 306, 507 S.E.2d at 296 (emphasis added). The court's
holding reflects a decision by the Oregon Supreme Court which held that the functional
test required that gain from a condemnation award be computed as business income
because the condemnation award, although involuntary, was gain derived from a business
asset. See Simpson Timber Co. v. Department of Revenue, 953 P.2d 366,370 (Or. 1998).
187. Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 308, 507 S.E.2d at 297 (holding that Polaroid's award "fits
squarely within the functional test and this state's definition of business income").
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business principle."'" According to the United States Supreme
Court, a state may tax corporate income without offending the
Constitution-regardless of whether the income could be allocated to
another state through separate accounting methods-as long as the
income is attributable to the company's unitary business performed
both inside and outside of the taxing state.189 Furthermore, the Court
has held that gain realized outside of the taxing state is still taxable
under the unitary business principle as long as the gain is allocated by
the company to "working capital" that is used, in part, to support the
company's operations in the state imposing the tax.190 Thus, because
"the monies received from the Kodak lawsuit were used as part of
Polaroid's working capital and therefore constitute part of Polaroid's
unitary business," the North Carolina Supreme Court properly held
that taxing the damage award in North Carolina was permitted by the
Constitution.191
The North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Polaroid that
the definition of business income set forth in North Carolina General
Statutes section 105-130.4 contains the functional test was correct
both in its use of statutory interpretation and in its application of the
functional test to Polaroid's damages award."92 The court's holding is
significant because it provides the state with a tool for increasing
revenues from multi-state companies doing business in North
Carolina. In light of the dramatic influx of multi-state corporations to
Charlotte and Research Triangle Park in the last decade, the taxation
power provided by the functional test may prove to be very valuable
indeed. 93
ANDREW PHILIP SHERROD
188. Id. at 314, 507 S.E.2d at 300.
189. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,438 (1980).
190. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768,777-78 (1992).
191. Polaroid, 349 N.C. at 314-15, 507 S.E.2d at 301.
192. See supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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Hog Farms and Nuisance Law in Parker v. Barefoot: Has
North Carolina Become a Hog Heaven and Waste Lagoon?
Traditionally, North Carolina farmers raised hogs as part of
larger, independently owned and operated family farms, where the
pigs served not only as a source of fertilizer, but as a source of food
and as a trading commodity.' That tradition has eroded in recent
years as corporate-run hog facilities have forced many independent
hog farms out of business. 2 The dramatic decline in independent hog
farms, however, has not prevented the hog industry from flourishing
in North Carolina The success of the industry stems from the
1. See JIM MASON & PETER SINGER, ANIMAL FACTORIES: WHAT AGRIBUSINESS
Is DOING TO THE FAMILY FARM, THE ENVIRONMENT AND YOUR HEALTH 149 (2d ed.
1990); SWINE ODOR TASK FORCE, NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MARCH 1,
1995 REPORT: OPTIONS FOR MANAGING ODOR 12 (1995) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
2. There is a direct correlation between the rapid decline of independent hog farms
and the vertical integration of the pork industry. See Ken Silverstein, Meat Factories,
SIERRA, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 28,31. Vertical integration has occurred as large corporate hog
producers have gained "control [over] every phase of [hog] production," from supplying
feed, to managing production facilities, through processing, and finally to wholesale
distribution. Id. at 31. Hog farmers contract with these large corporations, agreeing to
raise the hogs, provide the land, build the hog houses and waste lagoons, and assume the
risks associated with raising the hogs, including liability for nuisance claims. See TASK
FORCE, supra note 1, at 9; John T. Holleman, In Arkansas Which Comes First, the Chicken
or the Environment?, 6 TinL. ENVTL. LJ. 21, 25 (1992) (analogizing vertical integration to
"franchisor-franchisee relationship"); Silverstein, supra, at 31. In turn, the corporations
supply the hogs, feed, and medicine, and eventually take the hogs to the slaughterhouses.
See Holleman, supra, at 25. Poultry magnate Frank Perdue pioneered vertical integration
in the livestock industry; hog producers followed his lead. See Silverstein, supra, at 31.
Today, North Carolina "leads the country in the movement towards concentration and
vertical coordination of the entire [hog] industry." Raymond B. Palmquist et al., Hog
Operations, Environmental Effects, and Residential Property Values, 73 LAND ECON. 114,
114 (1997).
Since vertical integration first began in 1983, the number of hog farms in the
United States has decreased nearly 75%, from 600,000 to 157,000 in 1998. See Silverstein,
supra, at 28, 31. In North Carolina, the rate of decline mirrors the national trend. In 1983,
two million hogs were raised on over 23,000 farms, but by 1998, less than 6000 farms
produced more than 10 million hogs. See Dennis Rogers, The Gospel According to Boss
Hog, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 7, 1998, at lB. On average, the
establishment of one new corporate hog facility forces 10 independent or family operated
farms out of business. See id. This decline occurs because vertical integration causes the
price of pork to fall by significantly increasing the supply of hogs without a corresponding
increase in demand. This in turn forces less efficient farms out of business. See
Silverstein, supra, at 32 (noting that vertical integration has forced hog prices to plunge to
their lowest point in 25 years, providing less than half of what independent hog farmers
need to break even).
3. Hog farming is now the leading agribusiness in North Carolina, surpassing even
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industrialization of hog farming operations, which has created
massive, high-tech farm facilities throughout eastern North Carolina.
The state encouraged this expansion by using various incentives to
attract corporate hog producers beginning in 1979 and continuing
through most of the 1980s.4
Unfortunately, North Carolina's regulatory structure was ill-
equipped to handle the rapid growth of the hog industry and the
adverse environmental impacts associated with that growth.' The
state legislature only began to retreat from its support of the hog
industry after a devastating hog waste spill occurred in June 1995,
tobacco. See Joby Warrick & Pat Stith, Corporate Takeovers, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 21, 1995, at IA. Moreover, North Carolina has become the second
largest hog producer in the United States, raising more than 10 million hogs annually. See
Hog Farmers Liken Crisis to Depression, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Jan. 10,
1999, at B8; Silverstein, supra note 2, at 33.
4. See Eric Voogt, Pork, Pollution, and Pig Farming: The Truth About Corporate
Hog Production in Kansas, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1996, at 219, 228. Politicians
who possessed a personal stake in the success of North Carolina's hog industry sponsored
most of these incentives. During his 10 years as a North Carolina state legislator, Wendell
Murphy, the largest hog producer in the United States, sponsored and supported a series
of laws providing for various advantages to corporate hog producers. See Murphy's Laws,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 22, 1995, at 6A. For example, in 1985, North
Carolina reduced the tax on gas used by feed delivery trucks by four cents per gallon. See
id. A year later, construction materials related to hog farming were exempted from North
Carolina's sales tax. See id. In 1988, the largest hog producers were exempted from a 12
cents per ton inspection fee on hog feed. See id. Also in 1988, the North Carolina
legislature eliminated the tax on feed. See id. Finally, in 1991, the North Carolina
legislature clarified an ambiguity in the state's right-to-farm statute by expressly defining
the statutory term "bona fide farm" to include hog farming, thereby effectively prohibiting
counties from using their zoning authority to regulate hog farms. See id.
Wendell Murphy is not the only North Carolina politician with personal ties to the
hog industry. Former United States Senator Lauch Faircloth is a major stockholder in
Lundy Packing, a hog processor in Clinton, North Carolina. See Silverstein, supra note 2,
at 32-33. He owns a total of $19 million in numerous hog operations and his campaign
donors included the North Carolina Pork Producers Association, the American Meat
Institute, the National Pork Producers Association, and corporate hog producers, such as
ConAgra, Carroll's Foods, and Lundy Packing. See id.
5. See generally TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that "[n]o industry [in North
Carolina] had ever grown so large so fast" as the hog industry, which doubled in only four
years). The rapid increase in hog production and the greater density of industrialized hog
operations have produced large amounts of waste and dead animals in a relatively small
area, thereby increasing the strain on the environment in eastern North Carolina counties
where most large hog operations are located. See id. at 7-13. By 1993, North Carolina's 10
million hogs produced 9 million tons of fresh manure. See id. at 13. Despite the problems
involved in managing so much waste, North Carolina's right-to-farm statute has prevented
counties from taking steps to address related environmental and health issues. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 106-701(d) (1995); see also Charles W. Abdalla & John C. Becker,
Jurisdictional Boundaries: Who Should Make the Rules of the Regulatory Game?, 3
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 7, 25 (1998) (discussing the effect of North Carolina's right-to-farm
statute); infra notes 84-94 (same).
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when an eight-acre manure lagoon at Oceanview Farms in Onslow
County broke through its dam and spilled more than twenty-five
million gallons of hog manure into the New River.6 Following that
spill, the North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation
allowing counties to use their zoning authority to regulate hog farms,
7
while also establishing a temporary moratorium on the construction
or expansion of hog farms, waste lagoons, and animal waste
management systems so that counties could develop and implement
the new regulations Despite these recent efforts, however, odor and
other effects of corporate hog farming remain contentious issues
between corporate hog facilities and neighboring landowners, as
illustrated by the recent case Parker v. Barefoot.9
In Parker v. Barefoot, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
reviewed a nuisance claim brought by several neighbors of a hog farm
operated by Terry and Rita Barefoot. The issue on appeal was
whether the trial court had committed a reversible error by refusing
the plaintiffs' request to instruct the jury that the law does not
recognize the use of the state-of-the-art technology'0 as a defense to a
nuisance claim." The court of appeals held for the plaintiff-
appellants and granted a retrial. 2 Barefoot is noteworthy in two
respects. First, it is the first hog farming case to reach the appellate
court since the vertical integration of North Carolina's hog industry
that deals with the issue of whether hog odors constitute a nuisance. 3
6. See John D. Bums, Comment, The Eight Million Little Pigs-A Cautionary Tale:
Statutory and Regulatory Responses to Concentrated Hog Farming, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 851,851 (1996).
7. See Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 458, sec. 2.1, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 1938 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(b)(3) (Supp. 1998)); infra notes 93-94 and accompanying
text (discussing passage of the statute).
& See Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 458, sec. 1.1, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 1938, as amended
by Act of Oct. 16, 1998, ch. 188, sec. 2, 1998 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 72 (extending
temporary moratorium until September 1, 1999).
9. 130 N.C. App. 18,502 S.E.2d 42, disc. rev. denied, 349 N.C. 362 (1998).
10. The term "state-of-the-art" was used synonymously with the term "best available
technology" in Barefoot. 130 N.C. App. at 23, 502 S.E.2d at 46. The terms are used
interchangeably throughout this Note.
11. See id. at 18-19, 502 S.E.2d at 44.
12. See icL at 26,502 S.E.2d at 48.
13. Prior to Barefoot, only two cases involving hog farms had reached the appellate
level. See Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 254-55, 451 S.E.2d. 1, 3-4 (1994)
(addressing whether a farm that was converted from turkey production to hog production
remains shielded from nuisance suits under North Carolina's right-to-farm statute); Mayes
v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 200-01, 334 S.E.2d 489, 490-91 (1985) (recognizing that the
type of unreasonableness that must be shown to prove that hog farm odors are a nuisance
varies with the remedy sought). Although Mayes was decided in 1985, the factual dispute
was based on events in the early 1980s before the vertical integration of North Carolina's
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Second, it confirms the potential liability of hog facilities even if they
conform with applicable regulations and use the best available
technology for odor control and waste management.14
This Note begins with a synopsis of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals decision in Barefoot.5 The Note then discusses nuisance law
in North Carolina and pertinent state legislation.16 Next, the Note
briefly discusses the state-of-the-art defense. 7 After examining the
state of the hog industry and its waste problems in North Carolina,18
the Note considers the design of the Barefoots' farm and the current
state of the art for hog operations.' 9 Finally, the Note examines the
propriety of the decision in Barefoot and the case's probable impact
on future nuisance claims against hog farms.20
In 1991, Terry and Rita Barefoot constructed a ninety-five acre
industrial hog farm.2' The facility, designed by the U.S. Soil
Conservation Service,2 consisted of four hog houses used to raise
approximately 2880 hogsP3 As part of the facility, the defendants
constructed an open-pit anaerobic lagoon to store hog waste for later
use as fertilizer.2 4 After the farm began operations, twenty-seven
hog industry. 77 N.C. App. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 490; see also supra note 2 (discussing
vertical integration).
14. See Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 26,502 S.E.2d at 4&
15. See infra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 46-103 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 104-20 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 146-58 and accompanying text.
21. See Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 19,502 S.E.2d at 44.
22. The Soil Conservation Service administers several federal programs relating to the
use, protection, and development of land, includingresearch and technical assistance to
farmers and community conservation, land-use planning, and watershed management
control groups. See 7 C.F.R. § 15b, app. A (1999) (listing the programs and activities
administered by the Soil Conservation Service).
23. See Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 19,502 S.E.2d at 44.
24. See idL The construction or operation of an animal waste management system
requires the operator to obtain a permit from the North Carolina Environmental
Management Commission if the "animal operation" has 250 or more hogs. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-215.1(a)(12), -215.10B(1) (1999). An "[a]nimal waste management system"
is defined as "a combination of structures and nonstructural practices serving a feedlot
that provide for the collection, treatment, storage, or land application of animal waste."
Id- § 143-215.10B(3). When applying for a permit, the operator must submit a plan
discussing the animal waste management practices or combination of practices that will be
implemented for the specific feedlot. See id. § 143-215.10C(d). These practices must meet
either the minimum standards and specifications contained in the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Soil Conservation Service's Field Office Technical Guide or the minimum
standard of practices developed by the state Soil and Water Conservation Commission
before a permit can be issued. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 2H.0217(a)(1)(H)(i)
(June 1998).
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neighbors sued the Barefoots in Johnston County Superior Court,
claiming that the odor from the hog farm constituted a nuisance.' At
trial, the plaintiffs claimed that the odor from the open-pit lagoon was
so strong that it burned their eyes and noses, often significantly
impairing their vision and respiration.26 In response, the defendants
argued that occasional odors from their farm did not amount to a
nuisance,27 and presented evidence at trial that their hog facility was
"'operated with the most careful, prudent and modem methods
known to science.' " After the presentation of evidence, the
plaintiffs asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that North Carolina
law does not recognize the state-of-the-art technology defense in a
nuisance suit.29 The judge denied the plaintiffs' request, and the jury
found for the defendants.30 The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the
judge's ruling was reversible error.3
The North Carolina Court of Appeals accepted the plaintiff-
appellants' argument and remanded the case for a new trial.2 In an
opinion written by Judge Wynn, the court reiterated the well-
established rule that neither the use of state-of-the-art technology in
the operation of a facility nor the absence of negligence in a facility's
25. See Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 18-19, 502 S.E.2d at 43-44.
26. See itd at 19, 502 S.E.2d at 44.
27. See id. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by North
Carolina's right-to-farm statute, see Defendants' Answer and Motions to Dismiss at 1-2,
Parker v. Barefoot (No. 92 CVS 02092), but that argument was rejected by the trial court
at the summary judgment phase. See Parker v. Barefoot, No. 92 CVS 02092 (Johnston
County May 31, 1994) (order denying summary judgment). Because the issue was not
addressed in the trial court record or the appeals court decision, this Note does not discuss
it further. For a general discussion of North Carolina's right-to-farm statute, see supra
notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
28. Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 19, 502 S.E.2d at 44 (quoting Defendants' Answer &
Motions to Dismiss at 5, Barefoot (No. 92 CVS 02092)).
29. See id. The plaintiffs requested the following jury instruction:
The law does not recognize as a defense to a claim of nuisance that defendants
used the best technical knowledge available at the time to avoid or alleviate the
nuisance, and therefore the defendants may be held liable for creating a nuisance
even though they used the latest known technical devices in their attempts to
control the condition. The use of technical equipment and control devices may
be considered by you as evidence bearing upon the magnitude of a nuisance but
not as to its existence. Indeed, if defendants created a nuisance they are liable
for the resulting injuries, regardless of the degree of skill they used to avoid or
alleviate the nuisance.
Id& at 20-21, 502 S.E.2d at 45.
30. See id. at 19-20,502 S.E.2d at 44.
31. See id at 20,502 S.E.2d at 44.
32. See id at 18-19,26,502 S.E.2d at 44,48. The decision was .2-1, with Judge Martin
dissenting. See id. at 26-27, 502 S.E.2d at 48 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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design is an absolute defense to a nuisance claim.33 Therefore,
because the plaintiffs' proposed instruction correctly summarized
North Carolina's nuisance law, the appeals court held that the trial
judge's failure to provide the substance of the plaintiffs' instruction
was reversible error.3
On appeal, the neighbors argued that the Barefoots' main
defense at trial had been that they could not be held liable under the
law because their hog facility was" 'state-of-the-art' "and" 'operated
with the most careful, prudent and modern methods known to
science.' " The Barefoots disputed this claim, stating that they had
submitted the descriptions only to rebut the neighbors' allegation that
the hog farm was a "'shoddy, second-rate affair.' "36 Instead, the
Barefoots contended that the only defense they presented at trial was
a factual one, specifically that their facility did not constitute a
nuisance because it was reasonably designed and equipped with
technology sufficient to alleviate odor. Despite the Barefoots'
contentions, the appellate court held that their testimony and
argument at trial "could have reasonably been viewed by the jury as
an affirmative attempt ... to make out a 'state-of-the-art' defense. '38
Consequently, the appeals court determined that the evidence in the
case required that the trial judge present the substance of the
neighbors' requested instruction.39
The court concluded that the trial court's instruction did not
clearly inform the jury that the Barefoots still could be found liable
under North Carolina nuisance law if they substantially and
unreasonably interfered with the neighbors' use of their property,
regardless of whether the farm used state-of-the-art technology.41
The court emphasized that the presentation of state-of-the-art
evidence at trial was likely to confuse a jury about a defendant's
33. See id. at 21, 502 S.E.2d at 45; see also Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 616,
124 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1962) (holding that "[a] person who intentionally creates or maintains
a private nuisance is liable for the resulting injury to others regardless of the degree of
care or skill exercised by him to avoid such injury"); Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238
N.C. 185, 194, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953) (same). For a discussion of the state-of-the-art
defense, see infra notes 104-20 and accompanying text.
34. See Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 23,502 S.E.2d at 46.
35. IL (quoting Defendants' Answer & Motions to Dismiss at 3, 5, Barefoot (No. 92
CVS 02092)).
36. Id. (quoting Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 33, Parker v. Barefoot, 130 N.C.
App. 18,502 S.E.2d 42 (1998) (No. COA97-713)).
37. See id.
38. Id
39. See id. at 24,502 S.E.2d at 47.
40. See id. at 26, 502 S.E.2d at 48.
2360 [Vol. 77
HOG FARMS & NUISANCE LAW
potential liability unless the trial judge specifically instructed the jury
about the limited weight of such evidence.41 The Barefoot court ruled
that the trial judge's refusal to give this type of instruction constituted
reversible error and granted the neighbors a new trial.4'
Judge Martin dissented from the decision, although he agreed
with the majority's articulation of North Carolina's nuisance law.43
The primary difference between the majority and the dissent revolved
around the interpretation of the Barefoots' statements and arguments
regarding the construction and operation of their hog farm. Judge
Martin believed that the discussion of the farm's design was only a
minor part of the case.' He concluded that the neighbors' proposed
instruction was not justified by the evidence and that they had failed
to prove that they were prejudiced by the trial judge's ruling.45
The central issue in Barefoot was whether the farmers' use of
their property amounted to a nuisance. Nuisance law attempts to
balance two competing interests: the right of one individual to put his
land to productive use 46 and the right of nearby property owners to be
free from physical invasions that substantially interfere with the use
41. See ik
42. See iL
43. See id at 26-27, 502 S.E.2d at 48 (Martin, J., dissenting).
44. See id (Martin, J., dissenting) (accepting the Barefoots' factual characterization of
the evidence). Judge Martin perceived the Barefoots' brief testimony regarding the
general design of the facility as a mere rebuttal to the neighbors' denigrating
characterizations of the farm. See id. (Martin, J., dissenting). He argued that what the
majority interpreted as a state-of-the-art defense actually was "an insignificant aspect of
the case." Id. (Martin, J., dissenting). Since the neighbors' charge contained issues
irrelevant to the case, Judge Martin believed that the trial judge acted within his discretion
when he denied the request for special instructions. See id. at 27, 502 S.E.2d at 48 (Martin,
J., dissenting) (citing State v. Agnew, 294 N.C. 382, 395, 241 S.E.2d 684, 692 (1978)).
45. See id. at 26-27, 502 S.E.2d at 48 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Martin relied on
the notion that a jury instruction will be upheld as long as "'it presents the law of the case
in such manner as to leave no reasonable cause to believe the jury was misled or
misinformed.'" Id. at 27, 502 S.E.2d at 49 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones v.
Satterfield Dev. Co., 16 N.C. App. 80, 86-87, 191 S.E.2d 435, 440 (1972)). He argued that
the appellant has the burden of showing that the instruction given by the trial judge misled
the jury or that the omitted instruction affected the jury's verdict. See id. (Martin, J.,
dissenting) (citing Robinson v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 87 N.C.'App. 512, 524, 361 S.E.2d 909,
917 (1987)). According to Judge Martin, the trial court's instruction adequately depicted
the law of the case, and the majority's conclusion that the jury was misled, misinformed, or
otherwise confused by the trial court's refusal to provide the proposed instruction was
pure speculation. See idL (Martin, J., dissenting).
46. The landowner's right to put land to productive use is one of the bundle of rights
associated with property ownership. See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) (recognizing that states have a limited ability to
restrict the "bundle of rights" that landowners acquire concomitant with property
ownership and that a state may not completely restrict a landowner's productive use of her
land without just compensation).
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and enjoyment of their property.47 Consequently, the precise
boundaries of an individual's" 'right to do as he pleases with his own
property are difficult to define.' ,4 Nuisance law requires that the
particular use be reasonable under the circumstances.49 Ultimately,
the reasonableness of a property owner's conduct is determined by
the factfinder.50
The seminal case of Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co.51 established
the fundamental elements of nuisance. The Morgan family purchased
property in 1945 in Guilford County, North Carolina, and built their
home, a restaurant, and mobile home hook-ups on the site.52 Five
years later, High Penn Oil built an oil refinery nearby." Once
completed, the refinery remained in constant operation, emitting
noxious fumes and gases. 4 The issue in Morgan was whether these
emissions constituted a nuisance even though High Penn had used all
available methods to reduce the fumes and gases.55
In addressing that issue, the North Carolina Supreme Court
recognized the basic principle that "any substantial nontrespassory
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land
... is a private nuisance. '56 The court held that a person could be
liable for a private nuisance regardless of whether the invasion was
intentional or unintentional. The court defined both terms, stating
47. See Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 616, 124 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1962);
Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 193, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953); see also Louise
A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFE. L. REv. 89, 101-02 (1998)
(discussing the use of the common law doctrine of nuisance "as an all-purpose tool of land
use regulation" and dispute resolution); Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to Farm:
Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1699-1703 (1998) (discussing the
use of nuisance law to settle land-use disputes between hog farmers and their neighbors).
48. Watts, 256 N.C. at 617, 124 S.E.2d at 814 (quoting 39 AM. JUR. Nuisances § 16
(1942)).
49. See id. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814.
50. See id.
51. 238 N.C. 185,77 S.E.2d 682 (1953).
52- See id. at 186-87,77 S.E.2d at 684.
53. See id. at 186-87,77 S.E.2d at 684-85.
54. See id at 187-88,77 S.E.2d at 685.
55. See id at 190, 77 S.E.2d at 687.
56. lId at 193, 77 S.E.2d at 689. The court noted that private nuisances could be
classified into two distinct categories: (1) nuisances per se, or at law, and (2) nuisances per
accidens, or in fact. See id at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687. The court defined the former as "an
act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstance,
regardless of location or surroundings." Id By contrast, the latter only becomes a
nuisance "by reason of [its] location, or by reason of the manner in which [it is]
constructed, maintained, or operated." Id A lawful enterprise that is neither constructed
nor operated in a negligent manner, however, may still constitute a nuisance per accidens.
See id at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687-88.
57. See id, at 193, 77 S.E.2d at 689. The court recognized that private nuisances per
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that an unintentional nuisance stems from conduct that "is negligent,
reckless, or ultrahazardous," while an intentional nuisance results
from conduct that is deliberate and "unreasonable under the
circumstances."58  The court explained that unreasonable conduct
occurs when a person: (1) purposefully causes the nuisance; (2)
knows the nuisance will result; or (3) knows with substantial certainty
that a nuisance will result. 9 Therefore, the court held, someone who
"intentionally creates or maintains a private nuisance is liable for the
resulting injury to others regardless of the degree of care or skill
exercised by him to avoid such injury" because such conduct is
manifestly unreasonable.6° Under these principles, the court held that
there had been ample evidence presented at trial to establish that the
constant emission of fumes and gases onto the Morgans' property
significantly impaired their use and enjoyment of the land so as to
constitute a nuisance.6'
Watts v. Pama Manufacturing Co.6' built on the foundation of
Morgan. In Watts, the plaintiff-appellees purchased a home in
Gaston County, North Carolina, in 1957.63 The property was located
close to a hosiery manufacturer. 64 Two years later, the Pama
Manufacturing Company took control of the hosiery factory and
converted it to manufacture raw textiles.65 As part of the conversion,
the company replaced the original equipment with heavier and larger
machinery and installed an additional industrial air-conditioning
unit.66  The company operated this new equipment almost
continuously.67 The issue presented to the court in Watts was whether
the operation of the industrial mill, which caused continuous
vibration of the Watts' property, amounted to unreasonable conduct
constituting a nuisance.6 Relying on the principles enunciated in
Morgan, the Watts court held that although the operation of a lawful
enterprise does not constitute a private nuisance as a matter of law,
accidens could result from either intentional or unintentional conduct, but that most "are
intentionally created or maintained, and are redressed by the courts without allegation or
proof of negligence." Id at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 688.
58. Id. at 193, 77 S.E.2d at 689.
59. See id. at 194,77 S.E.2d at 689.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 194-95,77 S.E.2d at 690.
62. 256 N.C. 611,124 S.E.2d 809 (1962).
63. See id. at 613,124 S.E.2d at 810-11.
64. See id. at 613,124 S.E.2d at 811.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 614,124 S.E.2d at 811.
68. See id. at 615-16, 124 S.E.2d at 812.
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noise and vibrations may constitute a private nuisance in fact.69
The court explained the general principles of nuisance law,
stating that a "substantial non-trespassory invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of property" is a nuisance if
it substantially "'affect[s] the health, comfort or property of those
who live near[by].' "70 According to the court, a substantial invasion
is one "that involves more than slight inconvenience or petty
annoyance. ' 71 Nevertheless, the court cautioned that the intentional
character of an invasion does not necessarily render the invasion
unreasonable, explaining that "[w]hat is reasonable in one locality
and in one set of circumstances may be unreasonable in another."72
Therefore, the proper test is "whether reasonable persons generally,
looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would
consider [the defendant's conduct] unreasonable." 73  The court
remanded the case with a list of several factors for the jury to
consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant's actions.74
The North Carolina Court of Appeals elaborated on the
reasonableness test in a hog farming context in Mayes v. Tabor,75 in
which the owner of a summer camp brought a nuisance action seeking
permanent injunctive relief against neighboring hog farmers.76  The
court of appeals noted that a conclusion that a hog farmer operated
his farm without negligence in an agricultural area does not end the
69. See iL at 617,124 S.E.2d at 813.
70. h at 617, 124 S.E.2d at 813-14 (quoting Pake v. Morris, 230 N.C. 424, 426, 53
S.E.2d 300, 301 (1949), and citing Duffy v. E.H. & J.A. Meadows Co., 131 N.C. 31, 33-34,
42 S.E. 460,461 (1902)).
71. kL at 619, 124 S.E.2d at 815.
72 Id. at 618,124 S.E.2d at 814.
73. Id.
74. See id2 These factors include: the conditions and nature of the location and
operation, the severity and nature of the invasion, the social values of each party's land-
use, which party had earlier occupancy, "and other considerations arising upon the
evidence." Id. The court noted that "[n]o single factor is decisive [but that] all the
circumstances in the particular case must be considered." Id. Finally, the court
emphasized that even if "'a person voluntarily comes to a nuisance by moving into the
sphere of its injurious effect, or by purchasing adjoining property or erecting a residence
or building in the vicinity after the nuisance is created,'" a person can still recover
damages for any injuries she sustains as a result of the nuisance. Id. at 618-19, 124 S.E.2d
at 815 (quoting 39 AM. JUR. Nuisances § 197 (1942)). See generally Reinert, supra note 47,
at 1700-01 (discussing the shift away from fault-based evaluations of nuisance claims and
concomitant shift away from the rule that barred relief for plaintiffs moving to a nuisance).
75. 77 N.C. App. 197, 334 S.E.2d 489 (1985). This was the only nuisance case
involving hog farms and focusing on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct to
reach the appellate level before Barefoot. Search of WESTLAW, NC-SC database (July
12,1999) (using "hog farms" and "nuisance" as search terms).
76. See Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 198,334 S.E.2d at 489-90.
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inquiry as to whether or not the operation of that hog farm
constitutes a nuisance. 7 Instead, the type of unreasonableness must
be assessed in order to determine the appropriate remedy for an
intentional private nuisance." The court of appeals explained that
the type of unreasonableness determines whether a plaintiff can
obtain damages, injunctive relief, or both. 9 According to the court,
the "[u]nreasonable interference with another's use and enjoyment of
land is grounds for damages."80 Thus, in order to recover damages,
"the defendant's conduct, in and of itself, need not be unreasonable"
as long as the alleged nuisance unreasonably interferes with another's
use and enjoyment of her land."1 Injunctive relief, however, requires
"proof that the defendant's conduct itself is unreasonable; [that] the
gravity of the harm to the plaintiff ... outweigh[s] the utility of the
conduct of the defendant. ' Because the trial court failed to apply
the appropriate reasonableness standard, the court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case so that the propriety of injunctive
relief could be determined.8
3
77. See id. at 200,334 S.E.2d at 491.
7X See id. at 200,334 S.E.2d at 490.
79. See id. at 200, 334 S.E.2d at 490-91.
80. lId at 200, 334 S.E.2d at 490 (citing Kent v. Humphries, 303 N.C. 675, 677-78, 281
S.E.2d 43, 45 (1981); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 217-18, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797
(1977)).
81. Id (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 87, at 623 (5th ed. 1984)).
82. Id at 200, 334 S.E.2d at 490-91 (citing Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 217-18, 236 S.E.2d
at 797). According to the court, " '[r]easonableness is a question of fact to be determined
in each case by weighing the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the
conduct of the defendant.'" Id. at 200, 334 S.E.2d at 491 (quoting Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at
217, 236 S.E.2d at 797). In determining the gravity of the harm, the court must consider:
(1) the extent and character of the harm to the plaintiff; (2) the social value that the law
attaches to the type of use invaded; (3) the suitability of the locality for that use; (4) the
burden on the plaintiff to minimize the harm; and (5) other relevant considerations arising
from the evidence. See id. (quoting Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 217, 236 S.E.2d at 797).
Similarly, when determining the utility of defendants' conduct, the court must consider:
(1) the purpose of the defendant's conduct; (2) the social value that the law attaches to
that purpose; (3) the suitability of the locality for defendant's use; and (4) other relevant
considerations pertinent to the evidence presented. See id (quoting Pendergrast, 293 N.C.
at 217, 236 S.E.2d at 797).
83. See id at 200, 334 S.E.2d at 491. The defendants also contended that North
Carolina's right-to-farm statute entitled them to summary judgment. See id. at 201, 334
S.E.2d at 491. The court of appeals disagreed, interpreting the statute as precluding
nuisance suits in situations where land-use patterns change around existing farming
operations. See id; see also infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text (discussing North
Carolina's right-to-farm statute in more detail). In Mayes, the court noted that the
plaintiff summer camp had operated for nearly 60 years, while the hog farm had operated
for just 15 years; thus, it was not a situation where non-agricultural activities had extended
into an agricultural area. 77 N.C. App. at 198,201, 334 S.E.2d at 489-90, 491.
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Within this framework of general nuisance law, North Carolina's
agricultural operations often receive special protection because the
General Assembly has passed a right-to-farm statute that makes it
harder to bring nuisance suits against farmers. 4 As the state court of
appeals recognized in Baucom's Nursery Co. v. Mecklenburg
County s8 "[it is the public policy of North Carolina to encourage
farming, farmers, and farmlands. 8 6 To this end, the right-to-farm law
"limit[s] the circumstances under which an agricultural ... operation
may be deemed to be a nuisance."'  Under the statute, a farm that
has been in lawful operation for at least one year and that was not a
nuisance when it commenced cannot become either a public or
private nuisance "by any changed conditions in or about the locality
thereof.''as While external changes to the locality surrounding a hog
farm fall within the purview of the statute, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals has interpreted the law to exclude situations in which a
farmer fundamentally alters the nature of her agricultural activity.89
Thus, if a farming operation exists for more than one year and then
significantly changes its form of agricultural use or its hours of
operation, the statute does not provide blanket protection to the farm
owner.90 Instead, the new agricultural use or hours must exist for one
year before coming within the scope of the right-to-farm law.91
84. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§106-700 to -701 (1995). Commentators have called North
Carolina's law, which was enacted in 1979, "one of the earliest and most influential right to
farm laws" in the United States. Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer,
Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer,
1983 Wis. L. REv. 95, 119. At least 19 states modeled their right-to-farm statutes on
North Carolina's law. See id.
85. 62 N.C. App. 396,303 S.E.2d 236 (1983).
86. i at 398,303 S.E.2d at 238.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (1995).
8& 1d § 106-701(a). Section 106-701(b) defines an "agricultural operation" as "any
facility for the production for commercial purposes of ... livestock ... [or] livestock
products." Id. Therefore, hog farms fall within the statutory protections against nuisance
claims.
89. See Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 254-55, 451 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994); cf. Mayes
v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 201, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1985) (observing that sections 106-
700 and 106-701 of the North Carolina General Statutes apply only in situations where a
non-agricultural use extends into an agricultural area, not where there is a pre-existing
non-agricultural use situated in a particular locality prior to the initial operation of an
agricultural facility). Mayes is discussed supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
90. See Britt, 117 N.C. App. at 255, 451 S.E.2d at 3. In Britt, the court held that the
alteration of the agricultural facility from turkey to hog production constituted a
fundamental change not protected by section 106-701. See id at 255, 451 S.E.2d at 4. The
court also held that defendant's compliance with federal law did not bar a nuisance claim
where the federal law does not specifically preempt state law. See id.
91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701(a).
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The right-to-farm statute originally declared null and void any
local ordinance that would make any farming activity or the operation
of a farm a nuisance. 92 The scope of this restriction was limited in
1997, however, when the General Assembly passed a package of hog
farm and clean water provisions in reaction to a major hog waste
spillf 3 Under the 1997 amendments, section 153A-340 of the North
Carolina General Statutes now authorizes counties to adopt zoning
regulations for hog farms with a designed capacity of about 4000 hogs
or moref 4 The relationship between North Carolina's right-to-farm
statute and the 1997 provisions is not yet clear, but these zoning
amendments are significant because for the first time since the
adoption of the right-to-farm statute in 1979, counties have some
ability to regulate industrial hog farms and to allow private nuisance
suits against them.
A recent case from another major hog-producing state95 suggests
that North Carolina's right-to-farm statute could be further weakened
by a constitutional challenge. In Bormann v. Board of Supervisors,96
the plaintiff-appellants facially challenged Iowa's right-to-farm law,97
92. See id. § 106-701(d).
93. See Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 458, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 1938 (codified in scattered
sections of North Carolina General Statutes Chapters 106, 143 and 153); supra notes 5-8
and accompanying text. The bill was enacted in response to the divisive environmental
and nuisance issues caused by North Carolina's thriving hog industry. See Abdalla &
Becker, supra note 5, at 25.
94. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340(b)(3) (1997). Because hogs are considered
ready for processing at the early age of six months, the amount of turnover in an
industrialized facility is tremendous and causes continual fluctuation in the actual
aggregate weight of the hogs at the site. Despite this constant change, the average weight
of the hogs (whether calculated on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis) can be used to
determine whether the facility is subject to section 153A-340 of the North Carolina
General Statutes. If the average weight amounts to 600,000 pounds or more, then the
facility does not receive the benefits of the right-to-farm statute. See id. § 153A-340. If,
however, the average weight is less than 600,000 pounds and the facility has been in
existence for one year or more, the facility is shielded from nuisance suits and zoning
regulations. See id, § 106-701(a); § 153A-340. A farm with 600,000 liveweight capacity has
room for about 4000 hogs. See Abdalla & Becher, supra note 5, at 25.
95. Iowa is the only state to produce more hogs than North Carolina. It raises more
than 14.5 million hogs annually. See Silverstein, supra note 2, at 31.
96. 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Girres v. Bormann, 119 S. Ct.
1096 (1999). See generally Mindy Larsen Poldberg, A Practioner's Guide to Iowa Manure
Laws, Manure Regulations, and Manure Application Agreements, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
433, 456-61 (1998) (discussing the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Bormann and its
potential effect on other statutes that provide nuisance protection to farmers).
97. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11(1)(a) (West 1994) ("A farm or farm operation
located in an agricultural area shall not be found to be a nuisance regardless of the
established date of operation or expansion of the agricultural activities of the farm or farm
operation."). An agricultural area was defined under the statute as an area designated by
a county with the consent of the property owners where the use of the land was limited to
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claiming not only that it constituted a per se taking of their property,98
but also that the provision gave certain private property owners in
designated agricultural areas legal permission to foist a nuisance onto
neighboring property, thereby generating an easement.99 The Iowa
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the statutory immunity from
nuisance claims allowed certain property owners to engage in
conduct, which, absent the establishment of an easement, would
constitute a nuisance. 10 Moreover, since easements are subject to the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,10 1 the court held that the
State could not "regulate property so as to insulate the users from
potential private nuisance claims without providing just compensation
to persons injured by the nuisance."'" The court concluded that the
"legislature exceeded its authority by authorizing the use of property
in such a way as to infringe on the rights of others by allowing the
creation of a nuisance without the payment of just compensation" in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 03
As the scope North Carolina's right-to-farm statute shrinks, hog
farmers may turn instead to the state-of-the-art defense for protection
from nuisance suits. The defense developed initially in products
liability law, where courts felt it was unjust to hold manufacturers
liable when older products did not live up to modem safety
standards.Y In products liability cases, the defense is used to assert
that a manufacturer should not be liable when it uses state-of-the-art
safety features in a product and instead should be. liable only if it fails
to warn consumers of an inherently dangerous product characteristic
when the manufacturer had actual or constructive knowledge of the
danger.05 Most jurisdictions recognize this defense, but apply it in
farming. See id § 352.6. The statute delineated several exceptions to the prohibition
against nuisance claims; a plaintiff could bring a nuisance suit if the defendant's farming
operation was (1) unlawful; (2) negligent; (3) a nuisance prior to the agricultural area
designation; or (4) caused a "change in condition of the waters of a stream, the
overflowing of the person's land, or excessive soil erosion." Id. § 352.11(1)(b).
9& See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 313.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 316.
101. See id. (citing United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910)). The Fifth
Amendment states that private property shall not "be taken ... without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102. Bonnann, 584 N.W.2d at 319-320 (citing Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,
233 U.S. 546,553 (1914)).
103. Id. at 321.
104. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976) ("A
consumer would not expect a Model T to have the safety features which are incorporated
in automobiles made today.").
105. See Matthew William Stevens, Survey, Strictly No Strict Liability: The 1995
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different ways." 6 For example, courts disagree over whether state-of-
the-art defenses may be asserted in strict liability cases. 7 Similarly,
jurisdictions differ regarding whether a state-of-the-art defense
functions as an absolute defense or whether it operates as a mitigating
factor to be weighed along with a variety of other circumstances.' 8
The recent Restatement (Third) of Torts effectively abolished the
defense and replaced it with a broader, more generic standard."9
Under the Restatement, a product is designed defectively if the
plaintiff establishes that a safer alternative design could have been
adopted, even though such a design had not been "adopted by any
manufacturer, or even considered for commercial use."" 0 The
ramifications of the Restatement's have not yet been clear because
the change is too recent to have affected court holdings.
Despite the uncertainty over the state-of-the-art defense in
products liability cases, the defense remains a significant factor in
nuisance suits. The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized
that although the state-of-the-art defense does not erect a complete
bar to nuisance claims, it can be used as a mitigating factor in
Amendments to Chapter 99B, the Products Liability Act, 74 N.C. L. REv. 2240, 2249-50
(1996) (quoting Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liability for
Failure to Warn as Dependent on Defendant's Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.L.R. 4th 369,
371 (1984)). Since scientific and technological knowledge is limited, certain risks and
safety measures remain unknown until an injury occurs. See David G. Owen,
Defectiveness Restated; Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REv. 743,782. Often, manufacturers sued for product-related injuries will claim that their
product was designed or manufactured according to the best available technology or was
state of the art at the time of production. See id. at 783.
106. See Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More
Protective Than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REv.
985, 1021 (1998).
107. Compare Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 1984) (noting that a
state-of-the-art defense is not relevant for strict liability purposes), with Anderson v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 550 (Cal. 1991) (holding that a defendant in
a strict liability case is permitted to present evidence to support a state-of-the-art defense).
108. Compare KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Michie 1992) (creating a
presumption that if a product conforms to generally recognized and prevailing standards
or the state-of-the-art in existence at the time the design was prepared, it is not defective),
and IoWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (West 1987) (stating that conformance with the state of
the art at the time the product was designed is an absolute defense), with O'Brien v.
Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983) ("[S]tate-of-the-art evidence is relevant to,
but not necessarily dispositive of, risk-utility analysis."), and Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 17 (Wis. 1984) ("A product may be defective and
unreasonably dangerous even though there are no alternative, safer designs available.").
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrs LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d, at 20
(1997); Larry S. Stewart, A New Frontier: Design Defects Cases and the New Restatement,
TRIAL, Nov. 1998, at 20,21.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCES LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. d, at 20.
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assessing the reasonableness of a party's conduct."' As such, a
defendant has the ability to show that the use of such technology
effectively eliminates a nuisance. The difficulty with asserting the
defense, however, is that the use of the best available technology is
not conclusive or controlling." 2 Instead, the technology used will be
assessed, along with a variety of other factors," to determine whether
the operation of the facility is reasonable under all the
circumstances." 4  Thus, asserting that one's hog facility has
implemented the best available technology will only provide a full
defense against a nuisance claim if that technology completely abates
the nuisance. Otherwise, a plaintiffs nuisance claim can succeed
despite the presentation of evidence showing that the defendant used
state-of-the-art technology provided the plaintiff can show that the
defendant substantially interfered with the reasonable use and
enjoyment of the plaintiffs property." 5
Another problem with applying the state-of-the-art defense in
nuisance claims is that it focuses on the knowledge of the defendant,
which is important in products liability but is not an essential element
in nuisance law. Traditionally, the state-of-the-art defense precluded
manufacturer liability unless the manufacturer had failed to warn
consumers of the inherently dangerous aspects of a product where the
manufacturer either knew or should have known of the product's
dangerousness." 6  Even though Restatement (Third) of Torts
eliminated the term "state of the art," its drafters still adopted the
rationale that a manufacturer is liable only for foreseeable risks and is
required to adopt only those risk avoidance measures that are
"reasonably knowable and otherwise commercially feasible at the
time of sale."" 7 The difficulty in applying a state-of-the-art defense in
hog farm odor nuisance suits, however, is that the defense only
applies if the defendant's knowledge is a prerequisite to recovery,'
but knowledge is not essential to liability in a nuisance claim." 9 A
111. See Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611,618, 124 S.E.2d 809,814 (1962).
112. See id. at 616,124 S.E.2d at 813.
113. See supra note 74 (listing the factors used to determine the reasonableness of
defendants' actions in nuisance suits).
114. See Watts, 256 N.C. at 618,124 S.E.2d at 814.
115. See id.; Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 193, 124 S.E.2d 682, 689
(1953); Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 26,502 S.E.2d at 48.
116. See Stevens, supra note 105, at 2249-50.
117. Owen, supra note 105, at 783; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCrS LIABILTY § 2, cmt. d, at 19-20 (explaining that liability attaches only to
foreseeable risks).
118. See T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249,1260 (N.J. 1991).
119. See Watts, 256 N.C. at 616, 618, 124 S.E.2d at 813,814. The test of what constitutes
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hog farmer can be liable for creating a nuisance even though he is
ignorant of the odor's existence. Thus, unless a defendant can show
that using state-of-the-art technology completely abated the alleged
nuisance, the defense will only be useful as a factor in determining the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct weighed against various
other factors. 20
The state-of-the-art defense also raises issues with respect to
what constitutes the cutting edge in modem hog farming operations.
Today's industrialized hog farms raise a significantly larger number of
hogs on roughly the same amount of land as traditional, family-owned
hog farms.'2 ' This change has increased the volume of hog waste and
has intensified related odors. North Carolina raises more than ten
million hogs annually,'2 producing over nine million tons of waste'
which is commonly stored in open-pit "lagoons" where the waste
remains until it eventually is used as fertilizer.124 Hog farms use one
of two types of waste lagoons: aerobic lagoons or anaerobic
lagoons." 5 Lagoon systems are designed to convert the organic
a nuisance is whether an actor's conduct substantially and unreasonably interferes with the
use and enjoyment of a person's property. See id. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814; Morgan, 238
N.C. at 193,77 S.E.2d at 689; Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 26,502 S.E.2d at 48.
Knowledge is a factor, however, in determining whether certain conduct
constitutes an intentional nuisance. See Morgan, 238. N.C. at 194, 77 S.E.2d at 689.
According to Morgan, liability for an intentional nuisance attaches when someone either
knows or is substantially certain that his conduct is causing a nuisance. See id. The
problem is that even if a hog farmer claims that she implemented the best available
technology at the time of design and construction of her facility, it is difficult to argue that
she did not know or did not have constructive knowledge that her hog farm would
generate odor. Odors are a natural and expected byproduct of hog farms. Therefore, the
state-of-the-art defense does not insulate hog farmers from intentional nuisances because
of the inherent nature of hog farms and their unavoidable creation of odors. Cf id.
(stating that actual or constructive knowledge that a nuisance will result from a person's
conduct is sufficient to constitute an intentional nuisance).
120. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
121. See TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that the tremendous growth in North
Carolina's hog production has occurred on farms that already housed hundreds or even
thousands of hogs at one site.
122. See Silverstein, supra note 2, at 33. Iowa is the nation's leading hog producer,
raising more than 14.5 million hog annually. See id. at 31.
123. See Rogers, supra note 2, at lB. For updates on the amount of waste deposited by
North Carolina hogs since January 1, 1999, see Environmental Defense Fund, Hogwatch
(visited Apr. 22, 1999) <http://www.hogwatch.orglresourcecenter/counter.html>.
124. See Brian Feagans, New Ways to Handle Hog Waste Sought, SUNDAY STAR-NEWS
(Wilmington, N.C.), Feb. 28,1999, at Supp. 19.
125. See Richard E. Nicolai, Managing Odors from Swine Waste, AGRIC.
ENGINEERING UPDATE (Dep't of Biosys. & Agric. Eng'g, Univ. of Minn., St. Paul,
Minn.), June 30, 1995, at 3. Aerobic lagoons need oxygen for the waste-decomposing
microorganisms to thrive, while anaerobic lagoons are not oxygen dependent. See id.
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matter in manure into stable products.126 While the relatively mild
odor produced by aerobic lagoons is a benefit from using such
systems, the substantial cost of installing and operating aerobic
facilities is a drawback. 27 As a result, most hog farms, including the
Barefoots' farm, use anaerobic waste lagoons.128
Whether hog waste decomposes aerobically or anaerobically, the
odors that emanate from these lagoons are comprised of a mixture of
gas, vapor, and dust.129 The odors from anaerobic lagoons, however,
often are more offensive than the odors from aerobic lagoons. 130
Anaerobic lagoons release a variety of gases-including ammonia and
hydrogen sulfide, which create that familiar rotten-egg stench-as
well as pungent fatty acids and 150 other volatile compounds. 31 Dust
and other airborne particles originating in hog pens not only contain
pathogens and physical irritants, but also transport many of the
compounds produced by waste lagoons. 32 The type of gaseous
mixture created depends upon the location of the hog facility, the size
and type of the operation, particular production practices, as well as
meteorological conditions.33  Consequently, it is difficult to
determine which compound or combination of compounds is
responsible for the offensive odors emanating from a particular hog
farm and, thus, to target and alleviate the noxious odors.134
Because the Barefoots chose to install an anaerobic lagoon
system to treat hog waste on their farm, the odors emanating from
126. See id. Lagoon systems treat waste by converting it into carbon dioxide, methane,
ammonia, and other gaseous compounds; organic acids; and cell tissue. See Act of Oct. 16,
1998, ch. 188, sec. 2, 1998 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 72. (detailing the various stable products
produced through both the aerobic and anaerobic decomposition process).
127. See Nicolai, supra note 125, at 3.
128. See Mark Sobsey, Human Health Issues (visited Apr. 22, 1999)
<http://www.hogwatch.orglresourcecenter/onlinearticles/Sos/sobsey.html>; see also
Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 19, 502 S.E.2d at 44 (describing the Barefoots' lagoon). The
North Carolina legislature has recently directed the state Department of Agriculture to
develop a plan to phase out the use of anaerobic lagoons and sprayfields as the primary
methods of disposing of animal waste at hog farms. See Act of Aug. 27, 1997, ch. 458, sec.
12.4,1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 1959.
129. See TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 15.
130. See id. at 19.
131. See id. at 15. These other compounds are the result of biological reactions within
the waste lagoon. They include "organic acids, alcohols, aldehydes, fixed gases, carbonyls,
esters, amines, sulphides, mercaptans, and nitrogen heterocycles." Id.
" 132. See id.
.133. See id
134. Hog farm odors generally originate from four areas: (1) buildings and holding
facilities; (2) manure storage and treatment areas; (3) areas on which lagoon liquids and
sludge have been applied; and (4) carcass disposal areas. See id. at 16-19 (providing a
.detailed discussion regarding how odors occur in each of these sources).
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their lagoon were more intense and more constant than if they had
installed an aerobic lagoon system. Perhaps anticipating problems,
the Barefoots attempted to alleviate their lagoon's odor by encircling
it with acres of crops, trees, and forest.135 In addition, they used the
expertise of the Soil Conservation Service in designing and
constructing their facility.3 6 Finally, the Barefoots not only installed
an underground irrigation system, but also built the lagoon twenty
percent larger than required in a further attempt to reduce odor. 37
The question remains: What more could the Barefoots have
done to alleviate the nuisance? Various technologies have been
developed to address the chronic problem of hog-farm odors. 3 For
example, two devices quantitatively measure odor: the
Scentometer Tm and the Odor MonitorTm.13 9 Although each device has
its limitations, the two instruments generally correspond in their
measurement and rankings of tested odors, and each device provides
farmers with a means of detecting an increase in the intensity of
noxious fumes.' 40 In addition, several odor-reducing techniques have
been developed. First, farmers can alter their hogs' diets, decreasing
the amount of ammonia, nitrogen, and other odorous compounds
produced.14' Farmers can also use odor-controlling additives to treat
or prevent odors in hog-storage houses and waste lagoons. 42
135. See Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 19,502 S.E.2d at 44.
136. See id
137. See id-
138. There is no precise method available to measure odors objectively, particularly
since the offensiveness of an odor does not necessarily correspond to its intensity. See
TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 38. Odors produced by hog farms often are intermittent
and usually are difficult to detect simply by measuring airborne concentration of
compounds. See id.
139. See icL at 39-40. The Scentometer TM Model SCC requires the user to inhale
through two nostril inserts. See id. "The user first receives odor-free air and then a
sequence of increasingly odorous samples, and a threshold is established when the user
first detects the odor. An odor's magnitude is determined by the number of dilutions
required to reach the threshold." I& at 40. Unlike the Scentometer Tm , the Odor
Monitor Tm does not require the use of human subjects, but instead evaluates odors by
measuring the odor-causing molecules in the air. See iL
140. See iL
141. See id. at 41. There are several approaches available regarding feed conversion
and odor control to make effective dietary improvements for hogs. One approach to
improve the diet of hogs in order to decrease nitrogen production is the substitution of
synthetic amino acids in place of traditional protein sources. See iL at 42. A second
approach is to use proteolytic enzymes to increase the digestibility of protein. See id.
Other options include the addition of odor absorbers, plant extracts, or enzymes to hog
feed in order to aid in the control of odors generated by hogs. See id.
142. See itL at 43-44. A number of additives are available to neutralize odors.
Aromatic oils, used either as masking agents or as counteractants, are one option to
control odors. See id. at 43. In addition, digestive deodorants, external odor absorbents,
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Another option is to install mechanical technologies, including
biological filters, catalytic converters, condensers, incinerators, and
scrubbers.'4' As a final option, farmers can install an effective
ventilation system to diminish the intensity of hog-related odors. 44
Notwithstanding the availability of a wide selection of odor-reducing
technologies and techniques, however, the most effective method to
control odors is the overall design, siting, and management of the hog
farm to maintain control over the cleanliness of both the hogs and the
facilities. 45
While these factual and legal issues call into question the utility
of the state-of-the-art defense in nuisance suits against hog farms, the
Barefoot court's ruling suggests that the defense may now become an
issue every time the parties introduce evidence regarding a hog farm's
design. Accordingly, Barefoot is significant in several ways. The first
significant aspect of the case stems from the difference between the
majority's and the dissent's interpretations of whether the evidence
presented by the defendant-appellees constituted a state-of-the-art
defense. The majority emphasized that the jury could have
reasonably interpreted the Barefoots' case as an affirmative state-of-
the-art defense. 4 6  The dissent, however, viewed the defendant-
appellees' claims that their hog farm was a state-of-the-art facility as
simply a rebuttal to the plaintiff-appellants' claims that the
substandard design of the farm caused noxious odors.47 The dissent
argued that the Barefoots were not advancing a state-of-the-art
defense and, therefore, that the trial court was not required to
instruct the jury about the substantive law of such a defense.148 The
majority's opinion creates a relatively low threshold for determining
whether the evidence and testimony presented at trial constitute a
state-of-the-art affirmative defense. According to the court of
and a variety of chemical deodorants provide viable options to mitigate odors. See id. at
43-44.
143. See id. at 56. All of these options pose significant financial costs, so the hog
industry has been reluctant to embrace them. See id.
144. See id. at 45-47. Proper ventilation prevents the accumulation of noxious gases
that result from decomposing manure. See id. at 46. As a result, the design of the
ventilation system is crucial in determining whether the dispersion of odorous fumes will
be released in a constant, diluted manner or whether those fumes will be emitted in
occasional, but highly, concentrated, doses. See icL
145. See id. at 74; see also Nicolai, supra note 125, at 2 (noting that management
practices and common sense are key determinants in controlling hog farm odors).
146. See Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 23,502 S.E.2d at 46.
147. See idU at 27, 502 S.E.2d at 49 (Martin, J., dissenting).
148. See idL at 27, 502 S.E.2d at 48 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Agnew, 294
N.C. 382,395,241 S.E.2d 684,692 (1978)).
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appeals, the introduction of almost any evidence about the design and
construction of the hog farm, regardless of the subjective motive for
its introduction, is sufficient to constitute a state-of-the-art defense.49
Consequently, once such evidence is introduced, a trial court is now
required to instruct the jury, at least in substance, that the use of
state-of-the-art or best-available technology does not absolve liability
in a nuisance claim. 150 Failure to provide this instruction is reversible
error.
151
Barefoot is also significant because it affirms that hog farm
owners cannot avoid nuisance liability simply by using the best
technology available, maintaining and operating their farms in
compliance with government regulations, using a reasonable design,
and implementing state-of-the-art technology. 2 While these factors
may be used to weigh the evidence and the severity of the
interference with neighboring landowners' use of their properties,
they do not bar the claim itself. 53
Barefoot, in combination with the recent legislative efforts to
curb the impacts associated with the corporate hog industry, provides
the first incremental gains in decades for those communities that have
had to absorb the financial and environmental burdens of the vertical
integration of hog farming. Of course, the ultimate decision as to
whether certain conduct constitutes a nuisance remains in the hands
of the jury, 54 and determining whether the new instructions will affect
juries' decisions must await the results of subsequent cases. While
Barefoot emphasizes that the use of state-of-the-art technology in the
operation and design of a hog facility is not a complete defense to a
nuisance suit, 55 the trajectory of that rule may be relatively flat. The
most significant barrier to these types of lawsuits is that they
149. See UL at 23-24,502 S.E.2d at 46-47.
150. See id at 26, 502 S.E.2d at 48.
151. See id. at 20,502 S.E.2d at 44; see also Bass v. Hocutt, 221 N.C. 218,219, 19 S.E.2d
871, 872 (1942) (holding that a trial court's failure to provide the substance of the state of
the law in a jury instruction as requested by a party is reversible error); Calhoun v. State
Highway and Public Works Comm., 208 N.C. 424, 424, 181 S.E. 271, 272 (1935) (same);
Parks v. Security Trust Co., 195 N.C. 453, 453, 42 S.E. 473, 473 (1928) (same); Michaux v.
Paul Rubber Co., 190 N.C. 617, 619, 130 S.E. 306, 307 (1925) (same); Marcom v. Durham
& S.R. Co., 165 N.C. 259, 259-60, 81 S.E. 290, 291 (1914) (same); Irvin v. Southern R.R.
Co., -164 N.C. 5, 17-18, 80 S.E. 78, 83 (1913) (same); Faeber v. E.C.T. Corp., 16 N.C. App.
429,430, 92 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1972) (same).
152 See Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 26,502 S.E.2d at 48.
153. See id at 22-23, 502 S.E.2d at 46.
154. See iU; see also Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 618, 124 S.E.2d 809, 814
(1962) (listing several factors to be considered by a jury in determining the reasonableness
of a defendant's conduct).
155. See Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. at 22,502 S.E.2d at 45.
1999] 2375
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
inevitably are brought in counties whose residents are heavily
dependent upon the hog industry for their employment and
livelihood. Combine demographics, geography, and economics with
the commonly held view that a person should be free to use her
property as she chooses, and the outcomes of these types of lawsuits
may not change, despite Barefoot.56
Although Barefoot illustrates the viability of nuisance claims to
combat the emission of hog odors and other related hog farm impacts,
a more prudent approach for future plaintiffs may be the one taken
by the plaintiffs in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, who successfully
argued that Iowa's right-to-farm laws constituted an unconstitutional
taking of property without just compensation by allowing farmers
easements over their neighbors' property. 57  A successful
constitutional challenge to North Carolina's right-to-farm statutes
could have several significant effects. A successful suit would require
the state either to pay just compensation to those potentially affected
by hog-farm odors or to invalidate the right-to-farm statute.15 8 Under
either scenario, neighboring property owners of hog farms would
benefit because they could bring nuisance claims regardless of the size
of the farm. Although the potential cost to the hog industry is
significant, hog farming's cost to tourism, public health, and the
environment in North Carolina has already proven expensive.
AARON M. McKowN
156. A year before the trial court decision in Barefoot, another Johnston County jury
determined that there was "nothing patently unreasonable" with having to reside near a
hog farm. Joby Warrick, Jury Rejects Claim Against Hog Operation, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 31, 1996, at 3A (providing background on hog farming litigation
after the Barefoot trial). Former United States Senator Robert Morgan observed, as long
as" '[p]eople... still have this feeling that, "[iut's my land, and ... I'll do whatever I want
with it," ' " there will not be "'a sympathetic jury in Johnston County.'" Id. (quoting
Robert Morgan). Mr. Morgan served as the plaintiffs' attorney in Barefoot. See id.
157. 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Girres v. Bormann, 119 S. Ct.
1096 (1999). For a discussion of Bormann, see supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
158. Invalidation of the statute would not necessarily avoid the compensation issue.
See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987) (holding that regulations which temporarily deprive a
landowner of all use of her property require compensation under the Fifth Amendment
evenif the government later abandons those regulations).
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Too Far Too Fast? The North Carolina Supreme Court
Eliminates the Common Law Distinction Between Invitees and
Licensees in Nelson v. Freeland
Consider the following scenario: Aaron and Leslie are neighbors
in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. While gardening one Saturday
afternoon, Aaron realizes he needs a particular garden tool which he
has previously borrowed from Leslie on several occasions.
Unannounced, Aaron walks over to ask Leslie if he may borrow the
tool. While on Leslie's property, Aaron steps into a small hole that
Leslie had dug that morning intending to plant a flower there.
Aaron's ankle twists and he falls, sustaining injuries. As it turns out,
Leslie is out buying fertilizer for the flower and is not home when the
incident occurs. Is Leslie liable in negligence' for the injuries to
Aaron?
For over a century in North Carolina, well-established common
law rules have governed the answer to this question.2 Under these
judicially created rules, the extent of the landowner's3 (Leslie's) duty
1. The tort of negligence consists of four elements:
[First, a duty imposed on defendant by law to conform to a certain standard of
conduct in respect of the interests of the others (and his own interests, in the case
of contributory negligence); second, breach of that duty; third, an injury or
danages to the plaintiff; and fourth, a sufficient factual and legal connection
between the defendant's breach of duty and the plaintiff's harm.
CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 16.10, at
134 (1991).
Negligence with respect to landowners and entrants, such as that in the
hypothetical, is a subset of general negligence law. See id. at 132. For further discussion of
negligence in the context of premises liability, see Charles E. Daye, Judicial Boilerplate
Language as Torts Decisional Litany: Four Problem Areas in North Carolina, 18
CAMPBELL L. REv. 359, 359-71 (1996); Norman S. Marsh, The History and Comparative
Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 LAW Q. REv. 182 (1953); Kathryn E.
Eriksen, Comment, Premises Liability in Texas- Time for a "Reasonable" Change, 17 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 417 (1986); John Ketchum, Note, Missouri Declines an Invitation to Join the
Twentieth Century: Preservation of the Licensee-Invitee Distinction in Carter v. Kinney, 64
UMKC L. REv. 393 (1995); Linda Sayed, Note, Assault on the Common Law of Premises
Liability: What Duty of Care Does an Owner or Occupier of Land Owe to a Police Officer
Who Enters the Premises of Another by Authority of Law? Newton v. New Hanover
County Board of Education, 19 CAMPBELLL. REv. 579 (1997); Michael Sears, Comment,
Abrogation of the Traditional Common Law of Premises Liability, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 175
(1995).
2. See Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 617, 507 S.E.2d 882, 883 (1998) (noting that
the common law approach has been used for more than 100 years), reh'g denied, 350 N.C.
108 (1999).
3. Throughout this Note the term "landowner" will refer to both owners and
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to ensure the safety of the entrant (Aaron) depends primarily on the
status of the entrant at the time of the injury.4 There are three
categories of entrants: invitees, licensees, and trespassers.5 Under
this "trichotomy," a landowner's duty of care is greatest toward an
invitee and least toward a trespasser.6 Landowners owe licensees a
greater duty of care than that owed to trespassers but lesser than that
owed to invitees.7 Thus, using the common law rules in the example
above, the extent of Leslie's duty toward Aaron, and her concomitant
liability, will depend on whether Aaron's status is that of an invitee,
licensee, or trespasser.
Both courts and commentators have criticized the common law
trichotomy.8 Some jurisdictions have substantially modified the law
by abolishing the distinction between invitees and licensees.9 Others
have abandoned the trichotomy altogether, establishing in its place a
duty on landowners simply to maintain their premises in a reasonably
safe condition to protect all visitors, including trespassers."
Nevertheless, despite this criticism, a significant number of courts
have refused to abandon completely the common law, even when
squarely presented with an opportunity to do so."
occupiers of land or other real property. Also, to avoid confusion, the term "entrant" will
refer to any person who enters another's premises for any reason.
4. See Newton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 342 N.C. 554, 559, 467 S.E.2d
58,63 (1996); DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 1, § 17.30, at 220; Sayed, supra note 1, at 579.
5. See Newton, 342 N.C. at 559,467 S.E.2d at 63. Invitees enter another's premises by
an express or implied invitation in order to confer some direct and substantial benefit on
the landowner; licensees enter the premises for their own lawful purposes; trespassers
enter another's land without permission or for no lawful purpose. See infra notes 79-97
and accompanying text (discussing the entrant classifications).
6. See infra notes 98-109 (discussing the varying levels of care).
7. See Hood v. Queen City Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534,540, 107 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1959).
& See, e.g., Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt & Ritt, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Iowa 1998) (noting
the court's "disenchantment" with the common-law approach); Moody v. Manny's Auto
Repair, 871 P.2d 935, 945 (Nev. 1994) (criticizing the common-law approach as based on
"antiquated" rules); Ouelette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 632 (N.H. 1976) (noting that the
United States Supreme Court has criticized the trichotomy); Daye, supra note 1, at 371
(suggesting that the categories be abolished altogether and replaced with a reasonable-
care standard); Ketchum, supra note 1, at 394 (suggesting that the common-law approach
is based on outdated principles of land ownership).
9. See, e.g., Sheets, 581 N.W.2d at 606 ("[W]e abrogate the distinction in premises
liability cases between invitees and licensees."); infra note 140 (listing jurisdictions that
have abolished the distinction between invitees and licensees).
10. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) ("[A]dherence to the
common law distinctions can only lead to injustice."); infra note 138 (listing jurisdictions
that have imposed a general duty of reasonable care).
11. See, e.g., Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc., 639 P.2d 330, 332 (Ariz. 1982) ("The particular
duty owed to the entrant on the land is defined by the entrant's status."); infra notes 142,
144 (listing jurisdictions that have not abrogated the common law categories).
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In a recent case, Nelson v. Freeland,2 the North Carolina
Supreme Court joined the growing number of courts that have
abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees. 3 Citing the
"complexity, confusion, and harshness" of the common law rules, 4 a
four-justice majority in Nelson imposed a duty on landowners to
"exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their premises for the
protection of [all] lawful visitors."' 5 Consequently, the status of an
entrant is no longer relevant in determining a landowner's duty of
care in North Carolina, 6 except in the case of trespassers who, unlike
invitees and licensees, do not enter land "under color of right."' 7
This Note first discusses the facts of Nelson, its history in the
lower courts, and the North Carolina Supreme Court's resolution of
the issues presented by the case.18 The Note then briefly discusses the
three common law classifications' 9 and the duty of care associated
with each, as enunciated by North Carolina courts.20 The Note also
examines the evolution of these common law premises-liability
principles, both in North Carolina' and in other jurisdictions. 2 Next,
the Note analyzes the majority opinion in Nelson and the holding's
significanceP In light of that discussion, the Note suggests ways the
court might have clarified and improved North Carolina premises-
liability law without abolishing the existing common law framework.24
Finally, the Note concludes that, although Nelson was correctly
decided as to the individual litigants, the court improvidently
abolished decades of existing law, leaving it to the North Carolina
General Assembly to decide whether to reinstate portions of the
12. 349 N.C. 615,507 S.E.2d 882 (1998), reh'g denied, 350 N.C. 108 (1999).
13. See id. at 631-32,507 S.E.2d at 892.
14. Id. at 629,507 S.E.2d at 891.
15. Id. at 632, 507 S.E.2d at 892.
16. In the hypothetical involving Aaron and Leslie, under the new rules, Leslie has a
duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining her premises for the protection of Aaron,
a lawful visitor. As with other negligence cases, a jury would determine whether Leslie
has fulfilled that duty. See DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 1, § 16.30, at 136. Whereas under
the common law system, Aaron's purpose for coming onto Leslie's land was part of the
threshold inquiry into Aaron's status, that factor would now be taken into account only if
the jury chose to consider it. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text (discussing the
significance of Nelson).
17. Nelson, 349 N.C. at 632,507 S.E.2d at 892.
18. See infra notes 26-73 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 110-31 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 146-202 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
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common law.25
Much like the scenario between Leslie and Aaron, Nelson
involved parties on friendly terms. For more than twenty years,
Greensboro resident John Nelson considered Daryl Dean Freeland
and his wife Belinda to be his good friends.26 Apparently, the feeling
was mutual. Nelson and Freeland "did a lot of things together. 27
They also helped each other out when one of them had car trouble
and occasionally gave each other rides.m On January 23, 1995, Nelson
drove over to Freeland's house-allegedly at Freeland's request-
and, like many times before, waited for Freeland to come out to the
car.29 According to Nelson, the two men planned to meet a mutual
friend to discuss an employment opportunity. When Freeland did
not come out, Nelson got out of his car, walked onto Freeland's
porch, and knocked on the door.3 1 Hearing no answer, Nelson turned
to go back to his car. 2 As he turned, he stepped on a stick lying on a
mat on the porch.3 Nelson's feet "shot out from under" him and he
fell, sustaining numerous injuries.'
Nelson sued the Freelands, alleging that they were negligent for
failing to maintain the porch in a reasonably safe manner and for not
warning Nelson about the stick.35 The Freelands moved for summary
judgment, which the superior court granted. 6 Nelson appealed, and
the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion,
affirmed the trial court's ruling.37 The court of appeals used the
common law trichotomy and held that, as a matter of law, Nelson was
25. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
26. See Excerpts from Deposition of John Harvey Nelson at 24, Nelson v. Freeland,
No. COA97-1120, slip op. at 4-5 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 30,1998) [hereinafter Deposition].
27. Id
28. See id.
29. See id. at 21.
30. See id. at 22-23.
31. See id. at 21.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 25. Freeland had left the stick on the porch earlier that morning after
using it to remove a wasp's nest from the porch railing. See Affidavit of John Harvey
Nelson at 18, Nelson (No. COA97-1120) (attaching a letter from Freeland explaining his
actions).
34. Complaint at 2, Nelson (No. COA97-1120). According to Nelson, he fell "with
great force and violence, injuring his left ankle by sustaining an inversion-type fracture
with dislocation to the left ankle and a sprain to the right ankle resulting in severe, painful
and permanent injuries to himself." Id.
35. See Complaint at 2, Nelson (No. COA97-1120).
36. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 616,507 S.E.2d at 883.
37. See Nelson, No. COA97-1120, slip op. at 5 (N.C. Ct. of App., Apr. 30,1998).
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a licensee when he entered the Freelands' premises. 8 The Freelands,
the court noted, owed Nelson a duty to refrain from willfully injuring
him and from wantonly and recklessly exposing him to danger.39 The
court concluded that Dean Freeland did not breach this duty by
inadvertently leaving a stick on his porch.40  Judge Walker of the
court of appeals filed a written dissent, and Nelson appealed the
court's decision as a matter of right.4'
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case to the superior court for a trial on the merits
under the new rules established by its decision.4 2 In the majority
opinion in which three other justices joined.43 Justice Wynn noted that
despite the supreme court's decisions in past premises-liability cases,
the common law system is no more "stable and predictable" than
before and has actually "confounded our judiciary."' As a result, the
court reasoned, landowners are not sufficiently aware of their duties
toward entrants.45 Justice Wynn declared, therefore, that "it befalls
us to examine the continuing utility of the common-law trichotomy"
in determining landowner liability. 6
After setting out the traditional common law premises-liability
rules in North Carolina, the majority opinion made a case for joining
the "modem trend of abolishing the common law trichotomy in favor
of a reasonable-person standard."' 7  The court noted that many
38. See id at 4.
39. See id
40. See id.
41. See Notice of Appeal at 1, Nelson (No. COA97-1120). Appeal as a matter of right
to the North Carolina Supreme Court is allowed when at least one judge on the court of
appeals files a written dissent. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (1995).
42- See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 633,507 S.E.2d at 893.
43. Justices Frye, Parker, and Whichard joined in the majority opinion. See Nelson,
349 N.C. at 615, 633, 507 S.E.2d at 882, 893. Justice Wynn, who was appointed to the court
by Governor James Hunt in 1998, lost a bid that same year to be elected to that seat on the
court. See Judges Who Lost in General Election Appointed to Seats on Court of Appeals,
HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Dec. 24, 1998, at C3. In January 1999, Justice Wynn
returned to the North Carolina Court of Appeals where he currently serves as judge. See
id
44. Id. at 616-17, 507 S.E.2d at 883.
45. See id. at 617, 507 S.E.2d at 883.
46. Id. The court determined the continuing relevance of the trichotomy sua sponte.
In their briefs, neither party argued for a change in existing law. Indeed, Defendant
specifically urged against finding for Plaintiff on the grounds that such a ruling would
"totally rewrite the case law on premises liability in this state." Defendant-Appellee's
New Brief at 9, Nelson, 349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998) (No. 216A98). Also, there
were no oral arguments on the subject of abolishing parts of the common law. See Nelson,
349 N.C. at 634, 507 S.E.2d at 893 (Mitchell, C.J., concurring in the result).
47. Nelson, 349 N.C. at 618,507 S.E.2d at 884.
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jurisdictions have attempted to "salvage" the trichotomy by creating
exceptions and sub-classifications to the general rules of status and
standards of care.4  The court emphasized that eleven jurisdictions,
frustrated with the increasing complexity, have "completely
eliminated the common-law distinctions between licensee, invitee,
and trespasser" since California first abolished its common-law
categories in 1968.49 In addition, the court reported that fourteen
jurisdictions have abolished the distinction between licensees and
invitees while keeping the trespasser category.50  In all, the court
concluded, nearly "half of all jurisdictions ... have ... abandoned or
modified the ... trichotomy in favor of the modern 'reasonable-
person' approach."'51
The majority opinion turned next to an examination of the
advantages and disadvantages of abolishing parts of the trichotomy,52
concluding that abolition would strike a better balance between
protecting "land-ownership rights [and] the rights of entrants. '53 The
court first noted that jurisdictions retaining the trichotomy suggest
three disadvantages to abolishing the traditional common law in favor
of pure negligence: (1) possible jury abuse of the reasonable care
standard; (2) unfairly burdening land-ownership rights by forcing
landowners to maintain expensive insurance policies; and (3)
replacing a stable legal system with an unpredictable one.54 The court
rejected these arguments one by one. None of the feared
disadvantages would materialize, the court suggested, since: (1) juries
have applied the reasonable care standard for years in other
negligence areas; (2) courts have always "explicitly stated" that they
did not intend to make landowners "absolute insurer[s] against all
injuries" sustained on their premises; and (3) the common law rules
are less predictable and stable than the standard of reasonableness
required in ordinary negligence cases.55
The court then noted several advantages of abolishing the
48. See id. at 618-19, 507 S.E.2d at 884.
49. kI at 622, 507 S.E.2d at 886. But see infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text
(concluding that only eight of the 11 jurisdictions have actually eliminated the common
law distinction).
50. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 622, 507 S.E.2d at 886. But see infra notes 192-98 and
accompanying text (concluding that only 12 of the 14 cases actually repudiated the
licensee-invitee distinction).
51. Nelson, 349 N.C. at 622-23,507 S.E.2d at 887.
52. See id. at 623-31, 507 S.E.2d at 887-92.
53. Id. at 619, 507 S.E.2d at 884.
54. See id. at 624-25,507 S.E.2d at 888-89.
55. See id.
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common law scheme. First, the basis for the trichotomy is outdated
since it was created during a time when it was "desirable to provide a
landowner free reign to use and exploit his land. ' 56 In a "modem,"
less agrarian society, the trichotomy is no longer viable because it
does not reflect our "'modem social mores and humanitarian
values.' ,57 Second, the trichotomy has created a "complex, confusing,
and unpredictable state .of law. '58 Because the inquiry as to an
entrant's status is fact-based and can change on a whim, 9 the
trichotomy analysis often leads to illogical results" and broad or
strained readings of the law.61  The complexity and confusion is
enhanced by the many exceptions and sub-classifications "engrafted"
onto the trichotomy.6 Third, the common law system leads to "unfair
and unjust" results,63 especially because it deflects attention away
from the "pertinent issue of whether the landowner acted reasonably
under the circumstances."'  Moreover, the trichotomy interferes with
the proper balance of courtroom power in that it gives the judge great
discretion to dismiss or decide cases and leaves for the jury only a
mechanical application of the rules.65
After determining that the advantages of abolishing the common
law system outweighed the disadvantages, the court decided to
eliminate the licensee-invitee distinction and instead require "a
standard of reasonable care toward all lawful visitors. '66 The court
emphasized that it did not hold that "[landowners] are now insurers
of their premises."' e67 court also stressed that it would retain a
separate category for trespassers so as not to place unfair burdens on
landowners who have "no reason to expect a trespasser's presence. 
'68
Finally, despite noting the importance of stare decisis in maintaining
stable laws, the court announced it would apply the new reasonable
56. Id. at 626,507 S.E.2d at 889.
57. Id. at 622,507 S.E.2d at 886 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561,568 (Cal.
1968)). The Rowland court explained that "[a] man's life or limb does not become less
worthy of protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation ... because he has
come upon the land of another without permission or with permission but without a
business purpose." Rowland, 443 P.2d at 567.
58. Nelson, 349 N.C. at 627,507 S.E.2d at 889.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 619-20,507 S.E.2d at 885.
62. See id. at 630, 507 S.E.2d at 891.
63. See id. at 628, 507 S.E.2d at 890.
64. 1& at 631, 507 S.E.2d at 892.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 632, 507 S.E.2d at 892.
68. Id.
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care standard both prospectively and retrospectively.69 Therefore, the
case was remanded for trial so that a jury could determine whether
Freeland satisfied his duty of reasonable care under the
circumstances. 7
The remaining three justices concurred only in the result reached
by the majority.71 In the concurring opinion, Chief Justice Mitchell
stated his belief that a jury could find that Nelson was an invitee while
on the premises and that Freeland violated the standard of care owed
Nelson; therefore, summary judgment for Freeland was premature. 72
Chief Justice Mitchell went on to note that he found it "unnecessary
for this Court to consider whether our prior holdings ... have been
erroneous and must be modified .... [and] inadvisable to render an
opinion of [this] magnitude" in this case]3  Thus, the concurring
justices would have waited for a more appropriate case to consider
the question of whether North Carolina should abandon substantial
portions of its current premises-liability law.
Pre-Nelson premises-liability law in North Carolina was-and to
a certain extent still is-a special category of ordinary negligence
law] 4 In ordinary negligence cases, a plaintiff must prove, inter alia,
that the defendant had a duty to act with reasonable care towards the
plaintiff and that the defendant breached that duty." Often, as in the
case of governmental immunity, the status of the defendant controls
the question of what duty, if any, the defendant owes a particular
plaintiff.76 In premises-liability cases, however, the defendant is
always the landowner, and it is instead the status of the plaintiff that
controls the level of care the defendant-landowner owes the plaintiff-
entrant.7  Prior to Nelson, the status of a plaintiff-entrant in North
Carolina was classified in one of three ways: invitee, licensee, or
trespasser.78
69. See id. at 633, 507 S.E.2d at 893.
70. See id.
71. See id at 634, 507 S.E.2d at 893 (Mitchell, C.J., concurring in the result). Justices
Lake and Orr joined the concurring opinion. See id.
72- See id. (Mitchell, C.J., concurring in the result).
73. Id. (Mitchell, C.J, concurring in the result); see also infra notes 156-61 and
accompanying text (noting that the issue was not raised or briefed by the parties).
74. See DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 1, § 16.10, at 132 (discussing negligence).
75. See id. § 16.30, at 134-35 (discussing the negligence standard of care).
76. See Mullis v. Sechrest, 347 N.C. 548, 554-55, 495 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1998) (holding
that the defendant was entitled to governmental immunity for acts done in his official
capacity as a public school teacher).
77. See DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 1, § 17.30, at 220 (discussing premises liability
cases).
78. See id. (discussing entrant categories).
2384 [Vol. 77
LAND OWNER LIABILITY
An invitee is a person who enters another's premises by an
express or implied invitation in order to confer some direct and
substantial benefit on the landowner.79 In Mazzacco v. Purcell,80 for
instance, the plaintiff, at the request of his sister and brother-in-law
(the defendants), brought with him on a visit to their home a
chainsaw and other tree removal equipment." While there, the
plaintiff was injured when helping remove some trees.s2 The court
classified the plaintiff as an inviteem because he had been expressly
invited and because his tree removal service "was of direct and
substantial benefit to defendants in maintaining and improving their
rental property."'  Similarly, in Crane v. Caldwell,5 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff who helped his
neighbor move a boat from the neighbor's yard was an invitee. 6
Licensees enter another's land "with the possessor's permission,
express or implied, solely for [their] own purposes rather than the
[landowner's] benefit."s The most common example of a licensee is
the social guest-one who enters the premises with permission but
79. See Cupita v. Carmel Country Club, Inc., 252 N.C. 346, 348, 113 S.E.2d 712, 714
(1960) ("Plaintiff's presence on the premises ... as a member of a dance orchestra to
provide music for a dance in the club building gave him the status of an invitee,").
Although the court in Nelson suggested that an invitee goes onto the premises for the
mutual benefit of the invitee and the landowner, see Nelson, 349 N.C. at 617,507 S.E.2d at
883 (citing Newton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 342 N.C. 554, 560, 467 S.E.2d
58, 63 (1996)), at least one commentary has stated that the real test is mere benefit to the
landowner. See DAYE & MORRIS, supra note ,1, § 17.33, at 236 n.132 (discussing duty
owed to invitees).
80. 303 N.C. 493,279 S.E.2d 583 (1981).
81. See id. at 494,279 S.E.2d at 585.
82. See id. at 496,279 S.E.2d at 586.
83. The most common example of an invitee is referred to as the "business invitee"-
one who enters a business establishment for any lawful reason during the normal hours of
operation. See DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 1, § 17.33.1, at 240; see also, e.g., Branks v.
Kern, 320 N.C. 621, 624, 359 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1987) (classifying a pet owner who took her
cat to an animal clinic as a business invitee). "Public invitees," in contrast, are persons
who enter a site for the purpose for which the premises are held open to the public. See
DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 1, § 17.33.3 at 241; see also, e.g., Walker v. County of
Randolph, 251 N.C. 805, 811, 112 S.E.2d 551, 555 (1960) (holding that an entrant to a
county courthouse to read items required by statute to be posted there is an invitee).
Examples of persons held to be invitees include a theatre patron, see Anderson v.
Reidsville Amusement Co., 213 N.C. 130, 133, 195 S.E. 386, 387 (1938), a hotel guest, see
Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 55 N.C. App. 686, 691, 286 S.E.2d 876, 880 (1982), and a
student at a dance studio, see Hedrick v. Tigniere, 267 N.C. 62, 65-66, 147 S.E.2d 550, 553
(1966).
84. Mazzacco, 303 N.C. at 498,279 S.E.2d at 587 (citations omitted).
85. 113 N.C. App. 362,438 S.E.2d 449 (1994).
86. See id. at 366-67, 438 S.E.2d at 452.
87. Mazzacco, 303 N.C. at 497,279 S.E.2d at 586-87.
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does not confer a direct or substantial benefit to the landowner.88
Thus, the landowner has granted the entrant permission to enter his
premises, but only as an accommodation to the licensee.89 In Martin
v. City of Asheville,9 for example, the city permitted county
ambulance personnel to park county ambulances in the city's fire
station.91 In an action by an ambulance attendant to recover damages
for a fall he sustained while in the fire station, the court classified him
as a licensee.91 The court reasoned that the city allowed county
personnel to use the fire station only as a matter of accommodation. 93
Unlike both invitees and licensees, trespassers enter land either
without permission, express or implied, or for an illegal purpose.94 In
other words, the trespasser can claim no legal right to be on the
land.9' In Nelson, Justice Wynn suggested the example of "[a] real-
estate agent [who] trespasses onto another's land to determine the
value of property adjoining that which he is trying to sell. 96 North
Carolina law provides that children who enter another's premises
without permission can also be classified as trespassers.97
Unlike ordinary negligence cases, the status of the plaintiff in a
premises-liability case determines what level of care must be
exercised by the defendant-landowner. In ordinary or pure
negligence cases, the duty owed is to act as a reasonable person under
all of the circumstances. 9 Thus, all people with whom a defendant
comes in contact are ordinarily entitled to expect that she will act
88. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 617, 507 S.E.2d at 884; see also Beaver v. Lefler, 8 N.C.
App. 574, 575-76, 174 S.E.2d 806, 807 (1970) (classifying the plaintiff as a licensee even
though he was injured while helping his neighbor carry meat into the neighbor's home
because the plaintiff was a social guest who conferred only a minor benefit on his host).
89. See Martin v. City of Asheville, 87 N.C. App. 272,275,360 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1987).
State employees who enter premises under authority of law have been held to be
licensees. See Dunn v. Bomberger, 213 N.C. 172, 175, 195 S.E. 364, 366 (1938). But see
Newton v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 342 N.C. 554, 562, 467 S.E.2d 58, 64 (1996)
(holding that police officers who respond to silent burglar alarms and enter premises
under authority of law are invitees).
90. 87 N.C. App. 272,360 S.E.2d 467 (1987).
91. See id. at 274, 360 S.E.2d at 468.
92 See id at 274, 360 S.E.2d at 469.
93. See id. at 275,360 S.E.2d at 469.
94. See Hood v. Queen City Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534,540, 107 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1959).
95. See id.
96. Nelson, 349 N.C. at 627,507 S.E.2d at 889.
97. See, e.g., Hashtani v. Duke Power Co., 578 F.2d 542, 544, 546 (4th Cir. 1978)
(holding that a 14-year-old boy was properly classified as a trespasser); see also infra notes
129-31 and accompanying text (explaining that while young children may be classified as
trespassers, landowners often owe them a higher duty of care than adult trespassers).
98. See DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 1, § 16.30, at 134-35 (discussing standard of care
for common negligence cases).
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reasonably in her actions towards them.99 In premises-liability cases,
however, no such entitlement exists for people injured after entering
others' property.10 Instead, the degree of duty owed an entrant
descends based upon the entrant's status: Landowners owe invitees
the highest level of care l and are required to exercise ordinary care
to keep their premises in a reasonably safe condition for such
entrants.1 2 This duty generally requires that landowners warn
invitees of hidden defects or perils discoverable by the landowner
upon reasonable inspection of the premises. 3 Compared to invitees,
licensees are owed a lesser degree of care.' °4 For licensees, the
landowner does not have to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition.0 5 Rather, he must merely refrain from willfully or
wantonly injuring the licensee and from increasing hazards through
active or affirmative 1 negligence.' °7 As to trespassers, landowners
need only refrain from willful or wanton conduct .that results in
injury. 01 Willful or wanton describes conduct that is needless and
manifests no rightful purpose; mere recklessness or carelessness does
not rise to the requisite level. 10 9
99. See id
100. See Clarke v. Kerchner, 11 N.C. App. 454,460, 181 S.E.2d 787,791 (1971).
101. See Hood v. Queen City Coach, 249 N.C. 534,540,107 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1959).
102. See id
103. See Ross v. Sterling Drug Stores, 225 N.C. 226, 228, 34 S.E.2d 64, 64-65 (1945).
104. See Clarke, 11 N.C. App. at 460, 181 S.E.2d at 781; DAYE & MORRIs, supra note
1, § 17.32, at 228 (discussing licensees).
105. See Pafford v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 217 N.C. 730,736, 9 S.E.2d 408,412 (1940).
106. Active or affirmative negligence was described by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Dunn v. Bomberger:
The owner is not liable for injuries resulting to a licensee from defects, obstacles
or pitfalls upon the premises unless the owner is affirmatively and actively
negligent in respect to such defect, obstacle or pitfall while the licensee is upon
his premises, resulting in increased hazard and danger to the licensee.
213 N.C. 172, 175, 195 S.E. 364, 367 (1938) (citing Brigman v. Fiske-Carter Constr. Co.,
192 N.C. 791, 136 S.E. 125 (1926)).
107. See Clarke, 11 N.C. App. at 460, 181 S.E.2d at 791 (quoting Dunn, 213 N.C. at 175,
195 S.E. at 367). Professors Daye and Morris have also argued persuasively that North
Carolina landowners owe licensees a duty to warn of hidden perils and dangers of which
the landowner knows and of which the licensee does not know. See DAYE & MORRIS,
supra note 1, § 17.32, at 228.
108. See Brigman, 192 N.C. at 794-95, 136 S.E. at 127. Some cases also speak of
holding landowners liable to trespassers injured by the actively (as opposed to passively)
negligent conduct of the landowner. See id In Brigman, the plaintiff was injured when
the defendant backed into the plaintiff's car with a truck. See id. at 793, 136 S.E. at 126.
The court characterized that conduct as "actual" negligence rather than passive
negligence, which would have resulted if the plaintiff had instead been injured by an
existing condition of the land. See id. at 797, 136 S.E. at 128.
109. See Yates v. J.W. Campbell Elec. Corp., 95 N.C. App. 354, 361, 382 S.E.2d 860,
864 (1989).
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Despite the well-established nature of the rules governing
entrant status and landowners' duty of care, North Carolina courts
have created various distinctions within the rules. As noted by the
majority in Nelson, the common law trichotomy has been plagued by
exceptions and sub-classifications. They have generally taken one of
two forms: (1) entrant status sub-classifications or (2) exceptions to
the landowner's duty of care in certain situations.
Entrant status sub-classifications have often been created
because of certain conduct, or a lack thereof, by the entrant. In
Cupita v. Cannel Country Club, Inc.,110 for example, the court held
that, to the extent that an invitee exceeds the scope of a landowner's
invitation, the invitee is downgraded to the status of licensee. 1'
Cupita involved an orchestra member who was injured when walking
towards the building in which the orchestra was to play.112 As the
plaintiff cut across the Club's lawn, he fell into a hole that he could
not see because it was dark." The court, in denying the plaintiff's
recovery for damages resulting from the fall, noted that the plaintiff
entered the premises as an invitee."4 The landowner thus owed him a
duty to exercise ordinary care, but only while the entrant used the
premises in a manner consistent with the purpose of the invitation." 5
Since the club owners could not have anticipated that the plaintiff
would cut across the lawn, especially in the dark, rather than stay on
marked walking paths, the court classified him as a licensee at the
time he fell in the hole."6
North Carolina courts have further complicated entrant-status
classifications with regard to invitees who merely confer a minor or
incidental benefit on the landowner. In the 1940 case of Pafford v.
J.A. Jones Construction Co.,1v for example, the court indicated that
for an entrant to become an invitee as a result of an implied
invitation, the entrant's purpose "must be of interest or advantage to
the invitor.""' 8 If so, then it is fair to infer an invitation even if one
has not been expressly given."9 Thus in Pafford, a salesman injured
after entering a construction site for which he had not been given an
110. 252 N.C. 346,113 S.E.2d 712 (1960).
111. See id. at 350, 113 S.E.2d at 715.
112. Id. at 348, 113 S.E.2d at 714.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 349,113 S.E.2d at 715.
116. See id. at 350, 113 S.E.2d at 715.
117. 217 N.C. 730, 9 S.E.2d 408 (1940).
118. Id at 735, 9 S.E.2d at 411.
119. See id.
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express invitation to visit was held to be a licensee because he failed
to show that his visit was of any significant advantage to the owner.2
In the 1981 case of Mazzacco v. Purcell,2' however, the court also
required an entrant with an express invitation to show that his visit
conferred more than a minor or incidental benefit on the
landowner.'2 Under Mazzacco, then, the invitee classification
requires that an entrant confer a "direct and substantial" benefit to
the landowner123 If no such benefit is conferred, the entrant is
treated as a licensee irrespective of the express or implied nature of
the invitation."2
Exceptions to landowners' duty of care, like entrant status sub-
classifications, have added a layer of fact-based complexity to the
analysis of premises-liability cases. In Branks v. Kern," for instance,
the court suggested that even though a landowner owes an invitee a
duty of reasonable care, that duty does not apply when the invitee is
injured by an obvious danger-in this case, the plaintiff's own cat,
which was angry after receiving a shot in the defendant veterinarian's
office. 6 Similarly, in Little v. Wilson Oil Corp.,17 a gas station owner
was not required to warn his customer, an invitee, of an obvious
protruding concrete structure.'2
Other exceptions have increased landowners' level of
responsibility to certain entrants. Landowners are often required to
exercise a higher degree of care towards trespassing children, for
example, even where a trespassing adult would not receive the same
treatment by the courts.2 9 Whereas a landowner must ordinarily
refrain only from willfully or wantonly injuring trespassers, children
"'of tender years' ,,130 who trespass and are injured by an "attractive
120. Id. at 736, 9 S.E.2d at 411-12.
121. 303 N.C. 493,279 S.E.2d 583 (1981).
122- See id. at 498, 279 S.E.2d at 587.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. 320 N.C. 621, 359 S.E.2d 780 (1987).
126. See id at 624,359 S.E.2d at 782 ("[lt has long been the law in North Carolina that
there is no duty to warn an invitee of a hazard obvious to any ordinarily intelligent
person.").
127. 249 N.C. 773, 107 S.E.2d 729 (1959).
12& See id. at 777, 107 S.E.2d at 731.
129. See DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 1, § 17.31.2, at 223 (discussing trespassing
children).
130. Dean v. Wilson Constr. Co., 251 N.C. 581,588, 111 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1960) (quoting
65 CJ.S. Negligence § 29(11) (1948)). In Dean, a 14-year-old boy was held to be too old to
benefit from the attractive nuisance doctrine. See id. at 589, 111 S.E.2d at 833. The court
noted that "'the great majority of cases in which [the doctrine] has been applied have
involved children of less than ten years of age.' "Id. at 588, 111 S.E.2d at 833 (quoting 65
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nuisance" are entitled to expect that the landowner will "exercise
reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the
children." '131 Thus, although such children are still classified as
trespassers, an exception is made to the landowner's ordinary duty of
care.
Like North Carolina courts, most other jurisdictions have also
gradually added exceptions and sub-classifications to their premises-
liability common law. 32 Some of these jurisdictions, becoming
increasingly frustrated with the growing complexity, began searching
for alternatives to the common law system in the late 1950s.133
England, the jurisdiction where the trichotomy originated, eliminated
the distinction between licensees and invitees by statute in 1957.1'M
Soon thereafter, the United States Supreme Court refused to extend
the common law classifications to admiralty law, concluding that the
trichotomy's "classifications and subclassifications ... have produced
confusion and conflict."' 35  Furthermore, in the seminal case of
Rowland v. Christian,'36 the California Supreme Court completely
abolished the common law system in favor of a standard of
reasonable care towards all visitors, whether lawful or not.137
Since Rowland, almost two-thirds of United States jurisdictions
have addressed the issue of whether to modify the common law
classification system, with the outcomes falling into one of four
distinct categories. Eight jurisdictions since Rowland have followed
California's lead and completely abolished all common law
classifications in favor of a reasonable care standard towards all
entrants.38  As justification, these jurisdictions cite the outdated
C.J.S. Negligence § 29(11)).
131: Broadway v. Blythe Indus. Inc., 313 N.C. 150, 154, 326 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1985)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339(e) (1965)). The attractive nuisance
doctrine in North Carolina goes back to at least 1908:
We think that the law is sustained upon the theory that the infant who enters
upon premises, having no legal right to do so ... is as essentially a trespasser as
an adult [would be]; but if, to gratify a childish curiosity, or in obedience to a
childish propensity... he goes thereon and is injured by the failure of the owner
to properly guard or cover the dangerous conditions which [the owner] has
created, [the owner] is liable for such injuries ....
Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting and Power Co., 148 N.C. 396,411, 62 S.E. 600,606 (1908).
132. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 494 n.4 (9th ed. 1994).
133. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 621-22,507 S.E.2d at 886.
134. See id. at 620-21, 507 S.E.2d at 885; WADE ET AL., supra note 132, at 493 n.2.
135. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959).
136. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
137. See icL at 568.
138. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Webb
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principles upon which the trichotomy rested, the complexity and
confusion caused by its application, and the harsh and inequitable
results that it produced.139  Fourteen jurisdictions (including North
Carolina in Nelson) have completely eliminated the invitee-licensee
distinction but have either expressly or implicitly retained the
trespasser category."4 These jurisdictions generally acted based on
the same rationales cited by the abolishing jurisdictions, but were not
willing to impose a burden on landowners to anticipate the presence
of trespassers.' 41 Seven jurisdictions since Rowland have altered the
common law categories without abrogating any of them altogether. 42
These jurisdictions found it either unnecessary to abandon the
common law or inappropriate to issue such a sweeping ruling in the
context of a particular case. Finally, twenty-one jurisdictions have
continued to apply the common law system and either have not
v. City of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 733 (Alaska 1977); Pickard v. City of Honolulu, 452 P.2d
445, 446 (Haw. 1969); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367, 371 (La.
1976); Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491, 496 (Mont. 1985); Moody v. Manny's
Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935, 942-43 (Nev. 1994); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634
(N.H. 1976); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868,872 (N.Y. 1976).
139. See, e.g., Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568 (concluding that "continued adherence to the
common law distinctions can only lead to injustice").
140. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/2 (West 1998); Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt, & Ritt, Inc., 581
N.W.2d 602, 606 (Iowa 1998); Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 310 (Kan. 1994); Poulin v.
Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me. 1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43,'51-52
(Mass. 1973); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Minn. 1972); Heins v. Webster
County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb. 1996); Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 879 P.2d 766,
769 (N.M. 1994); Nelson, 349 N.C. at 631-32, 507 S.E.2d at 892; O'Leary v. Coenen, 251
N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977); Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056,
1061-62 (R.I. 1994); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699,703-04 (Tenn. 1984); Antoniewicz
v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Wis. 1975); Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293,296 (Wyo.
1993).
141. See, e.g., Nelson, 346 N.C. at 632, 507 S.E.2d at 892 ("[A]bandoning the status of
trespasser may place an unfair burden on a landowner who has no reason to expect a
trespasser's presence.").
142. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557a (West 1991) (raising social guests to the
invitee level); Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973) (treating licensees by
invitation as invitees); Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639-43 (Ind. 1991) (treating
invited social guests as invitees); Kirschner v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 743 S.W.2d 840,
842-44 (Ky. 1988) (upholding the state constitutionality of a statute defining the standard
of care for trespassers in premises liability cases); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 705
A.2d 1144, 1148-49 (Md. 1998) (distinguishing between licensees by invitation and "bare"
licensees); Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Mo. 1976) (limiting the significance of
categories to entrants whose presence is not known to the landowner); Raguone v.
Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 633 P.2d 1287, 1290-91 (Or. 1980) (rejecting distinction
between "active" and "passive" negligence toward licensees).
143. See, e.g., Wood, 284 So. 2d at 695 (noting that the reasonable care standard is "too
vague and unreasonable a test to apply to a landowner because of the remaining, inherent
distinctions in relationships involved between persons who come upon an owner's
property").
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questioned its continuing validity or have expressly refused to
abrogate the trichotomy."4M For these jurisdictions, the rationales
posed by abolishing jurisdictions are insufficient to abandon years of
existing law. 45
By joining the thirteen other jurisdictions that have eliminated
144. See, e.g., Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Okla. 1990) ("At this time, we do
not find support to depart from the common law principles."); WADE, ET AL., supra note
132, at 494 n.5. The twenty-one jurisdictions are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia. See Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Constr. Co., 658 So.
2d 408, 410 (Ala. 1995) (expressly refusing to abrogate any of the common law
distinctions); Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Ass'n., 941 P.2d 218,
219 n.1 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (noting that the common law system has not been
abrogated, but not directly addressing that issue); Heigle v. Miller, 965 S.W.2d 116, 119
(Ark. 1998) (applying the common law concepts of invitee and licensee); Bailey v.
Pennington, 406 A.2d 44, 47-48 (Del. 1979) (declining to abandon the status and liability
distinctions between invitees, licensees, and trespassers); New Madison S. Ltd. Partnership
v. Gardner, 499 S.E.2d 133, 137-38 (Ga. App. 1998) (applying common law categories of
invitee and licensee), cert. denied, No. S981183, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 844 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1998);
Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 691 P.2d 1208, 1210-11 (Idaho 1984) (declining to abrogate
common law classifications in case where all parties agreed that plaintiff was an invitee);
Reetz v. Tipit, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 653, 654 (Mich. App. 1986) (noting that Michigan has not
abandoned common law classifications), aff'd, 415 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. 1987); Little v. Bell,
719 So. 2d 757, 763 (Miss. 1998) (expressly declining to abandon the common law for a
reasonable care standard); Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1119-20 (N.J.
1993) (not abrogating the common law classifications, but holding real estate brokers to a
reasonable care standard for the protection of potential clients who take tours of homes
for sale); Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 662 N.E.2d 287, 291 (Ohio
1996) (emphasizing Ohio's continued application of common law premises liability);
Pickens v. Tulsa Metro. Ministry, 951 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Okla. 1997) (noting that "we see no
reason ... to abandon ... the common law classification system and its legal
ramifications"); Palange v. City of Philadelphia, 640 A.2d 1305, 1308 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1994)
(declining to abolish the common law distinctions); Nesbitt v. Lewis, No. 2978, 1999 S.C.
App. LEXIS 63, at *8 (S.C. App. Apr. 26, 1999) (applying the common law
classifications); Musch v. H-D Elec. Coop., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 149, 151-52 (S.D. 1990)
(continuing to apply the common law categories); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Management Co.,
690 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. 1985) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring in the result) (noting that the
majority avoided consideration of abrogating the common law premises-liability
classifications); English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153, 156 n.1 (Utah 1993) (emphasizing that
Utah continues to determine duty of care in premises liability cases through use of the
common law categories); Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 799-800 (Vt. 1995) (noting
continued use of the common law categories, particularly that of "business invitee");
Franconia Assocs. v. Clark, 463 S.E.2d 670, 672-74 (Va. 1995) (applying the common law
categories); Younce v. Ferguson, 724 P.2d 991, 995 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (noting that the
"[c]ommon law classifications continue to determine the duty owed by an owner or
occupier of land in Washington"); Self v. Queen, 487 S.E.2d 295,296 (W.Va. 1997) ("[T]he
Court declines to alter the established law relating to licensees and invitees."); see also
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-115(3) (1996 Supp.) (reinstating the common law distinctions).
145. See, e.g., Lohrenz, 787 P.2d at 1277 ("At this time, we do not find support to
depart from the common law principles.... ").
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the licensee-invitee distinction in favor of a reasonable care standard,
the North Carolina Supreme Court in Nelson significantly changed
the landscape of North Carolina premises-liability law.'46 Aside from
the fact that the decision modifies or overrules more than a century of
established common law,147 Nelson has also had an immediate impact
on landowners' liability. Social guests and other related entrants, 4'
both invited and uninvited, are now entitled to the same level of care
as invitees.149 Since a large number of premises-liability cases involve
social guests,50 it seems likely that Nelson's impact will soon be felt in
litigation. Moreover, landowners are now responsible for the
protection of entrants who, prior to Nelson, "exceeded the scope of
their invitation" at their own risk.'5'
The breadth of the Nelson decision is all the more striking given
the circumstances of the case. First, because a jury could have found
that John Nelson was an invitee under the common law trichotomy, it
was not necessary for the court to reverse the summary judgment on
such sweeping grounds. 52 In his amended complaint, Nelson alleged
that he entered the defendant's premises not only at the defendant's
request but also to confer a direct and substantial benefit on
Freeland-a ride to a potential job site where Freeland, who was
unemployed at the time, could potentially earn nine dollars per
146. See Ruling May Make It Easier to Sue Homeowners, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 2, 1999, at A3. Michael Dayton, editor of the North Carolina.
Lawyer's Weekly, was quoted in the article as saying, "'In legal terms, it's as big as the
Beatles.'" Id- (quoting Michael Dayton).
147. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 634, 507 S.E.2d at 893 (Mitchell, C.J., concurring in the
result). Although the court's decision was certainly groundbreaking, there are at least two
reasons why its impact could be substantially curtailed in future decisions. First, the vote
was close-4 to 3-to abolish the common law rules, and the opinion's author, Justice
Wynn, is no longer on the court. See supra note 43. Second, since the jury could have
found Nelson to be an invitee under the common law rules and the court could have so
held, see supra note 72 and accompanying text, the opinion as it applies to licensees might,
in the future, be considered dicta. At the very least, the holding in this case could be
limited in the future to the proposition that only this plaintiff in this particular fact
situation is entitled to the reasonable care standard.
148. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text (discussing licensees).
149. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 631-32, 507 S.E.2d at 892. But see infra note 165 and
accompanying text (questioning whether the standard of care previously applied to
invitees will satisfy the "reasonable care" standard enunciated by the court).
150. See Ruling May Make It Easier to Sue Homeowners, supra note 146, at A3 ("Since
lawsuits brought by social guests are so common, [Michael Dayton] called the 4-3 ruling
one of the half-dozen most significant in civil law in the past decade.").
151. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (explaining that under the common
law system, invitees are treated as licensees to the extent that they exceed their invitations
and are therefore owed a lesser duty of care by landowners).
152 See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 634, 507 S.E.2d at 893 (Mitchell, C.J., concurring in the
result) (noting that a jury could find that the plaintiff was an invitee).
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hour.5 Since summary judgment requires that all reasonable
inferences be drawn in favor of the nonmovant5 4 (Nelson in this
case), the supreme court could have reversed the court of appeals on
the grounds that sufficient evidence existed of the plaintiff's
beneficial purpose for entering the premises to allow a jury to decide
his status. 55
Second, the broad ruling issued by the majority was not
requested. Neither the defendant nor the plaintiff ever asked for a
change in the common law of premises-liability.5 In their briefs to
both the court of appeals and the supreme court, both parties argued
the case using common law principles.5 7 Neither party's brief
contained even a passing suggestion that the court make a change in
the law as sweeping as abolition of the licensee-invitee distinction.158
The court also did not have the benefit of oral arguments on the
subject.159 Moreover, neither the majority nor the dissent in the court
of appeals alluded to, and certainly did not argue for, abrogation of
the common law. 6 Indeed, it does not appear that any North
Carolina court has ever requested such a change.16'
Despite the majority opinion's seemingly simple solution to the
153. See Amended Complaint at 13, Nelson (No. COA97-1120); Deposition at 23,
Nelson (No. COA97-1120).
154. See Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375,378,218 S.E.2d 379,381 (1975).
155. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 634, 507 S.E.2d at 893 (Mitchell, C.J., concurring in the
result).
156. See id.
157. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 4, Nelson (No. COA97-1120) ("The question
arises as to whether, at the time of the accident, plaintiff was on the porch as an invitee or
merely a licensee."); Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 4, Nelson (No. 216A98) (arguing
that a material issue of fact existed as to the plaintiff's status); Defendants-Appellees'
Brief at 4, Nelson (No. COA97-1120) (describing the issue as whether "a person who picks
up a friend on the way to work [is] an invitee on his friend's property"); Defendant-
Appellees' Brief at 4, Nelson (No. 216A98) (same).
158 See supra note 157 (listing briefs).
159. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 634, 507 S.E.2d at 893 (Mitchell, C.J., concurring in the
result).
160. See Nelson, No. COA97-1120, slip op. at 1-5; id. at 1-3 (Walker, J., dissenting),
161. As support for its statement in Nelson that "our cases show that the trichotomy is
no longer viable because of ... the numerous exceptions and subclassifications engrafted
into it," Nelson, 349 N.C. at 630, 507 S.E.2d at 891, the majority opinion pointed out that
"[ilndeed, our Court of Appeals noted that 'the relevant cases tend to illustrate exceptions
to the general rule rather than the rule itself.' Id- (quoting Hockaday v. Morse, 57 N.C.
App. 109, 111, 290 S.E.2d 763, 765, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 384, 294 S.E.2d 209 (1982)).
In Hockaday, however, the court was addressing only one narrow aspect of premises
liability, specifically whether a person visiting a registered hotel guest is an invitee along
with the guest. See Hockaday, 57 N.C. App. at 111, 290 S.E.2d at 765. Thus, consistent
with other North Carolina courts before Nelson, the Hockaday court was not suggesting
that premises-liability cases in general illustrated exceptions rather than the general rules.
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"complexity" of the common law system, Nelson may be even more
significant for the questions that it leaves unanswered. For example,
unlike other courts that have abolished the licensee-invitee
distinction, the majority opinion in Nelson offered no guidelines for
instructing juries under the new reasonable care standard.162 Justice
Wynn remanded the case only with instructions that the jury
"determine whether defendant Freeland fulfilled his duty of
reasonable care under the circumstances." 63 It is not clear, then,
what types of factors, if any, the jury may consider when determining
if a landowner has exercised reasonable care. 64
More importantly, the scope of the "reasonable care" standard
itself is unclear after Nelson. The case leaves open the question of
whether the duty includes everything from the former invitee duty of
care, or something less, or perhaps more. For example, it is unclear
whether "reasonable care" will require a landowner to warn lawful
entrants of obvious dangers, a duty not previously required under the
former invitee standard of care. 6 5
Finally, by retaining the trespasser category, the court may have
significantly undermined its goal of creating a less "complex and
confusing" premises-liability law. 66 Because the effect of Nelson is to
improve the position of former licensees, the distinction between
licensees and trespassers may now take on even greater
162. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 631-33, 507 S.E.2d at 892-93. In contrast, in Sheets v. Ritt,
Ritt, & Rit, Inc., the Iowa Supreme Court offered the following guidance for judges when
instructing juries as to the adequate exercise of reasonable care:
Among the factors to be considered ... will be: (1) the foreseeability or
possibility of harm; (2) the purpose for which the entrant entered the premises;
(3) the time, manner, and circumstances under which the entrant entered the
premises; (4) the use to which the premises are put or are expected to be put; (5)
the reasonableness of the inspection, repair, or warning; (6) the opportunity and
ease of repair or correction or giving of the warning; and (7) the burden on the
land occupier and/or community in terms of inconvenience or cost in providing
adequate protection.
581 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Iowa 1998) (citing Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57
(Neb. 1996)).
163. Id. at 633, 507 S.E.2d at 893.
164. The lack of guidelines in Nelson is particularly striking because in ordinary
negligence cases-toward which the majority opinion purports to be moving- "the judge
must instruct the jury as to what specific acts or omissions under the pleadings and
evidence can be found by the jury to constitute negligence." DAYE & MORRIS, supra note
1, § 16.30, at 136.
165. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (discussing duty of care owed to
invitees).
166. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 57 (Mass. 1973) (Kaplan, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that keeping the trespasser category "tends to perpetuate ... the
kind of... mistaken analysis that... the court was aiming to correct").
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significance.167 Thus, it will still be necessary in many cases for courts
to apply the common law trespasser and licensee rules to determine
an entrant's status."6 Moreover, since the duty of care is much less
stringent towards trespassers,169 courts will still have to apply different
standards based on the status of the entrant. Consider, for instance,
the following scenario cited by the majority opinion in Nelson as
illustrating the confusion produced by the common law trichotomy:
A real estate agent trespasses onto an owner's land to determine the
value of adjoining land.7 0 The owner sees him and the two begin
talking, first about business, then socially.' 71 After Nelson, at what
point, if any, does the landowner's duty of reasonable care begin? Is
it when the owner first sees the real estate agent, or is it when they
are talking? The majority opinion offers no guidance as to when, if at
all, an unlawful entrant, protected only to the extent of the common
law, can become a lawful entrant who is protected by the new
standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. 72
Despite the opinion's landmark holding, the court's reasoning is
not as compelling as the significance of the decision would seem to
require. The court engages in a form of what one commentator has
termed "decisional litany,"'7 in which language from other abolishing
jurisdictions was "plucked" from those courts' opinions and used
without significantly analyzing its relevance or applicability to North
Carolina law or conditions. For example, one justification used by
the court in abolishing the trichotomy is that it is no longer viable in
"modem times."'74  The court recites conclusory language from
several other jurisdictions suggesting that the common law system
167. See, e.g., Douglas Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MOD. L. REV. 359, 360
(1958) (discussing the effect of England's decision to abolish only the licensee-invitee
distinction); see also supra notes 87-97 (defining the two common law categories of
licensee and trespasser).
168. See Payne, supra note 167, at 360.
169. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing the duty of care owed to
trespassers).
170. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 627,507 S.E.2d at 889-90.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 632, 507 S.E.2d at 892 (retaining the trespasser category but offering no
guidance as to its future application).
173. Daye, supra note 1, at 361. Professor Daye defines "'decisional litany'" as "the
practically verbatim repetition of language from prior cases in subsequent judicial
opinions without sufficient inquiry into the adequacy and appropriateness of the language
as applied to the case at hand." Id. at 361. This Note uses the term to describe the court's
recitation of language from jurisdictions other than North Carolina without sufficient
inquiry as to its appropriateness.
174. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 626,507 S.E.2d at 889.
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was better suited for a rural society.'75 The court does not attempt,
however, to explain or elaborate why this justification applies with as
much force in North Carolina, a state which is still largely rural with
pockets of urban areas, as it does in the jurisdictions from which the
court "plucks" the language.176 Neither does the court attempt to
explain where the line should be drawn in order to determine that
society is "modern" enough to abolish or substantially modify
decades of existing law.'77
A second justification "plucked" from other jurisdictions is that
the common law system has "'produced confusion and conflict.' "178
Although the majority opinion discusses three North Carolina
premises-liability cases with seemingly conflicting holdings,79 the
opinion offers no further North Carolina case law analysis. 180 Instead,
the majority opinion notes several cases that have produced dissents,
which "evidence[] that the trichotomy fails to clearly articulate a
landowner's standard of care."'' In six of the seven cases cited by the
court, however, the majority and the dissent agreed as to the entrant's
status.1' 2 Rather, most of the disputes centered on application of the
175. See, e.g., id. at 621-22, 507 S.E.2d at 886 (" '[i]t is clear that those distinctions are
not justified in the light of our modem society.'" (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d
561, 567 (Cal. 1968))). The majority opinion relied on judicial opinions in at least five
other jurisdictions (New York, New Hampshire, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts,
and Florida), concerning the supposedly outdated, tradition-bound principles undergirding
the common law system. See id. at 626-27, 507 S.E.2d at 889.
176. See id. at 621-27,507 S.E.2d at 886-89.
177. See id
178. Id. at 627, 507 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959)).
179. See il at 29-30, 507 S.E.2d at 891 (citing Crane v. Caldwell, 113 N.C. App. 362,
438 S.E.2d 449 (1994); Briles v. Briles, 43 N.C. App. 575, 259 S.E.2d 393 (1979); Beaver v.
Lefler, 8 N.C. App. 574, 174 S.E.2d 806 (1970)). As even the court points out, however,
any inconsistency produced by these three cases resulted from a narrow issue with respect
to invitees-the scope of the "direct and substantial benefit" test. See id. It seems
inappropriate to characterize the entire common law system as complex and confusing on
the basis of cases that address only one narrow, and admittedly confused, issue.
180. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 631-33, 507 S.E.2d at 892-93.
181. Id. at 631, 507 S.E.2d at 892.
182- See id. (citing Roumillat v. Simplistic Enters., 331 N.C. 57, 69, 414 S.E.2d 339, 345
(1992) (Frye, J., dissenting); Pulley v. Rex Hosp., 326 N.C. 701, 709, 392 S.E.2d 380, 385
(1990) (Meyer, J., dissenting); Goldman v. Kossove, 253 N.C. 370, 374, 117 S.E.2d 35, 38
(1960) (Moore, J., dissenting); Gray v. Small, 104 N.C. App. 222, 224, 408 S.E.2d 538, 539
(1991) (Phillips, J., dissenting), afj'fd per curiam, 331 N.C. 279, 415 S.E.2d 362 (1992);
McIntosh v. Carefree Carolina Communities, Inc., 98 N.C. App. 653, 657, 391 S.E.2d 851,
853 (1990) (Greene, J., dissenting), rev'd per curiam, 328 N.C. 87, 399 S.E.2d 114 (1991);
Starr v. Clapp, 40 N.C. App. 142, 148, 252 S.E.2d 220, 223 (1979) (Hedrick, J., dissenting);
Smith v. VonCannon, 17 N.C. App. 438, 440, 194 S.E.2d 362, 364 (Brock, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 283 N.C. 656, 197 S.E.2d 524 (1973)). Although McIntosh involved a dispute as to
whether entrant classification is a matter of law or fact, only Smith involved a dispute
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standard of care for summary judgment purposes, 1' which will
continue to be a source of conflict for as long as summary judgment is
available in negligence cases. Moreover, in ninety-two North
Carolina premises-liability cases from 1908 until 1998 involving the
licensee-invitee distinction, only eleven produced a dissent.'" Of
those eleven dissents, only two involved a dispute as to an entrant's
proper classification. 18 5
Finally, the majority rested a substantial part of its opinion on its
perception of a trend toward abolishing the invitee-licensee
distinction and abolishing the trichotomy altogether.'86 Of the eleven
jurisdictions cited by the court as having "completely eliminated" all
distinctions since Rowland,'"7 however, only eight have actually done
so. Iowa, cited by the court as a complete abrogation state, only
abolished the invitee-licensee distinction.88 The court also cited
Illinois, only parenthetically noting in a string of citations that the
particular case it cited abolished the distinctions only with respect to
children; in effect, the Illinois court merely adopted a form of the
attractive nuisance doctrine. 189  Furthermore, in Colorado, the
about the classification itself.
183. See Roumillat, 331 N.C. at 69, 414 S.E.2d at 345 (Frye, J., dissenting); Pulley, 326
N.C. at 711, 392 S.E.2d at 387 (Meyer, J., dissenting); Goldman, 253 N.C. at 374, 117
S.E.2d at 38 (Moore, J., dissenting); Gray, 104 N.C. App. at 224, 408 S.E.2d at 539
(Phillips, J., dissenting); McIntosh, 98 N.C. App. at 657, 391 S.E.2d at 853 (Greene, J.,
dissenting).
184. Search of WESTLAW, NC-CS database (Aug. 25, 1999) (using "Licensee AND
Invitee" as the search term). The NC-CS database includes all North Carolina Supreme
Court cases from 1887 through slip opinions and all North Carolina Court of Appeals
decisions from 1968 (inception) through slip opinions. The search produced 95 total cases.
Of these, three cases were decided in 1999 and five cases, although including both of the
words "licensee" and "invitee," only indirectly involved premises-liability issues. A case
was counted as containing a "dissent" only if an actual dissent appeared in the reported
opinion.
185. See icL The two cases involving dissents over entrant categories are Newton v. New
Hanover County Board of Education, 114 N.C. App. 719,443 S.E.2d 347 (1994) (involving
a dispute over the appropriate common law classification of police officers), and McIntosh
v. Carefree Carolina Communities, Inc., 98 N.C. App. 653,391 S.E.2d 851 (1990) (involving
a dispute over whether classification decision is matter of law or fact).
186. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 618-23,507 S.E.2d at 884-87.
187. See id. at 622, 507 S.E.2d at 886.
18& See Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt & Pitt, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Iowa 1998) ("We do not
decide whether a distinction should persist with regard to trespassers.").
189. See Keller v. Mols, 472 N.E.2d 161, 161 (Ill. App. 1984). The North Carolina
Supreme Court also did not address the fact that the Illinois legislature abolished the
common-law licensee-invitee distinction with respect to children and adults effective
September 12, 1984, leaving intact the distinction as to trespassers. See 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 130/2 (West 1998). The legislature amended the act in 1995 to define more clearly
the duty of reasonable care owed to former licensees and invitees. See id. Specifically, the
legislature excluded from the duty of reasonable care any duty to warn of known, open, or
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legislature reinstated the distinctions more than nine years ago,' at
one point citing the "unpredictable and inequitable results"'191 of the
reasonable care standard.
Of the fourteen cases the court cited as having "repudiated" the
invitee-licensee distinction, an analysis reveals that only eleven of
those cases actually abolished the distinction.'" For example, in a
Florida case cited by the majority opinion, the Florida Supreme Court
specifically stated that "we continue the category of licensees who are
uninvited, that is, persons who choose to come upon the premises
solely for their own convenience."' 93 Thus, Florida continues to have
three categories: invitees, uninvited licensees, and trespassers.94
Additionally, although the court cited an Oregon case as repudiating
the distinction, the Oregon Supreme Court emphasized that "there is
no need for this court to address the issue whether, or to what extent,
the invitee-licensee dichotomy should be abrogated."' 95 The North
Carolina court also did not note distinctions in the precedential value
of some of the cases cited. In Massachusetts and New Mexico, for
instance, the cases cited did modify the common law licensee-invitee
distinctions but the courts acknowledged that the cases could be
decided under the common law. 96 Another jurisdiction cited by the
court, Rhode Island, is retreating from its initial complete abrogation
of all common law distinctions.Y In 1994, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court reinstated the trespasser distinction and left open whether it
would at some point reinstate the invitee and licensee categories as
obvious dangers, the duty to warn of hidden dangers unknown to the landowner, and the
duty to warn of dangers caused by the entrant's own misuse of the premises. See id.
190. See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 622 n.2, 507 S.E.2d at 886 n.2 (citing COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-115(3) (Supp. 1996)).
191. Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856, 861 (Colo. 1989) (discussing the legislative
history of statute).
192 See Nelson, 349 N.C. at 622, 507 S.E.2d at 886-87. The three cases cited by the
court that did not actually abolish the invitee-licensee distinction were Wood v. Camp, 284
So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973), Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Flippo, 705 A.2d 1144, 1148-49
(Md. 1998), and Ragnone v. Portland School District No. 1J, 633 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Or.
1980). However, with the addition of North Carolina in Nelson and of Illinois and Iowa,
which were misclassified as having abolished the trichotomy altogether, there are in fact
fourteen states that have abolished the invitee-licensee distinction. See supra notes 140
(listing all states that have abolished the invitee-licensee distinction), 188-89 (discussing
the misclassification of Iowa and Illinois).
193. Wood, 284 So. 2d at 695.
194. See id.
195. Ragnone, 633 P.2d at 1291.
196. See Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 47 (Mass. 1973); Ford v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 879 P.2d 766,768-69 (N.M. 1994).
197. See Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056,1062 (R.I. 1994).
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well. 98
Within the past twelve to fifteen years, the trend actually has
been to "uphold the traditional common law categories.' '199 Several
courts have either refused to abolish the distinctions even when
presented with an opportunity to do so, 00 or have continued applying
them without questioning their vitality. 0 ' Twenty-eight jurisdictions
now fall into the category of courts that have neither completely
abrogated all distinctions nor completely abrogated the licensee-
invitee distinction. 2
In Nelson, the North Carolina Supreme Court could have done
what a majority of United States jurisdictions have apparently
concluded is best: improve the common law premises-liability scheme
without abolishing substantial portions of the trichotomy. One
method is to reclassify as invitees those entrants whom the landowner
by express or implied invitation induces or leads to come onto the
property for any lawful purpose; licensees would thus be lawful, but
uninvited, entrants.2 3 Trespassers would differ from licensees insofar
as a trespasser enters premises with no legal right at all.204 Licensees
and invitees would thus be classified based upon the degree to which
the landowner could reasonably anticipate any given lawful visitor.
The "direct and substantial" benefit test, which the court criticized in
Nelson, would no longer control an entrant's classification. This
would eliminate much of the confusion (to the extent it exists) in the
case law regarding entrant status.20 5
In light of the suggested reclassifications above, the court could
have kept intact the current duty of care owed by a landowner to each
198. See id. at 1062 ("We decline to comment on the other aspects of the holding in
Mariorenzi as no issues involving invitees or licensees are before us.").
199. Id. at 1060.
200. See, e.g., Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Okla. 1990) ("It is not reasonable
to impose on a landowner the burden of eliminating all possible sources of injury which
may exist on his property.").
201. See, e.g., New Madison S. Ltd. Partnership v. Gardner, 499 S.E.2d 133, 137-38 (Ga.
App. 1998) (applying common law categories of invitee and licensee), cert. denied, No.
S981183, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 844 (Ga. Sept. 11, 1998).
202. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (noting that seven jurisdictions have
altered but not abandoned any of the common-law distinctions); supra note 144 and
accompanying text (noting that 21 jurisdictions have completely retained their common-
law framework without alterations).
203. See, e.g., Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 694 (Fla. 1973) (distinguishing licensees
by the nature of the invitation).
204. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text (discussing trespassers and
licensees).
205. See, e.g., Nelson, 349 N.C. at 629-30,507 S.E.2d at 891 (criticizing the benefit test).
2400 [Vol. 77
LANDOWNER LIABILITY
category of entrant,26 but with one modification. With respect to all
categories, the court could have required landowners to warn entrants
of hidden dangers or perils of which the landowner is aware but the
entrant is not, as long as the landowner knows or reasonably should
know of the entrant's presence. 7 Such a doctrine would merely
extend the current duty to warn invitees2°8 (and arguably licensees209)
to all categories of entrants. Thus, once the landowner is or should be
aware of the presence of an entrant, he would be required at a
minimum to warn the entrant of hidden perils.
By merely modifying the common law categories and standards
of care, the court could have achieved a better balance between the
privilege historically accorded to landowners to the free use of their
land210 and the responsibility to protect entrants from harm that can
be reasonably anticipated. 21' By resting 'the relevant distinction
between invitees and licensees upon the nature of the invitation itself,
the privilege of land ownership would be burdened by its attendant
responsibility only to the degree that the landowner could anticipate
an entrant's presence. Furthermore, by requiring a landowner to
warn of hidden dangers to all entrants of whose presence he is or
should be aware, the court could have recognized that the privilege of
land ownership cannot overcome the landowner's social responsibility
to prevent an entrant from proceeding into danger that the landowner
can easily prevent 12
In conclusion, there is ample evidence that North Carolina's
common law premises-liability system needs to be clarified. Indeed,
as one court has noted, "[w]ith social change must come change in the
206. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text (discussing the common law duties
of care).
207. See, e.g., Daye, supra note 1, at 364 (noting that no North Carolina Supreme Court
case has held against such a rule).
208. See Ross v. Sterling Drug Stores, 225 N.C. 226,228,34 S.E.2d 64, 64-65 (1945).
209. See Daye, supra note 1, at 364-71 (arguing that such a rule may exist as to
licensees).
210. See, e.g., Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Wis. 1975) (Hansen, J.,
dissenting) ("The concept that-'a man's home is his castle' has deeper roots [than even
feudal times], and can hardly be said ... to have 'long since vanished.' "). Indeed, just
because society becomes more "modem" does not mean that the privacy enjoyed by one
who owns a home or land becomes any less private. Although it may be correct to note
that the ownership of land in itself is not as "deeply rooted" in our culture as it once was,
the privacy of the land we do own is deeply rooted in our present culture. See id.
211. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561,568 (Cal. 1968).
212. See, e.g., Daye, supra note 1, at 363 ("[I]t is difficult to believe that the law would
countenance a landowner's failure to warn [an entrant] whom the landowner saw about to
walk onto the covering of a concealed well, when the landowner knew the covering was
rotten and would not support the weight of a person.").
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law. 2 13 But change does not necessarily require abrogation. The
Nelson court abolished over a century of existing law to reach a result
that could have been achieved on much narrower grounds. For the
North Carolina Supreme Court, Nelson is a missed opportunity to
improve a venerable area of the common law. For the General
Assembly, it is a golden opportunity to strike the best possible
balance between both the privilege and the responsibility of land
ownership in a modem society.
PHILLIP JOHN STRACH
213. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691,696 (Fla. 1973).
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